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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the historical roots of scientific medicine in an 
effort to highlight the lack of humanist intersubjectivity within the 
contemporary medical model. The study notes that contemporary medicine 
is overtly scientific and that its scientific framework is upheld and 
furthered by a medical model which draws legitimation from the 
irrefutability of what is referred to variously within this work, as its 
scientific "regime". It is shown that in terms of the humanist 
tradition people, not science, constitute the epicentre of meaningful 
experiential participation in the defining of human social reality. 
This, it is argued, implies a radically different ontology from other 
sociological perspectives on medicine. 
The thesis suggests that the contemporary medical model loses sight of 
the patient's ability to cognitively participate in the defining of 
illness, diagnosis and treatment in terms of his/her experience thereof , 
and argues that contemporary medicine, by advancing the idea that it 
alone has the correct and only answer to such problems, has led to a 
situation which promotes an overmedicalisation of society . The study 
gives an indication of the way in which this overmedicalisation has led 
to areas of human life becoming conceived of only in relation to medical 
expertise. In this respect it is noted that medicine has so successfully 
infiltrated the human consciousness (involving areas as diverse as 
childbirth, genetic engineering, transplant surgery and death), that 
decisions on health are invariably taken from a foundation of scientific 
legitimation which seems to exclude the patient as subject. It is 
argued that this way of making decisions reinforces the requirement for 
a scientific medical model which as it negates the human element 
insidiously amplifies its power over human life; thereby devaluing the 
very people it seeks to serve. 
The thesis suggests that in terms of a humanist reading of the 
Oath of Hippocrates, medical decisions can only be taken within a 
framework of experiential involvement which includes both medical 
expertise and lay understanding. It is indicated that when this 
happens, social reality functions in terms of a symbolic participation 
which fosters a commitment to equalise the conditions of human 
existence, and promotes a dialogical negotiatory process which is both 
intersubjectively and ongoingly produced. 
To 
THE PATIENT 
The often overlooked 
"Third Party" 
in the 
Sacred 
Doctor-Disease Relationship 
Andrew C Twaddle (1981) 
For Ashley Cliffe and the 12th May 1987 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The study which follows is an attempt to offer a critical 
evaluation of the theoretical literature within medical sociology 
and to indicate a humane way of defining illness, diagnosis and 
treatment by locating these concepts within an intersubjective 
humanist framework. 
In order to search the concept intersubjectivity within the 
medical model, the thesis probes the hypoth~sis that 
the scientific mechanistic medical model (with its adherence to 
reductionist technology), is unable to facilitate the personal 
ongoing meaningmaking and world construction desirous of 
intersubjective living and healing . 
The study examines in depth the concept of intersubjectivity as it 
appears within the sociological literature, and the theoretical 
component of the study proceeds to search its theoretical lineage. 
This is achieved by indicating that the concept of 
intersubjectivity is not satisfactorily accounted for within the 
sociological theoretical approaches to society of both the 
conflict and systems perspectives. And conversely, it is argued 
that the humanist perspective provides a coherent outline of how 
the concept can be seen to account for meaningmaking in terms of 
humanism. It will be shown that within the humanist tradition, the 
concept of intersubjectivity implies a radically different 
ontology from that of the systems and conflict perspectives. 
Chapter one offers a brief examination of the theoretical 
traditions of the systems, conflict and humanist perspectives. In 
the systems tradition the work of Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons 
and Jeffrey Alexander will be read, and an effort will be made to 
indicate that any notion of intersubjectivity becomes subverted by 
what might be termed "consensual overlap" . 
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The chapter moves from what can broadly be defined as the 
traditional aspects of systems theory, through to the more modern 
representations of the systems tradition . In this way it will be 
shown that the potentiality for a negotiational platform of 
choices and alternatives is occluded by a view which sees human 
interaction in tones of role performance (in accordance with the 
systems view). 
Within the conflict tradition, a brief examination of the work of 
Karl Marx, Ralf Oahrendorf and Jurgen Habermas will be undertaken, 
in order to seek to show that intersubjectivity (broadly defined) 
is here seen in terms of the way individual realities are framed 
by the power structures within society which appear 
non-questionable. In this tradition the power structures are 
perceived as the poles around which human intersubjectivity 
becomes swamped by either the interests of the group, dominant 
role positions or the power of what Habermas terms a distortion of 
communication . 
Within the humanist tradition, chapter one utilises the work of 
George Herbert Mead and Alfred Schutz in order to base the 
humanist perspective in its traditional roots. In this section it 
will be indicated that the humanist perspective locates people as 
creatively involved in constructing a meaningful lifeworld. This 
is shown to mean that the emphasis within the humanist tradition 
is upon intersubjective meaningmaking which takes into account 
both the human possession of self-consciousness and the 
experiential participatory elements necessary to understand 
humanist social reality. It is indicated that within the humanist 
perspective the possession of self-consciousness suggests a 
potential for reflexive debate between alternative viewpoints . 
And, furthermore, an inherent intentionality to revise meaning 
structures in the light of various options which present during 
interaction . 
Chapter one then moves on to note the fraility of the concept 
intersubjectivity within the sociological literature pertaining to 
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the systems and conflict traditions. This so called fraility is 
indicated to take the form of a lack of human meaningmaking and 
worldconstruction . The humanist tradition is then utilised in 
order to locate intersubjectivity in humanist terms and lays the 
foundation for chapter two which attempts an in-depth account of 
modern humanist theory. An effort is made at various stages of 
these reading to locate particular theoretical perspectives within 
the medical setting in order to show that medicine in terms of a 
scientific regime, is incapable of allowing for people's true 
meaningmaking potential and thereby can be argued to obstruct 
humanist intersubjective living. 
The discussion of the conflict, systems and humanist perspectives 
undertaken in chapter one, serve as a basis from which to present 
the development of contemporary humanist theory in relation to the 
concept of intersubjectivity. Hence, in chapter two, the study 
proceeds to examine (so defined) humanist authors' ideas on 
intersubjectivity and related concepts. 
Chapter two builds a narrative account of intersubjectivity as it 
appears through the work of variously defined contemporary 
humanist authors. The aim is to construct a theoretical framework 
with which to utilise and extrapolate the arguments of humanist 
oriented theorists. This examination is undertaken in order to 
show how the term intersubjectivity can be defined in such a way 
as to take account of the human meaningmaking and world-
construction activities operating in society . In this regard it 
will be indicated that certain theorists have pointed to the way 
in which intersubjectivity may become distorted or constrained in 
society. And it is thereby argued, that according to the humanist 
perspective the concept of power may be considered in terms of a 
distortion of interaction . Later in the thesis an attempt is made 
to utilise the framework thus developed to examine this so called 
distortion of intersubjective living, both within contemporary 
medicine and within society. 
Chapter two uses the concepts developed within the work of, inter 
alia, Jean-Paul Sartre, Peter Berger, Richard Brown, Cornie Alant 
and Norma Romm, and addresses in depth the implications of seeing 
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social reality as intersubjective in humanist terms . Habermas and 
Michel Foucault's analyses of power are also read and 
"humani st ically" interpreted. Foucault's argument is used to 
highlight the insidious mechanism of power in society . His theory 
indicates that "power structures" so successfully control people's 
lives that the power mechanisms themselves can be disposed of, 
leaving people controlling themselves. Habermas's argument is 
presented here in order to draw on the critical marxist theory of 
power as constrained or restricted interaction (communication) . It 
will be shown that Habermas's theory differs from the orthodox 
marxist view and from the Dahrendorf focus on role positions as 
the basis of power, allowing for the argument to be advanced that 
this position may be seen to concur with the humanist focus on 
intersubjectivity. (By using certain of the ideas of Habermas and 
inflecting with the positions of specific "humanist" authors in 
contemporary sociology, it is hoped to show how this concurrence 
can be effected . ) 
In this way the argument thus offered opposes a definition of 
illness which regards the medical scientific model as 
un -questionable and its view of diagnostic power as something 
which can only be defined by experts . And it promotes the idea 
that intersubjectivity (as humanists have defined the term), 
implies a specific definition of how reality becomes constructed . 
It is argued that all such construction takes place in 
consciousness in the belief that meanings cannot be defined 
outside of people ' s meaning structures . Meaningmaking is shown to 
function within a negotiational arena and assumes social reality 
to be symbolic and dialogical in essence . Furthermore, 
meaningmaking is indicated to be an ongoing process which is 
experiential (rather than given) and therefore in continual flux . 
Ongoing meaningmaking i s in turn shown to imply that knowledge of 
illness (or for that matter, diagnosis and treatment) may be seen 
as something which is experientially constructed by people rather 
than something which can be known through what might be termed 
biological facts . These concepts are indicated to be negotiable 
rather than given and are therefore, in terms of the humanist 
perspective, re-definable, precarious and incomplete . 
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Once these concepts have been developed, the framework is provided 
to consider the absence of intersubjectivity within contemporary 
medicine. 
Chapter 3 looks at the scientific medical model, its historical 
roots and its evolution as a mechanistic scientific regime which 
has promoted legitimisation of the view that patients need to rely 
on the expertise of the medical profession without becoming 
meaningfully involved. It is suggested that the contemporary 
medical model functions upon what appears to be the irrefutability 
of scientific facts. In this way scientific medicine is pr~ffered 
to have the one and only right answer to illness, diagnosis and 
treatment and, furthermore, can be argued to occlude humanist 
intersubjectivity by blocking people's potential to take part, or 
to take what Sartre calls co-responsibility for one's own 
condition . Responsibility and the potential to meaningfully take 
part therein, become stifled by an oppressive medical regime. 
It is this stifling process which causes Ivan Illich to argue that 
a radical monopoly is being promoted by the medical profession 
which feeds upon itself and cultivates an elitist power that 
becomes a malignancy . In this way the assumptions within the 
medical model denote expertise as having access to the truth 
rather than to acknowledging that there can be no one right answer 
to anything outside of people's consciousness . The concept of 
choice in relation to intersubjectivity is therefore explored in 
the context of its implications for defining reality (and the 
realities of illness), not in terms of truth , but in terms of 
people's need to make sense of the world around them. 
It is indicated that within the literature on medical sociology a 
differentiation still seems to be made between illness, treatment 
and diagnosis in terms of an elitist prescription of who has 
knowledge. Whilst in terms of the humanist tradition these 
concepts can have no status or life devoid of the meanings that 
people apply to them. It is noted that in interactionist type 
theories within medical sociology, the presumption is made that 
within the interactional setting patients can interact, or even 
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negotiate what might be called certain possibilities of how to 
relate or respond to the condition of sickness. 
But the point which invariably seems to be missed is that at the 
very outset the definition of the sickness is itself a negotiable 
construct. It is, therefore, according to humanism, not ' the 
prerogative of either party to define how the person is classified 
as sick in the first place. Thereby, both patient symptom and 
elitist specialist knowledge should not be taken as given: both 
need to be subjected to intersubjective negotiation. Or otherwise 
stated, what should take place is what Veronica McKay (1990) 
refers to as a status shift which denotes an equalising of 
knowledge between parties. In this way the doctor's specialist 
medical knowledge becomes available to the layperson, and the 
patient's personal knowledge of a particular condition becomes 
available to the doctor. This means that all available knowledge, 
both scientific and personal, enter into the interactional forum 
and provide a "mingling" of what can be termed the "sum" of 
knowledge. 
By recognising that the doctor does not have sole prerogative to 
diagnose - a prerogative which presupposes a rigidified base, the 
study suggests that within medical sociology to date there has 
been no attempt to uncover the process of constructing the very 
definition of illness . The sociological relevance of 
intersubjectivity applied to the domain of medicine therefore 
indicates how this concept, in offering a radically different 
epistemology or way of seeing social reality as humanly 
constructed, contests scientific truth as possessing the only 
right answers . It is argued that such truths have become 
legitimised by doctor and patient alike as the only definition 
possible, and that this state of affairs is due to' what can be 
termed an infiltration of people's consciousness by the inherent 
prerogative within the medical model. 
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The study suggests that the currently accepted definition within 
medicine of illness , treatment and diagnosis, rather than being 
complete, is merely one alternative in a fluid matrix of options . 
It is argued that control is exercised by the medical fraternity 
over the symbolic worldconstruction of the sick, and by promoting 
a definition of illness in terms of something that the patient 
passively suffers and the doctor solves with dominant expert 
elitist knowledge, thus fails to take account of intersubjective 
meaningmaking and therefore fails in humane terms . 
By suggesting that illness can be considered i n intersubjective 
terms, the study seeks to offer an alternative to currently 
dominant medical ideology (ideology in this study is defined 
[after Habermas) as distorted intersubjectivity) , and to indicate 
that no one way of seeing can be considered "healthy". The 
suggestion is made that rigidified meaning patterns have become 
established within the scientific medical model, and that actors 
should - rather than passively accept what can now be termed the 
"status quo" of medical elitism - be encouraged to recognise the 
relativity of their own particular point of view. And , 
furthermore, to envisage that this viewpoint is an open invitation 
for further debate . 
What should be occurring is a fluid matrix of ideas which form a 
platform for negotiational discourse - a platform which does not 
encourage the belief that members of the medical profession are 
genies who not only know what illness is , but who are the only 
people who know what to do about it . It is argued rather , that 
what is needed is a forum which establishes the potential of 
patient and doctor alike to participate in the very definition of 
illness, diagnosis and treatment, through an intersubjective 
dialogical encounter. This points to what can be called the need 
for confrontational negotiation in the field. 
Via a consideration and interpretation of various theorists within 
each perspective, the suggestion is made that the mechanistic, 
reductionist contemporary medical model is too scientific in 
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application . It is noted that an explanation of humanist 
sociology (with reference to intersubjective dialogical living), 
by defining intersubjectivity in humanist terms, takes up the 
ideas of Cornie Alant & Norma Romm (1990) and draws attention to 
the notion that human subjectivity does not indicate an 
exclusively individual or private experience of the world . All 
such experience is noted to be already imbued with knowledge that 
is shared with other people. Therefore, it is indicated that 
although people live in a shared world they experience the world 
in original ways. These shared and original aspects of human 
experience pOint to the notion that humans in possessing 
self-consciousness have the capacity to give different meanings to 
the so called same world. According to this view, humans are 
intersubjectively linked : they take account of the shared world 
and at the same time acknowledge that their personal experiences 
of the world cannot be understood in isolation. 
In Chapter 4 the theoretical framework of humanist 
intersubjectiv i ty developed in chapter two, and the contemporary 
medical model developed in chapter three, are brought face-to-face 
in order to offer a critique of the so called over scientific 
medical model . The juxtaposed positions are shown to indicate 
that there is an occlusion· of intersubjectivity within the 
consciousness of those adhering to the medical model. The 
integration of a theoretical humanist framework highlights not 
on ly the failings of medicalisation in mechanistic terms, but also 
the overpowering deficiencies which this model fosters in regard 
to human beings . Finally, the benefits to be gained from the 
reintroduction of a human essence into medicine is probed in order 
to sugge·st ways in whi ch the worl d of i 11 ness can be rendered more 
meaningful . 
In Chapter 5 an evaluation of the changing nature of medical 
ethics is undertaken - in order to test humanist theory "in the 
field" - and it is indicated that the advance of medicine along 
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technological lines has led to a further negation of human 
intersubjective living. It is noted that concerns with health and 
illness have changed from a discipline subsumed under theology and 
supernatural power (which entertained the subjective, 
nonscientific orientations of philosophy and ethics) to a 
scientific technological platform which, in advancing scientific 
medical progress, has caused a convergence of ethics and medicine 
which tends to deny human meaningmaking in humane terms. 
By re-reading the theorists identified in chapters one and two, 
and applying their work to the scientific medical model as laid 
down in chapter three, an indication is given that ethical and 
moral decisionmaking now needs to accommodate technological 
advancement, not merely in terms of science but also in terms of 
human enterprise. This means that decisions must be made not only 
in accordance with the situation at hand, but also by taking into 
account what these decisions may mean for others at a later stage. 
Ethical decisions can no longer be made from a basis of what might 
be termed cognitive, almost intuitive, medical knowledge, but are 
initiated in accordance with laid down criteria which supposedly 
accommodates a more formal intellectual framework. According to 
the medical model, this is the only way in which medical personnel 
can be expected to competently address ethical problems thrown up 
in response to the advance of medical technology. 
It is suggested that by condoning and utilising this formal 
framework for criteria in decisionmaking, science is able to 
intervene and manipulate human bodies and minds on the basis of 
its unquestionability . Where intervention in the form of life 
support machinery is called for the questions arise : who decides, 
and on what basis which patient will receive these so called 
benefits of medical science? Chapter five argues that although 
criteria are laid down for making this judgement (when resources 
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are scarce and when only so many can be helped if others are 
denied), an area of decisionmaking exists which currently appears 
to relate to, and to be reliant upon, the scientific belief that 
medical science alone has the right answers. The question is posed 
as to whether or not these decisions can be humanely addressed in 
scientific terms alone. 
It is argued that there exists no allowance within the 
contemporary medical model for a negotiational platform which 
promotes intersubjective dialogue and the more humane elements of 
shared choicemaking. It is further suggested that this lack of 
shared choicemaking is derogatory to the human condition in terms 
of the humanist framework. And, thereby, that ethical and 
existential questions having become integral to contemporary 
medicine, tend to exclude the very people it (the medical 
profession) purports to serve. This is argued to be dehumanising 
and to be a form of devaluation in terms of humanist theoretical 
values. It is thereafter suggested that the authority inherent in 
making medical decisions need be seen as a challenge to the 
medical establishment rather than a normative situation, and as 
such should be recognised as a situation which urgently requires 
attention if medicine is to regain its humane relevance. 
Chapter six concludes with a brief resume of the arguments 
presented and a recommendation for ways in which further research 
into a more humanised medical model may be undertaken: thereby 
facilitating medicine as a more humane enterprise. The need for 
contemporary medicine to address the discourse engendered by the 
blocking of human consciousness through its rigidified medical 
model is highlighted. This is indicated to point to a necessary 
reconsideration of theoretical categorisation in order to embrace 
the emancipatory elements which lead to unconstrained discourse, 
and to provide what V. McKay & N. Romm (1991) refer to as an 
infusion of new life into ossified (ideological) patterns of 
meaning. 
CHAPTER 1 
SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITIONS AND THE ISSUE OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the theoretical foundations of the systems, conflict 
and humanist sociological perspectives are explored in order to 
search the traditional basis against which the concept of 
intersubjectivity has to be situated. 
Sociology is an attempt to understand human social reality and to 
make sense or meaning of people's place within it . This study will 
indicate that exactly what this understanding involves is 
problematic and often many -sided . Therefore the issue as to what 
sociological understanding entails is not clear-cut within the so 
called sociological discipline. This point is distinctly expressed 
within the sociological literature and indicates that sociologists 
define the theory and study of sociology in variously different 
ways. In attempting an understanding of the broad sociological basis 
within which intersubjectivity has to be studied, the main 
traditions in sociological thought will be covered . 
Sociological theorising can be divided into theoretical perspectives 
which may be equated to differing ways of "seeing" and trying to 
understand and make sense of human social reality. For the study at 
hand, three sociological perspectives will be chosen. They are the 
consensus or systems theoretical tradition, conflict theory and the 
symbolic interactionist, ethnomethodological and phenomenological 
tradition . Under the perspectival umbrella of each perspective 
this thesis will consider the work of various authors who are here 
deemed to be relevant within a particular perspectival tradition. 
It is however recognised in this respect that the choice involved in 
placing part i cular authors within a certain framework is itself not 
clear-cut (especially where the author concerned has not self-named 
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their ,own work as belonging to a particular tradition) . Therefore, 
other people may indeed place the authors utilised by this thesis 
within different frameworks or perspective to those chosen here. 
Thereby, within this chapter it will be noted that some authors are 
used to express principles involved within particular traditions 
which may at first glance appear unusual. For example JOrgen 
Habermas's work will at different times within the thesis be argued 
to fall under both the categories of so called modern systems theory 
as well as the neo-marxist tradition. This is deemed acceptable in 
the light of the fact that the placing of a particular author's work 
is always problematic. In the case of Habermas, it will also be 
shown that when combined with the phenomenological argument, his 
theory helps to explain and elucidate some of the tenents of the 
humanist approach. This allows one finally to argue that Habermas 
can be seen to lay the foundation for the phenomenological argument 
which is taken up and utilised within the following chapter. 
Under the systems (consensus) perspective the work of Emile 
Durkheim, Talcott Parsons and Jeffrey Alexander will be read in 
order to suggest that systems theory pushes human interaction into 
what can be called consensual overlap. Under conflict theory this 
thesis will deal with the theories of Karl Marx, Ralf Dahrendorf and 
JUrgen Habermas. It will be indicated that the theories of Marx and 
Dahrendorf subvert human interaction into what can be termed group 
or role interest. Habermas's neo-marxist version of conflict 
theory is also here presented and indicates a move towards a view of 
the power structures operating within society which can be 
considered in terms of a distortion of communication. However (as 
is shown in more detail in chapter 2 of this thesis), it is 
noted that Habermas's work can also be placed alongside the 
phenomenological and ethnomethodogical tradition. In this regard, 
Habermas's theory of communicative action may be utilised to 
indicate that it is not possible to access reality through a process 
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of uncovering external facts within society (as systems and conflict 
theories do), but rather through what can be termed the knowing 
processes of human beings. 
The chapter then moves on to consider the interactionist/ 
ethnomethodological /phenomeno l og i cal traditions of George Herbert 
Mead and Alfred Schutz in order to form what might be called a 
bedrock for traditional humanist ideas. In this way a platform is 
erected from which to examine the more contemporary humanist authors 
to be utilised in chapter 2 of this work. This means that the 
thesis searches a definition of humanist intersubjectivity in order 
to build a framework which can thereafter be applied to the 
scientific medical mode l . 
The thesis will take as its starting pOint the suggestion made above 
that sociology can be divided tripartly (many more divisions are 
possible). This way of distinguishing sociological tradition has been 
paralleled by a number of authors within the discipline - amongst 
others William Skidmore (1979), Randall Collins (1983), Michael 
Haralambos (1989), George Ritzer (1983), John Wilson (1983) and E. 
Cuff & G. Payne (1984). As indicated, the three chosen perspectives 
present different starting points and different assumptions and 
thereby promote differing views of human social reality. These 
differing views of social reality will be drawn out within the body 
of the work. 
Working with the three chosen perspectives, various primary 
theorists will be categorised within the body of particular 
theoretical perspectives and the thesis will build upon their ideas 
by citing other authors' work where necessary. 
Arguments within the systems, conflict and humanist perspectives 
will be aeait "I; lh bnef1y to indicate that neither ,ysteiil s Oi' 
conflict perspective can really account for intersubjectivity (in 
humanist terms). Within the humanist perspective ·it will be shown 
that humanism presents a radica l ly different ontology from that of 
the systems and confli ct perspectives. However, this 
conceptualisation does not mean that sociological perspectives are 
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entirely separate - they often overlap, borrow from and adapt each 
other. They do this in a desire to uncover how social real ity might 
be perceived, and by posing questions about the nature of people and 
hu man societies, can be seen to pursue knowledge in an effort to 
understand. 
This chapter endeavours to show what the concept intersubjectivity 
means within what is here called the humanist framework and which 
roughly coincides with what Cuff and Payne (1984) term 
ethnomethodology and phenomenology, Haralambos (1989) terms 
interactionism and Wilson (1983) calls humanism. This is achieved by 
noting the lack of intersubjectivity (in humanist terms) within the 
systems and conflict perspectives. 
1.2 SYSTEMS THEORY 
1.2.1 Introduction 
Two of the mai n thrusts within sociological enquiry are consensus 
(systems) theory and conflict theory, and although the one advocates 
co-operation and the other coercion, both address society as a 
systematic entity. In opposition to these views it will be 
indicated that humanism approaches society from a radically 
different angle which accentuates the intersubjective elements of 
'human" structures. This it does in the belief that humans have the 
capacity to actively participate in the creation of social reality. 
The emphasis of the systems perspective invariably rests upon the 
concept of consensus and views social order as contingent upon th e 
consensual acceptance of values and norms. It focuses on the ways 
in which the ordered nature of societies and social life are viewed 
as integrated wholes. Society is seen as holding together in an 
orderly 2xis tence af 2quilibrium and !~ suggestive of people being 
moulded into acceptable roles which are necessary for its 
(society ' s) continued existence. According to this view everything 
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about social life bears an interrelationship to the whole, and a 
change in one part of the system will necessitate a change in the 
other parts. 
In this context society is viewed as separate from, or independent 
of, the individuals within it - what Emile Durkheim referred to as 
'sui generis' or as having a unique existence independent of its 
members. Michael Haralambos highlights this point in relatio n to the 
in stitution of the family by stating that: 
Rather than constructing their own social world, members of 
society appear to be directed by the system ... they are 
organised into families and systems of stratification because 
society requires these soci.l arrangements in order to 
survive . . . (1989:524). 
It will be shown later in thi s thesis that according to this view of 
society the institution of medicine functions in much the same way. 
Patients accept more and more sc ientific medicine by ~elinquishi ng 
their own autonomy for illness management into the hands of the 
medical profession, and in this way accept the medical mode l as 
definer of hea lth and illness because this maintains equilibrium 
within the system. 
Wi thin this perspective individuals are considered to have totally 
internalised the norms and values of the soc ial system. These values 
become what John Wilson infers are their values. He states: • ... 
ac tors are free to choose ... but their choices are structured by 
dominant values and norms" (1983:98). With reference to this point 
Haralambos notes that 
... it is not the consciousness of the individual which directs 
his behaviour but common be1iefs and sentiments which transcend 
the ind iv idual and shape consciousness ... [and thus] members of 
society become constrained by [what Durkheim terms] the social 
fact (1989 :524-5) . 
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1.2.2 Emile Durkheim 
Emile Durkheim, working within the mode of analysis known as 
functionalism (which is founded on the assumption that actions are 
to a large extent structured by the social environment), was 
particularly interested in social systems as moral entities and he 
saw human association as giving rise to expectations or patterns of 
conduct . Durkheim advocated that interacting humans tend to develop 
common ways of acting in society and that these common expectations 
of actions constrain and oblige them to behave in particular ways. 
It will be shown later that the medical profession seems to function 
in this way: the doctor defines and the patient passively accepts . 
The social and moral pressure to conform to societal norms develops 
what Durkheim terms a collective consciousness and this forms the 
basis of an ordered society . According to Durkheim, the social 
fact of conforming to norms, exists almost as an external entity 
because people have so thoroughly accepted and internalised 
society's ruled system. Therefore facts are not intersubjective 
because they function outside of human experience in the realms of 
what can be thought of as a consensual moral order. Durkheim argues 
that it is this moral reality, which includes the collective values 
and the order of priorities on which the members of the society are 
agreed . This fosters the notion that society somehow exists over 
and above us (referred to earlier above as sui generis) . 
Using ordinary everyday concepts like fashion and religion to 
highlight the external properties of social facts, Durkheim argues 
that such concepts are a collective phenomenon which he maintains 
cannot be reduced to an individual level without losing the 
essential meaning . He suggests that this takes place because they 
involve the collective action and the sentiments of many persons. 
Specifically in the case of religion, Durkheim argues that the 
positive function of religion, in affording human life what might be 
called an existential framework of meaning, helps to maintain the 
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moral unity within society. Therefore, in Durkheimian terms, 
collective and unifying do not take account of intersubjective 
meaningmaking because they actually constitute what can be argued to 
be a distinct and separate reality. This reality deals with things 
external to and coercive of the actor. 
In chapter 3 it will be indicated that medicine can also be seen in 
these terms. Scientific irrefutability provides the medical 
profession with what can be called a separate reality: science 
presents as external and unquestionable to the actor when it is not 
understandable in layperson's terms. 
William Skidmore (1979:128) notes that the Durkheimian value system 
is shared by participants in structured social action and gives 
coherence, form and shape to all such action . This does not say 
that people have to think alike to accomplish social coordination, 
but it does suggest " ... that people must share in an organised 
stable pattern of values so that one person can have reasonable 
expectations about the other person's behaviour" (1979:128). 
In this way consciousness is merely an internalisation of external 
facts which do not require active participation to render the world 
meaningful. Any interaction which takes place does so by 
sacrificing voluntary control for the benefits of common belief and 
sentiments. By extrapolation, consciousness in Durkheimian terms is 
not an intersubjective process - it is a collective process which 
functions in a consensual way by upholding common values. 
It will be indicated later in chapter 2 of this thesis, that human 
action within this collectivity is not negotiatory and participatory 
in the ongoing terms of humanist intersubjectivity, but is confined 
to certain limits only, within which limits the individual desire 
has free range . In Durkheimian theory, unity takes place in terms of 
a shared consciousness, whilst for the humanist, unity can only 
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exist in terms of a dialogue between opposing standpoints, which 
does not threaten, but rather invites participatory negotiation and 
a choice of unified action. Action is of primary interest to 
another systems theorist, Talcott Parsons, and it is to his work 
that we now turn. 
1.2.3 Parsonian action theory 
The second major theorist whose work is characteristic of the 
consensus approach within sociology is Talcott Parsons. Arguing to 
elaborate and systematise the consensual framework, Parsons by 
introducing functional prerequisites to his analysis of social 
systems, maintains that for any system to operate, both social 
organisation and the personality needs of the members of society 
should be addressed. According to Skidmore (1979) prerequisites 
• . .. entail a series of choices on the part of the actor' (1979:148) 
which are directed towards social objects. The actor must choose 
between certain pattern variables which are directly related to the 
social system and link together abstract aspects and individual 
voluntary action within that particular system. Initially this 
argument sounds somewhat humanistic, but as will be shown, Parsonian 
addressal of these needs still seems to revolve around the 
functional/consensual prerequisites of the system and are therefore 
not unlike Durkheim's theory. 
Intersubjectivity exists only in the form of what may be called 
consensual overlap and this again restricts action to certain 
bounded limits within which people can act. In chapter 2 of this 
thesis it will be indicated that this so called freedom of choice 
does not take account of intersubjective humanist meaningmaking, but 
of equilibrium. This equilibrium is attained through a 
socialisation process which requires actors to interact in terms of 
the expectations of society. This type of interaction necessitates 
that people learn how to act through a process of sanctioning 
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/negative sanctioning and in this way, become committed to the 
societal value system. 
The central mechanism of Parsons's grand theory is one of human 
action related to role and to pressures - which are largely given by 
society . Any choice of action in Parsonian terms is intrinsically 
linked to the upholding of the social structure, and the individual 
becomes socialised to make such choices only within the parameters 
of accepted societal norms and values. If socialisation is 
successful, the norms and values of society become internalised 
through interaction, and become part of the actor's consciousness to 
such an extent that George Ritzer (1983:196) argues: " ... in pursuing 
their own interests, the actors are in fact serving the interests of 
the system as a whole ... ". It will be shown later that from a 
humanist perspective it may be argued that actors become passive and 
non-creative because the need for acceptance and gratification 
ensures that any social role they may choose to fulfil is fashioned 
by agreement on expectations (this point is further explored later 
in this chapter) . 
Even though Parsons advocates the need for an addressal of 
personality within his theory (in other words that people are not 
defined as mindless automatons and are therefore capable of deciding 
how to act), he does not really believe in free individual action 
(in humanist terms) because he thinks this would lead to chaos not 
order (1983:198). Rather he suggests that the sentiments of the 
people be sufficiently shared so as to maintain an ordered society 
and this alone provides for personality needs. This takes place as 
socialisation insidiously infiltrates the human consciousness in a 
pre-programmed, instead of thoughtprovoking fashion and this negates 
meaningmaking in terms of humanist intersubjective dialogical 
living. Although Parsons argues that interaction within the 
socialisation process does invite participation this thesis 
suggests that participation in these terms becomes severely limited 
by societal expectations of what particular roles involve. 
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Therefore this way of seeing interaction in no way addresses 
humanist intersubjectivity or the ongoing debate around the choices 
and alternatives invoked by the expectation of role. In the case of 
medicine this lack of intersubjective debate is clearly visible in 
the doctor-patient consultation. In this setting the communication 
which takes place 
intersubjective. 
work. 
can be identified as subjective rather than 
This point is taken up again in chapter 3 of this 
Societal expectations denote the way in which the socialisation 
process functions. It can be defined as deterministic because it 
places emphasis upon equilibrium rather than on the active 
involvement of people . Furthermore this deterministic outlook 
promotes the idea that society is seen as external to human beings 
and, therefore, that society and social reality exist outside of 
human experience . It will be shown that in humanist terms nothing 
can be known outside of human experience : society as social reality 
can only become meaningful to people when it is experientially taken 
into human consciousness . 
Therefore to suggest that Parsonian theory can be voluntaristic is 
not acceptable to the humanist thinker because to identify subjects 
as learners of norms and values, without allowance for the 
capacities of those subjects to intervene in the process of 
learning, is merely a form of determinism under the name of 
voluntarism. This ambiguity led Parsonian Grand Theory into 
methodological difficulties and in response to this, modern systems 
theorists have attempted to re - instate Parsons's role theory by 
addressing anew this problematic dilemma . One such theorist is 
Jeffrey Alexander and it is to his work that this study now briefly 
turns. 
1.2.4 Systematised theory - the revival 
Jeffrey Alexander (1989) takes up the debate between structure and 
human agency and by using the work of Parsons and Habermas, tries to 
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show that modern systems theory is not as "closed" as it once may 
have been. Arguing that there seems to be a Parsonian revival 
within sociology and that through the interest of various theorists 
who are not generally placed within the confines of the systems 
perspective, Alexander debates this revival in terms of its ability 
to make space for the phenomenological aspects of human meaning. In 
this regard he indicates that with the exception of the continuing 
strand of Marxist orthodoxy " .. . theory has become dramatically 
"Parsonised" ... [in) every major branch - critical theory, systems 
theory , action theory, phenomenology - . . . [noting that each has) 
absorbed some of Parsons's most important lessons" (1989 :397) . 
Alexander notes that Parsonian theory emphasises the normative 
aspects of society by utilising an explanatory theory which 
postulates a high level of generality . And he locates Habermas's 
initial interest in Parsons to be his quest to unite the Parsonian 
focus on norms, with an understanding of the way i n which pattern 
variables work within society. He shows that " ... Habermas was 
attracted to the pattern variable schema [within Parsonian theory, 
and that he) revised it in a revealing way" (1989 :399) . Alexander 
indicates that Habermas : 
... used the schema to complicate and di fferentiate the 
conceptual apparatus he had inherited from critical 
theory ... [and) the pattern variables to reinstate the very 
dichotomy that Parsons had sought to avoid. Habermas claimed 
that affective neutrality, universalism and specificity were 
the principal norms of instrumental capitalist society; only in 
some post instrumental society would the alternative 
pattern-variable choices come into being (1989:399) . 
Alexander suggests that Parsons had tried to rid his theory of the 
either/or choices of norms and interests by suggesting that they 
were in fact interpenetrating positions which could account for both 
the personality needs of people and the needs of society . And 
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he postulates that it was in the first instance this double-sided 
attitude within Parsons's theory which set the framework for 
Habermas's own theoretical development. He argues that due to 
Parsons's seeming insistence for the mere instrumental 
characteristics of structuring within the modern world, Habermas was 
prompted to " ... turn Parsons's synthetic theory inside out" 
(1989:399), by also pointing to the communicative realm of human 
1 i fe. 
Suggesting that Habermas takes up the stance that reciprocal 
interactions cannot be forged between social system demands and 
psychological needs, Alexander notes that the polarity of 
instrumental rationality versus human value does not merely melt 
away, but can actually be argued to become reestablished. He notes 
that in this way, Habermas uses Parsons to reflect the problems he 
himself sees in modern society. He says that Habermas: 
... acknowledges that [Parsons] poses the crucial question of 
the relation between lifeworlds - worlds of experience and 
symbolic discourse - and system or structure. But ... insists 
that Parsons ... reduces symbolic experience to an instrumental 
reflection of impersonal "systems" life (1989:400). 
Therefore, according to Alexander, Habermas reinstates the 
dichotomic aspects of Parsons's theory in order to graft onto it his 
own form of theorising (as will be shown in more detail in chapter 2 
when Habermas's communication theory is read). But in doing so he 
incurs Alexander's criticism. Alexander says: 
Habermas's "critical Parsonianism" seems to me one-sided and 
wrong. He has drastically depersonalised the social system and 
overly moralised the lifeworlds of culture and experience. His 
theory finds answers ... brilliantly ... [but] in doing so Habermas 
has reintroduced the epistemological and ideological 
dichotomies of idealism (1989:400). 
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By this Alexander alludes to the fact that he himself disagrees with 
the way in which Habermas treats the symbolic realm of ideas being 
generated in discourse. 
What is the source of Alexander's critique of Habermas's focus? The 
answer to this question appears to lie in the way in which Habermas 
defines rationality . Habermas argues that rationality is not 
mechanistic or already realised in the world as structured, and 
cannot therefore be "normatively ascribed" as Parsonian theory 
maintains . Rather, he argues, rationality has to be communicatively 
achieved through symbolic understanding. Only when communication 
involves understanding, can it be seen to imply a rational choice 
which embraces a view of the lifeworld. But Alexander argues that 
this focus on communicative interaction of Habermas's is overdrawn. 
Alexander says "It is true and not true at the same time" 
(1989:245). He argues that linguistically-structured worldviews 
cannot be reduced to mere humanly constructed interpretations 
because people continue to infuse values in terms of narrative 
traditions . And he notes that: 
... deeply held conceptions of self, nature, society ... continue 
to structure modern action in a relatively arbitrary way ... . 
For rationality to develop it must be invested with cultural 
power .... This is usually done by connecting rationality to the 
sacred centres of a modern society . . .. The relation between 
rationality and tradition is a complex problem .... That the 
relation exists ... points to a serious weakness not only in 
Habermas's account of contemporary society but also in his 
theory of communicative action itself (1989 :245) . 
Alexander suggests therefore that where co-operation is achieved it 
can only be voluntary in the conditional sense because it is always 
mediated by cultural constraints which exist outside of people's 
conscious control. He argues that this situation arises because of 
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" i nst itut i ona lly coerci ve processes that can never be completely 
superseded" (1989:247) . Alexander seems therefore to indicate that 
the marriage of Parsonian systems theory and Habermas's 
communicative action theory, whilst it allows a description of 
social order which is richer and more complex, nevertheless upholds 
the original dichotomies within systems theory . In this way 
decisions are still taken in terms of systematised options and 
people's capacity for creative participation which function within 
the realms of "set" rather than totally "fluid" alternatives which 
are at all times unknown prior to communication taking place . In 
other words Alexander wishes to emphasise that communication takes 
place within structured settings. 
In this thesis it is argued that Alexander's reading of Habermas's 
theory fails in humanist terms because participation, as Alexander 
defines it, is linked to a rationality which appears to flow from 
inherent pre-defined conditions within society (culture and 
traditional values), rather than to an intersubjective experiential 
framework. In Alexander's framework, action is linked to rigidified 
pre-existing conditions rather than to ongoing re-definition. It 
will be indicated later (in chapter 2), that Habermas's theory can 
instead be read to incorporate communicative action within the 
humanist framework of symbolic living , wherein human action becomes 
the springboard for discourse and debate. In chapter 2 it will be 
argued that Habermas presents the relationship between "structure" 
and "lifeworld" in a way which does not reduce symbolic experience 
to an instrumental reflection of impersonal systematised action. And 
it will be shown that by reading Habermas in this way the occlusion 
of symbolic experience (as Habermas defines it) results in a form of 
distorted intersubjective living. (See chapter 2 section 2.5.3). 
1.2.5 Does systems theory provide for intersubjective living? 
It seems quite clear that within systems theory the ideal of 
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intersubjective living (in humanist terms) becomes blurred - what 
might be termed, diminished in the light of systematised power 
relationships. People do make choices in terms of a "subjective" 
criterion, but such criteria relate to a restrictive framework of 
systematised options. As such, the choices taken can only be 
considered as "surface" choices (in terms of the humanist argument) 
because they do not involve the "real" choice mechanism of humanist 
intersubjectivity . 
Seen in this way, the choices available to people are not actually 
open choices because they are made from amongst what might be called 
inflexible options. These options do not involve actors in the 
creation of their own social reality because choices are made from 
set alternatives which have been agreed upon by the system as a 
collectivity rather than in terms of the individuals who make the 
system up. There is almost an obligatory element at work here 
because (as was noted in section 1.2.3 above), human interaction 
within the system as it becomes more depersonalised and normative, 
requires the actor to address less and less personal options and to 
rely upon consensual rules and modes of action. In chapter 4 it will 
be shown that this is indeed the way in which the medical model 
functions within society . However, in answer to the question posed 
by this sub-section, "intersubjectivity" can only be located in what 
must be termed a consensual overlap. People negotiate and agree on 
a level which equates to a collective consciousness . 
In terms of the humanist argument to be put forward later it will be 
indicated that this so called consensual overlap implies that people 
are alienated, because they take little autonomous responsibility 
for the choices they make. It will be suggested that humanism makes 
provision for a form of negotiation which in no way leads to fully 
common situational definitions. On the contrary, humanism argues 
that communication in the form of symbols, are merely starting 
points for the mediation of what particular symbols may mean to 
people. Later in this chapter the work of George Herbert Mead will 
draw this point out more fully (see section 1.4.2 . to follow) 
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The next sociological model to be presented deals with the 
structuralist orientations of conflict theory. 
1.3. CONFLICT THEORY 
1.3.1 Introduction 
The second major perspective within sociological theory identified 
by this thesis is that of conflict theory which can be said to focus 
on the tensions and contradictions within society. The conflict 
theorist is intent on finding out how power structures operate. If 
theorists are working from a Marxist standpoint, they will view the 
unequal access to the means of production as the main conflict 
causing element within the societal structure . In this respect, 
conflict is regarded as inherent within pre-socialist society and is 
defined by Karl Marx as primarily economic . This economic definition 
is intimately linked to the unequal access to the means of 
production and to the unequal distribution of scarce resources 
between classes in a particular society . 
The Marxian analysis of class and social inequality related to the 
mode of production is one classification of inequality. Randall 
Collins notes in this respect that: ·Some Marxist-influenced work is 
focused on issues of class and the political implications of 
economic power .. . [whilstj .. . . Other work is properly dialectical ... • 
(1983:327) . For example the concepts status, race, sexually related 
divisions, and even role acquisition (see section 1.3.3.1), are 
areas of stratification which certain theorists choose to stress in 
opposition to class stratification. Although not directly related 
to economically determined class divisions , these stratifying 
concepts can still be power orientated and therefore be seen to 
address contradiction and conflict within society. 
However, for the purposes of this study a brief consideration of 
conflict within society from a Marxist perspective is initially 
undertaken. Thereafter attention is directed to the work of 
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Ralf Dahrendorf in order to seek an alternative approach to power 
structures which do not rely for analysis upon unequal access to the 
means of production. 
1.3.2 The Marxist view of conflict 
Marx was not concerned with class relations as a thing - a given 
entity - but with class as a process of movement, change or 
development. Therefore, from a Marxist position, class is not a 
static phenomenon as it may be seen in the systems perspective, but 
a force acting through history in a way which helps to grasp the 
problems of social change. Class division understood as a social 
relationship and defined with reference to the means of production 
is thereby a constantly recurring process of both material 
production and social reproduction. This relationship is founded on 
the unequal distribution of the forces of production which give rise 
to two separate classes - the owners of the means of production and 
the workforce who own nothing but their labour power. 
Class division identified as social relations to the means of 
production, reflect what can be termed the prior distribution of the 
means of production, and which maintain the respective positions of 
the groups that make them up. It is the dialectic tension between 
incompatible forces which brings forth conflictual contradictions 
within society. Therefore, class as a constantly reoccurring process 
reinforces exploitation of the wage-labourer by the capitalist 
owners. Although in one sense this dialectic tension does not take 
place within an overtly coercive atmosphere - because it is based 
upon what might be called a freely entered into contract - it does 
occur within definite forms of social consciousness. 
Marx's insight in this regard can be seen to raise an important 
point with reference to medicine. Differentiation does enter into 
the doctor-patient relationship in the form of a doctor who is seen 
to have elitist knowledge and a patient who seems to be 
knowledgeless. Also there is what can be termed a freely entered 
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into contract - the doctor heals, the patient relinquishes 
responsibility for that healing. Later it will be shown that this 
type of situation can be seen to be somewhat coercive when 
considered in terms of elitist knowledge : the doctor uses science to 
back his claim of having the right answer to human illness. 
Therefore the so called freedom of contract relates not to a freedom 
of individual consciousness because as intimated to above, it 
maintains the respective positions of opposing groups and therefore 
upholds the ideology inherent under capitalism (and medicine), 
rather than a freedom of liberation . Thereby, in Marxist theory, 
interaction can be seen to occur in the form of group interest. The 
Marxist answer to this conf1ictua1 situation lies in revolution to a 
socialist state which would manifest in a reorganisation of the mode 
of production. For the Marxist theorist this would constitute 
worthy social change. 
In opposition to this idea it will be shown in chapter 2 section 
2.5.1 , that worthy social change for the humanist theorist can only 
come about through a true liberating freedom of consciousness. This 
means that the undia10gica1 interaction of group interests is 
replaced by a dialogical interaction of individuals, leading to 
symbolic intersubjective wor1dconstruction and meaningmaking . In 
medicine this would indicate what Veronica Mckay (1990) terms a 
"status shift" (see page vi of the general introduction to this 
thesis) situation: the doctor and patient both share their 
know1edges. However, revolution in Marxist terms (to exchange one 
structural ideology for another - capitalism for socialism), is 
considered to be worthy change. In humanist terms this is merely 
one choice in a matrix of options and therefore of no more import 
than other alternatives . Even the term socialism (in humanist 
terms) is a negotiable concept, open to an ongoing re-negotiation. 
(This idea of negotiated concept is taken up again later in Chapter 
3 with reference to the definition of the concept illness) . 
Norma Romm (1991:141) takes up this argument (discussing Habermas's 
distorted communication theory as distorted intersubjectivity, and 
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using as an example Marx's account of the institution of the free 
labour contract as an ideology operating within capital i st 
societies), notes that: 
... the ideological or illusory character of the contract 
. .. makes the object of conflict unrecognisable . .. [by] 
restricting communication . .. it thwarts public communication on 
the way in which ... relationships are to be organised in 
society . .. because it predefines from the outset that such 
relationships are to be based on wage labor and that this is a 
fair arrangement . 
The idea that Romm's argument is alluding to here is that ideology, 
in promoting negotiated group interests, restricts intersubjective 
communication because the terms of its relationships are already 
predefined in terms of wage labour as the right starting point to 
negotiate from. This in effect means that the platform on which the 
two conflictual classes meet is a closed arena where meaningmaking 
is framed by opposing material positions, not intersubjective 
meaningfulness . 
In the writ i ngs of Marx it is often expressed that he sees the 
structures of pre-socialist society as impinging upon people's 
capacity for creativity. In Marx's terms, creativity is creative 
labour - the things which people produce through their physical 
labour. He argues that the development of the capitalist mode of 
production separates the means of production from labour and thereby 
forms opposing classes which are intimately based upon the mode of 
production. People's creative labour now becomes the means by which 
the capitalist mode of production is upheld . Marx notes that : 
... the law of development of the capitalist mode of production, 
is to separate the means of production increasingly from 
labour, and to concentrate the scattered means of production 
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more and more into large aggregates, thereby transforming 
l abour into wage-labour and the means of production into 
capital (in Thompson and Tunstall, 1979:245). 
Marx argued that as the capitalist mode of production advanced, the 
needs of new markets forced the corporate guilds to vanish in the 
wake of machinery which, whilst it revolutionised industrial 
production, robbed the workpeopl e of their ability to creatively 
produce. In this respect Marx notes that " ... owing to the extensive 
use of machinery and to division of labour, the work of the 
proletarians has lost all individual character ... all charm for the 
workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine . .. " (in Thompson 
and Tunstall, 1979:241). Marx argued that the bourgeoisie reduce the 
ties which once bound man to hearth, home and community, to what he 
calls the ever callous "cash payment" . He notes that: 
It has resolved personal worth into exchange value and, in 
place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has 
set up that single, unconscionable freedom - free trade . In 
one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political 
illusions . It has substituted naked, shameless , direct , brutal 
exploitation (in Thompson and Tunstall , 1979:239). 
By indicating that as world markets grew the wants of people change 
and could no longer be satisfied by the productions of their own 
country, Marx notes that: "In place of the old l ocal and national 
seclusion and self-sufficiency we have intercourse in every 
direction ... " (in Thompson and Tunstall, 1979:240) . He notes that 
the bourgeoisie, in order to keep pace with the growing world 
market , agglomerated the population and more and more centralised 
the means of production which in turn led to a centralisation of 
political interests. 
Free competition on a world scale developed production forces which 
in terms of class interests saw the bourgeoisie became a class of 
capital accumulators, and the proletariat a class of labourers whose 
on ly means of survival was reliant upon their finding work or labour 
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which increased capital for the bourgeoisie. As a class of 
wage-labourers, the proletariat became tied to a system from which 
they could not extract themselves (to a condition which restricts 
the worker to a level of mere subsistence and maintenance) . In this 
way it could be argued that in terms of the proletariat their 
interest was to overthrow the capitalist mode of production - to try 
to free themselves from the capitalist "structures" of domination. 
And in terms of the opposing class (the bourgeoisie) Marx argued 
that their interest was to maintain the "status quo" (the capitalist 
structures) in order to continue to extract surplus value . 
As noted earlier, whilst the use of machinery advanced the amount of 
goods produced, the proletariat class became concentrated in greater 
masses and their class identity and strength became their weapon 
against the ever unceasing increase and improvement of machinery 
which made their livelihood precarious . Marx notes that the 
workers' answer to this precariousness was to form trade unions. He 
says: "Thereupon the workers begin to form combinations against the 
bourgeois; they club together in order to keep up the rate of wages; 
they found permanent associations ... "(in Thompson and Tunstall, 
1979:242} . 
Therefore, within Marxist theory, it can be argued that the human 
potential for creativity becomes intrinsically tied to what Marx 
considers are the immovable structures of capitalist society within 
which the two classes act each in accordance with their own 
interests . Human potential therein, relates to a form of group 
class consciousness whereby people's capacity to act, in the words 
of George Ritzer (1983:91) becomes " ... subverted as a result of the 
unanticipated consequences of capitalism". But, as will be shown, 
the Marxist focus on this subversion detracts in humanist terms from 
the real issues involved . Humanism argues that Marxist theory is 
robbed of creative intersubjective meaningmaking for the reasons now 
put forward. 
This so called "robbery" in the terms of this thesis, can be seen to 
operate on three fronts which present oppositiona11y to the way in 
which Marx considers people's creative involvement within social 
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reality. For Marx, the involvement of people is intimately tied to 
their creative ability to labour and this labour is in turn placed 
within an exploitative economic framework which functions upon the 
relations of domination. As noted above the proletariat have to use 
their labour power to uphold and develop the capitalist mode of 
production if they are to survive . Their only redress towards the 
inequality of this insidious situation lies in group action. 
The first criticism which humanism can be seen to point to is the 
idea that creativity is bound by creative labour. It will be shown 
in chapter 2 that for the humanist, creativity can only be 
experienced by people in the form of taking part - in other words 
within an interactional framework which involves the taking into 
account of others' ideas. Therefore, in the terms of this thesis, it 
is not labour which is the problematic within society - creativity 
in humanist terms is a much broader concept and throws open for 
consideration both the concept labour and creativity. Humanism 
argues that labour and creativity are symbolic entities which do not 
inhere one meaning - they are both only definable and understandable 
within the framework of a negotiated human participation (See 
section 1.4.2.3). 
A second point of critique, from the humanist standpoint, is that 
Marx advocates that people's ability to creatively labour is tied to 
the class structures which operate within society. The humanist 
would again argue that these so called structures are not clear-cut, 
they are open to redefinition in terms of the meaning they may have 
for people and, therefore, again cannot inhere one meaning. The 
humanist argues that societal structures as structures of the self 
consciousness of people, are ongoingly created . Therefore in terms 
of humanist theory the structures within society are less important 
than the way in which they become defined. 
Thirdly, whilst humanism would agree that the relations of 
domination pointed to by Marx is indeed intrusive, humanism would 
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argue that these relations are not problematic in the same way as 
presented by Marx . As noted earlier, for Marx the problem of 
domination lies in the fact that one class restricts the ability of 
the other class to labour creatively. In turn, this class domination 
upholds the unequal relations of the means of production. For the 
humanist the problem lies rather in the fact that domination 
suppresses the voices of actors and thereby prevents their creative 
participation within the fabric of social life in the form of 
offering alternative visions . This reading of the problem of 
domination is brought out by the neo-Marxist tradition later in 
chapter 2 section 2.5.3. It will be shown that Jurgen Habermas 
recognises the importance of domination, but links his critique not 
to material inequality or unequal distribution within society, but 
to what he sees as the most powerful lack of creative participation : 
domination in the form of a suppression of voices. 
Therefore, in terms of Marxist theory, the freedom and individual 
capacity and ability to act is actually not brought to fruition. It 
melts into the dialectic contradictions of two opposing classes and 
takes on a form of group consciousness which loses intersubjectivity 
(as the humanist wishes to define it) in the process . 
This study now moves on to discuss the work of the conflict theorist 
Ralf Dahrendorf. It is noted that whilst Dahrendorf is also 
interested in the dialectic tensions within society, he locates 
these tension not in the economic base related to the access to the 
means of production, but in the power inherent within certain 
economic roles within society. 
1.3 .3 Authoritative roles as power - Ralf Dahrendorf 
Dahrendorf's work, like the work of most conflict theorists, was 
greatly influenced by the writings and theory of Marx. Therefore 
Dahrendorf ' s theory begins, as so many other writers on power, 
stratification or conflict do, with a critique of Marx and his 
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ideas. Writers in this field develop their own ideas from reading 
Marx and so have not only been influenced by the Marxian tradition, 
but have in the process drawn criticism from other writers for their 
interpretation thereof. Dahrendorf is no exception, but his 
argument in seeking to answer the following question is of interest 
to the argument developing here (1969:41) : 
Do classes and class conflicts belong to that group of 
phenomena by which only the capitalist type of industri al 
society is characterised, or is their existence a consequence 
of industrial production itself, and are they therefore a 
lasting feature of industrial societies? 
In looking for an answer to this question Dahrendorf postulates that 
a Janus faced dialectic (what he refers to as Janus headed) between 
conflict and consensus exists within society. It necessarily 
follows that from these two faces there will grow two different 
ways of interpreting social reality . Power and its use or misuse, 
are central to both conflict and consensus because on the one hand 
its application can achieve social integration, whilst on the other, 
a divided people or society . 
The conflict face of Janus in relation to role interests us here and 
Dahrendorf sets the scene in this way: 
... here it is not voluntary cooperation or general consensus 
(as with integration theory) but enforced constraint that makes 
social organisations cohere. In institutional terms, this 
means that in every social organisation some positions are 
entrusted with the right to exercise control over other 
positions in order to ensure effective coercion; in other 
words, that there is a differential distribution of power and 
authority. One of the central theses of this study consists in 
the assumption that this differential distribution of authority 
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invariably becomes the determining factor of systematic social 
conflicts of a type that is germane to class conflicts 
... (1969:165). 
Dahrendorf asserts that the origin of class conflict should be 
sought in the arrangement of social roles which are either endowed 
with expectations of domination or subjection and furthermore, that 
it is the differentiation between these two types of positions which 
initiate social conflict. He works with Max Weber's definition of 
power as being the probability that one actor will be in a position 
to carry out his will despite resistance, and authority as the 
probability that a command with a given specific content will be 
obeyed by a given group. His main argument concerning these two 
concepts is that power is essentially tied to the personality of 
individuals and authority is always associated with social positions 
or roles (1969:166). It will be shown in a later chapter that the 
authority inherent within the doctor's role places patients into 
what Dahrendorf suggests is a role of subjection. This in no way 
allows for intersubjective meaningmaking within the doctor-patient 
relationship. 
Because this thesis wishes to highlight the concept of conflict in 
society in opposition to Marxist theory, it is this aspect of 
authority relating to social roles which will interest us here. As 
indicated previously the Marxist theory of power, and thereby 
conflict, is located firmly in the camp of the haves within society 
relative to the economic structure, whereas the concept of conflict 
in Dahrendorf's terms states: 
... that while power is merely a factual relation, authority is 
a legitimate relation of domination and subjection ... authority 
can [thus] be described as legitimate power (1969:166). 
1.3.3.1 The structural relations of power 
Dahrendorf is now able to argue that group conflicts rest with the 
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fact that they are not the product of structural relations of power, 
but appear whenever and wherever power and authority are exercised, 
and he locates the concept of conflict in imperatively coordinated 
associations (ICAs) which he states are institutions governed by 
relations of authority. It will be argued in a later chapter within 
this thesis that the institution of medicine is just such a case in 
point. (See chapter three sections 3.3.2, 3.3.3). 
Here it will be indicated that the scientific medical profession can 
be seen in terms of a conflictual relationship (in humanist terms) 
when the doctor invokes the power and authority seen 
as inherent within the professional role. Dahrendorf argues that: 
" ... authority, is a type of soci a 1 re 1 at i on present in every 
conceivable social organisation" (1969:168), and that ICA's 
relate to structures of coercion and constraint which generate 
conflicts of interest and therefore . become the birthplace of 
conflict groups . 
Dahrendorf maintains that authority is a universal element of social 
structure and that such relations of authority can be found wherever 
there are people whose actions are the subject of legitimate and 
sanctioned prescriptions. These prescriptions therefore " ... 
originate outside [of] them but within [the] social structure" 
(1969:168). Two groups are therefore identifiable, those who 
exercise authority and those who are subject to it. Each of these 
two groups has certain interests : one group aims to keep its 
authority, and the other aims to readdress its subordinate position. 
1.3.3.2 Authority as occupied role position 
However, these two identified groups cannot merely be defined as 
haves and have-nots as in Marxist theory . And here Dahrendorf 
argues that authority also has two faces - the plus-side and the 
minus-side . What he means is that authority is actually located in 
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the particular role position a person occupies and as such " ... the 
domination in one association does not necessarily involve 
domination in all others to which (a person) belongs" (1969:171). 
By this Dahrendorf is suggesting that in a democratic state the same 
person can occupy a position of subordination in one setting and a 
position of power in another. He states: 
a cabinet minister may be, in his church, a mere member, 
i.e., subject to the authority of others . ... the set of roles 
associated with an individual ... do not usually present an 
unambiguously dichotomic authority structure ... within every leA 
in any given society . ... There is a distinction of aggregates 
of those who dominate and those who are subjected ... [with] 
total societies [presenting] the picture of a plurality of 
competing dominant [and, conversely, subjected] aggregates 
(1969:171,172). 
1.3.3.3 The power position re-directed 
However, the occupants of positions of domination and the occupants 
of positions of subjection hold by virtue of these positions, 
certain interests which appear not immediately unlike the Marxist 
theory of power (two opposing interest groups seeking either to 
overthrow or preserve the status quo). What has happened is that it 
is now not exactly the owners of property - as it was in the 
historically specific period in which Marx was writing - but rather 
people who fill specific roles within organisations or associations 
who have power. Their power relates not to their ownership of an 
organisation, but rather to their position within the system which 
lies in its [the organisation] continuance if they are to retain 
their own power within it. 
Dahrendorf argues that by furthering the interests of the 
organisation, an authority is exercised which exists as an 
expectation independent of the specific person occupying the 
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position . And furthermore, that this places a restriction upon the 
chances of the occupants of positions of subjection to upward 
mob i lity. It is noted in chapter 4 section 4. 2.3, that this 
restriction can be seen to be operational within medicine if the 
doctor is unwilling to share scientific knowledge with patients. 
1. 3.3.4 Class conflict as authority differentials 
In · submitting a model of class conflict which is defined in terms of 
authority differentials, Dahrendorf offers a theory which is unlike 
Marxian theory in two ways . Firstly it does not relate directly to 
the unequal distribution of wealth but rather to the inequality of 
power inherent within certain roles, and secondly it is not 
historically specific . 
Some roles offer a domination of position in relation to the amount 
of authority they afford, others subjection - a lack of authority or 
power. The domination roles which people occupy in ICA's are, in 
most cases, pressed upon them and this means that they are 
exercising power not from a position of economic superiority - as 
with the bourgeois in Marxist theory - but from what might be called 
a once removed position which at one and the same time protects both 
the organised system and the interests of the role encumbent. 
Conflict occurs when those in positions of subjection - who want 
more authority - and those in positions of domination - who wish to 
preserve both their own position and therefore the status quo -
meet . 
The protection aspect of Dahrendorf's theory is also of interest for 
the institution of medicine . It will be argued later that doctors 
protect their professional status by projecting a professional 
attitude which denotes a closed interactional system to the patient . 
Conflict may occur when patients require a more open arena for 
negotiation of illness or diagnosis. 
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1.3.3.5 Authority differentials and humanism 
For interests to relate to position and not to human endeavour for 
dialogical living, the humanist ideal of participation and the 
belief that social reality is rooted in the experience of 
participants, is non-existent in Dahrendorf's theory. To protect 
interests, position occupants develop within groups - trade unionism 
is a case in point - and thereby exchange individual freedom for the 
agreed upon interests of the group. Dahrendorf notes this point in 
this way: 
A ... prerequisite of effective conflict regulation is the 
organisation of interest groups .... in order for effective 
regulation to be possible, the opposing parties in [societal 
conflict] have to agree on certain formal rules of the game 
that provide the framework of their relations .... these rules 
normally protect the survival of both parties ... [and] 
introduce some predictability into their actions. [They] 
... protect third parties from undue harm ... (1969:226). 
When these certain formal rules of the game are no longer effective 
the services of an impartial arbitrator become necessary. The 
arbitrator's decision on the negotiation in hand is final and this, 
not surprisingly, can be the seat of a problematic in conflict 
regulation because it relates directly to the issue of power and 
authority which Dahrendorf, in the terms of his theory, can do 
little to rectify. 
However, as noted in the general introduction to this thesis, 
Habermas's communication theory argues that power and authority 
within society need be seen in terms of a restriction of 
communicative rationality rather than structural or role 
differentials. Therefore, he refutes the idea that power is inherent 
in either structures within society or role position, by arguing 
that human social reality cannot be found in an external existence 
outside of the knowing processes of human beings. 
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In this chapter Habermas's theory is utilised to suggest a 
neo-Marxist argument which roots power within society in symmetrical 
communication. Later , in chapter 2 section 2.5.3, this same theory 
will be used to account for the way in which communication can 
become distorted by certain power media operational within society 
a distortion which may be classified as distorted intersubjectivity. 
Habermas's theory may thus be linked with the humanist tradition in 
this res pect. At present however, a brief examination of Habermas 's 
neo -Marxist argument is proffered. 
1.3.4 Habermas and the power of communication in human action 
Habermas defines his theory in relation to the Frankfurt School of 
co ntemporary critical theorists, whose efforts Romm notes " ... were 
directed at examining the possibility of instilling a critical 
social consciousness within society" (1991:133). This critical 
theory Habermas proposes in opposition to: 
Traditional theory [which] rl R<ignates the model . .. dominant 
ever since Descartes, of a closed system of statements 
constructed according to logical rules, while critical theory 
is governed by an interest in rational conditions ... (1982:45). 
As was noted earlier in section 1.3.3.5, Habermas argues for what he 
calls a commun icative rationality, as opposed to the closed system 
located within pregiven "logical" rules. A rationality which is 
chosen by people in accordance with their interests and made 
possible by humankind's ability to use language as the basis of its 
capacity for rational actions couched in understanding. For 
Habermas, thi s ability is expressed in communicative action which is 
oriented towards a shared understanding. Shared understanding, in 
Habermas's terms, can only mean a public arena which ·thrives upon 
communicative discourse. 
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In this respect Arie Brand (1990) notes : "Thus in communicative 
action the coordination of action is not based on an a priori 
normative consensus . . . but on the participants own fallible 
accomplishments of reaching understanding" (1990:16). In this way 
it is apparent that shared understanding in no way assumes a 
consensual understanding, but takes up the possibility for different 
implications for action. Such implications have to do with what 
Habermas terms the speech act, and it is to this area of Habermas's 
theory that we now turn. 
Habermas argues that there are three elements which link together to 
form the coordination of action implied by communicative action, and 
he notes that a l istener reacts to what he calls a speech act in one 
of these ways. Dependent upon the understanding of a communicated 
message, a yes or no position will lead either to a conventional 
action or to a discourse in which speaker and listener can change 
position . Brand's (1990) explanation of what Habermas means by this 
suggests that understanding of meaning is invariably linked not only 
to the communicated message itself but to people's knowledge of what 
lies behind what is said . In this respect Brand notes that: " ... it 
is . . . the fact that this [communicated message] can be warranted 
which makes the listener understand the request and which rationally 
motivates . . . [them] to follow it up (1990 :28). 
The speech act therefore allows for a shared negotiated 
understanding which then leads to action. This means that people 
are called upon to make judgements in relation to their own 
understanding of a situation rather than in accordance with 
stereotypical reasoning . Habermas argues in defence of his version 
of interpretive understanding in this way: 
A hearer knows the content of what is said when he knows what 
reasons .. . the speaker would give for the validity of his speech 
act. But reasons are of a special nature . They can always be 
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expanded into arguments which we then understand only when we 
recapitulate . . . them in the light of some standards of 
rationality .... The interpretative reconstruction of reasons 
makes it necessary .. . for us to place their standards in 
relation to ours, so that in the case of contradiction we 
either revise or relativise . . . we cannot understand reasons 
without at least implicitly evaluating them (1990:32). 
Habermas's argument is very much linked to a participatory element 
which manifests in a dialogue in which different or opposing 
insights on reality are exchanged within communication. Reality as 
such does not exist in law-like regulations or structures which are 
communicated to people through language. Nor does reality exist 
outside of people's understanding because as we have seen, 
understanding is intimately linked to the participatory elements in 
communication. These participatory elements are in turn linked to 
rationality and claims of validity. Therefore rationality for 
Habermas refers to what he sees as a more genuine dialogical 
relationship. Power within society is focused upon the suppressions 
of speech as embodied in language and interaction, wherein not all 
voices have symmetrical input . Romm notes Habermas's insistence 
that: 
.. . when undertaking social theorising with the intention of 
recovering the potential for reason in society, the task is 
clearly not a solely theoretical one . The very act of 
theorising expressly embodies the particular goal with which 
the theorist identifies . [This goal in Habermas's terms is] the 
goal of generating a social community of undistorted 
communication (1991:135). 
Therefore Habermas's theory of communication pOints to the power 
within society as stemming from the restriction of discursive 
elements contained in communication. Later it will be shown that it 
is this discursive element which, in Habermas's terms, allows for 
human emancipation. 
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Power does not lie in external structures within society nor does it 
manifest in the form of opposing groups (orthodox Marxism) or role 
position (Dahrendorf), but within the revolutionary power inherent 
in an emancipated expression/communication. This is why Romm notes 
that " ... the motor of human emancipation . .. [does] not rest in 
history ... but solely in the potentialities possessed by human beings 
themselves" (1991:133). 
Now the question must be asked as to whether or not conflict theory 
can successfully address intersubjectivity in humanist terms, and it 
is to this question that this chapter now turns. 
1.3.5 Does conflict theory provide for intersubjective living? 
It was shown that in the terms of Marxist theory human potential to 
interact is characterised by a focus on structures, of for instance 
capitalist society, within which the two classes of actors (the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat) interact in accordance with own 
interests. As was noted in section 1.3.2 these interests relate to 
the relationship between the two opposing classes and the mode of 
production. In identifying two major classes Marx argues that there 
is an inherent antagonism within their specific interests. Section 
1.3 . 2 points out that groups do interact and negotiate within the 
framework of their particular interests, for example the proletariat 
within the trade union movement. In this way interaction may take 
place within the confines of specific issues in terms of fighting 
over aspects such as wages, working conditions, worker satisfaction, 
etc . , or the struggle for a new mode of production. But this type 
of interaction is not to be seen in terms of a humanist 
i ntersubjective relationship because true (humanistic) involvement 
cannot work in terms of actors who are determined by collective 
impulses. 
In these terms, Marx can be argued to make human beings subjects 
only in so far as they are subjects within group identities which 
express material interests . This focus upon group interests does 
not allow for people to have alternative ways of conceiving 
interests or ways of responding to situations. This thesis argues 
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that seen in these terms people become tied to a group consciousness 
which in no way allows for humanist intersubjective living because 
the group interests, which are fundamentally tied to material 
interests, appear to exist almost separate from individual interest. 
This means that Marx seems to advocate that people can only think 
along the lines of the interests of their particular group or class 
and this way of conceptual ising amounts to what is variously termed 
within this thesis as a lack or distortion of intersubjectivity. 
When Marx speaks of the suppressions within society whereby people 
become constrained, he refers to the constraint imposed by the 
opposing class structures linked to the mode of production. For the 
humanist constraint becomes a problem when people's subjectivity is 
constrained to belong to a particular group. On the other hand 
intersubjectivity implies that there are subjects who are able to 
perceive reality in terms other than those which are prior 
identified - in other words identified in terms of the idea that one 
can posit that they have certain material interests. According to 
Romm (1991:140-141) one can argue that prior group interest, as 
opposed to intersubjective interest, restricts intersubjective 
communication because the terms of its relationship are already 
predefined in terms of wage labour as the right starting point to 
negotiate from . (This argument is expressed in Habermas's 
neo-Marxist focus on suppression of intersubjectivity.) 
Thus the problem with the orthodox Marxist position is its excessive 
focus on the way in which meaningmaking is framed by opposing 
material interests rather than intersubjective lifeworld 
construction. This implies that people's intersubjectivity becomes 
confined to the closed arena of "interactions· in terms of 
identified material goals. In this way it is argued that Marx does 
not see structures as structures of consciousness but rather as 
structures in terms of economic material interests which constrain 
people. Thereby in the final analysis the inability of orthodox 
Marxism to take into account people's creative ability to enter into 
communicative discourse, highlights its failure to come to grips 
with intersubjectivity in terms of the humanist perspective. 
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In terms of Dahrendorf's argument the situation is very similar in 
that the role positions taken up within society determine in the 
first place how people think and how they start questioning. Actors 
are seen to negotiate and act only within the restricted arena of 
particular roles within society, or particular quasi groups. In 
humanist thinking this lack of provision for conscious exchange of 
viewpoints does not allow for a truly intersubjective ongoing 
process of dialogue, interpretation and negotiation, and therefore 
can be argued to be a form of materialism which rather than seeing 
viewpoints in terms of an expression of meaning, sees interpretation 
in the form of expressions relative to role position . On the other 
hand Habermas ' s theory of communicative rationality may be seen to 
pave the way for a truly humanist appreciation of what 
intersubjective living can mean. Habermas ' s theory can be read to 
indicate the idea of a speech act where dialogical consideration of 
viewpoints allows for humane interaction between participants. 
In the next section of this chapter the work of two so defined 
humanist authors will be addressed in order to provide the 
traditional roots of humanist theory. In chapter 2 these so called 
traditional roots will be directed towards a more contemporary 
debate of humanism in order to indicate how, when social reality is 
seen in terms of an experiential participatory nature, the field of 
scientific medicine can be seen to become a more humane experience. 
1.4. HUMANIST THEORY 
1.4. 1 Introduction 
The main thrust of the humanist argument is characterised by the 
suggestion that human social reality is not a private world, but a 
world which is at one and the same time common to all and yet 
embraces an experiential area leading to different interpretation . 
This denotes the world of humans as unfinished, or incomplete and 
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points to the notion that humans have to actively and meaningful ly 
create their own lifeworld. This is what Norma Romm (in Alant, 
1990:17) means when she says : 
The actions of people .. . [are] meaningful to them .. . people 
themselves define their situation and act in certain ways in 
order to attain certain ends. 
The way in which humans achieve meaning in their lifeworld is 
through interaction with other human beings, and this takes place 
via a dynamic process of negotiation involving a continuous and 
ongoing interpretation and mediation by all parties . Society 
therefore is not a static structure, but a flowing symbolic reality 
wherein people take account of things around them on the basis of 
the meanings they have for them. Through dialogue, meanings are 
negotiated and modified as people interact and try to make sense of 
reality. 
Human social reality therefore, i s a symbolic reality which 
functions intersubjectively and thereby allows for what can be 
termed "sameness" and "otherness". Two writers who have addressed 
this area of meaningful worldconstruction are George Herbert Mead 
and Alfred Schutz, and it is to their theories that this study now 
turns . 
1.4.2 Symbolic interactionism - George Herbert Mead 
1.4 . 2. 1 Mead's view of human capacities 
George Herbert Mead has long been recognised as the father figure 
within the field of Symbolic Interact i onism . William Skidmore notes 
that Mead was not a sociologist but was a philosopher with an 
interest in social processes (1979 :198). Nevertheless, we have come 
to associate his field of sociology as concerned with the human 
actor and his/ her thoughts and conduct relevant to social action. 
For Mead, the starting point to any investigation of the human being 
begins in the knowledge that people have the ability to think in 
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terms of concepts and thus to delay their responses to stimuli. 
This is the characteristic, in Mead's terms, which sets humans apart 
from animals: they have an intelligent mind which enables them to 
make choices. This ability to think as we shall see later - not 
only in first person terms but also abstractly - predisposes humans 
to the development of what Mead calls a self. People are the only 
beings who are: 
... capable of being both subject and object, that is man can 
both undergo experience and be aware of this experience. If 
human beings are to anticipate the future, to plan their 
actions and to reflect on past conduct, they must be able to 
reflect on themselves, to look on themselves in the same way as 
they look upon any object. They must not only be aware of 
other things [including other people] which make up their 
environment, they must also possess some awareness of 
themselves as things in the same environment (1934:118-9). 
The development of the human being from child to adult - from a 
creature who engages in imitation to one who possesses a 
self-consciousness which allows for thoughts in terms of the self as 
object - is intricately linked to Mead's ideas on the formation of 
the self. According to Mead humans can never reach full potential 
unless there is a healthy mix of the two components which he 
indicates fo rm the self of every individual. These two components 
he calls the "Me" and the "I". A closer examination of the "Me" and 
'I' is now undertaken . 
1.4 .2. 2 The formation and development of the self - the "Me' and 
Mead argues that the self is not inborn but is something which 
develops over time in il,teY'dctioll with oth8rs. Dav 'id ;;a 'r ' ~r'edV~$ 
(in Blackledge and Hunt, 1985:238) states: ' ... the central idea ... is 
that a person's self develops in relation to the reaction of other 
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people to the person . . . as they perceive other people reacting to 
them ... ". It will be shown that in thi s way the "Me" accommodates 
society's regulations whilst the "I" can be argued to offer unique 
reactions to societal stimuli. In relation to the argument to follow 
concerning the medical profession, this might be seen as a reason 
for the growth of alternative medicine as a reaction to the growth 
and dominance of scientific medicalisation (this point is developed 
further in Chapter 3) . 
In Mead's view the development of a consciousness of self is an 
essential part of the process of becoming a human being, and this 
becoming involves an intersubjective ability to place oneself in the 
position of others. Thereby people can appreciate the morality 
involved in different positions within society. H. Joas makes note 
of this point in this way: 
Mead's interest in a theory of intersubjectivity developed 
through his opposition , on the one hand, to considering 
individual egoism to be an innate characteristic of human 
beings and, on the other hand, to hypo -statisation of 
collectivities, which negated the individuality of the 
collectivities ' members (1985 :121). 
Joas argues that it is only by accepting the practical implications 
inherent in Mead's concept of intersubjective living that people 
become able to distinguish between rationally guided common activity 
and selective self-gratification . Rational resolutions of moral 
problem-situations consist in taking into account and understanding 
all values which appear in a situation. Joas notes that: "This does 
not mean that one merely juxtaposes these values in relativistic 
fashion; rather , it means questioning .:. based on communication and 
cooperation" (1985:137) . Therefore moral and ethical problems 
cannot be solved from a standpoint of either conviction or mere 
responsib i lity , but from an understanding and consideration of other 
se l fs and other values through self-consciou s reflection . (Chapter 5 
-39-
considers what these ideas might mean for ethical decisions within 
the field of medicine). 
Human interaction is not merely the acqulrlng of a socialised 
language, but a symbolic language which allows the individual to 
intersubjectively make meaning of social reality in different ways. 
Therefore, the self does not consist simply in the bare organisation 
of social attitudes. It is not a mere reflection of society but an 
intelligence which can contribute. The Meadian "Me" takes on the 
general ised attitudes within society and the "I" acts in novel ways 
towards these stimuli . Because people have this capacity to act in 
novel ways society is ever changing, always in a process of 
re-definition - what was noted earlier as the dialectic relationship 
between people and society, and what will later be referred to as an 
intersubjective dialogue between tradition and novelty . 
1.4.2 .3 Symbolic reality 
To enter into intersubjective dialogue requires that people 
communicate with each other . In communicating, people share, define 
and re-interpret via what Mead terms symbol (language), and this 
means that people become actively involved in constructing and 
reconstructing the meaning patterns in their lives. It is a dynamic 
process of continuous interpretation and negotiation which denotes 
society as a symbolic reality . People take account of things around 
them on the basis of the meanings they ascribe to them, and through 
dialogue these meanings become modified as people interact. This 
means that symbolic reality is an intersubjective reality . 
Mead's use of symbol as the corner stone of human living together 
pOints to the fact that people share in the process of assigning 
meanings . It is a social process, and therefore symbols evolve via 
communication in the social setting . Everyday life is produced by 
people acting together and producing their own roles and patterns of 
action. These roles and patterns are mediated in dialogue. For Mead 
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the use of language provides for rational conduct because it enables 
the consideration of options, thinking before acting and a 
consideration of the consequences of these actions. Mead notes this 
point in the following way: 
When we speak of the meaning of what we are doing we are making 
the response itself ... the meaning is a stimulus for the 
preparation [to act] ... [this] is what we call a reflective 
individual. That is the general mechanism of what we term 
thought, for in order that thought may exist there must be 
symbols, vocal gestures genera lly, which arouse in the 
individual himself the response which he is calling out in the 
other . . . (1934:72-73). 
According to Hargreaves (1985:241) the choice of any action involves 
people taking account of what they believe to be an understanding of 
what others expect of them. This does not mean that actions only 
take place in accordance with this expectation (this would merely be 
fulfill ing " rolp), hut that actions take account of others ' 
meanings. As will be noted later, Cornie Alant and Romm suggest 
that society as a symbolic structure cannot function without 
involving the consciousness of participating members of society and 
this suggests that meanings become mediated through the medium of 
1 anguage. 
All symbols by implying provisional meaning form the starting point 
of human worldconstruction and meaningfulness. In this respect 
Michael Haralambos (1989:544) notes that: " ... symbol does not simply 
stand for an object or event: it defines them in a particular way 
and indicates a response to them" . But this definition and response 
become mediated by reconsideration within the individual 
consciousness and the mediating factor involved is the intelligence , 
or, is Mead refers to intelligence, the Mind. 
1.4.2.4 Mead and the human intellect 
Self formation via the use of symbols is made possible because 
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people are able to think. Mead maintains that there can be no 
mental activity unless people live with others and develop a shared 
language in terms of which they can make choices, develop new 
meanings and re-consider old ones. Mental activity, like the 
formation of the self, is not an individual function, but rather a 
social dimension which is dependent upon symbolic living and the 
social process. Therefore general expectations associated with 
position may be interpreted differently . For example in the context 
of the institution of, say, the family, it can be argued that this 
institution seems to embody what we could call accepted modes of 
thought and conduct. But according to Mead, modes of thought and 
conduct which are not continually being questioned/scrutinised imply 
a rigid and unacceptable way of organising anything. Looking at the 
symbol mother within the family Mead would ask, what is a mother? 
And would answer that there is no fixed definition because this has 
to be defined and renegotiated in specific contexts. In other words 
the symbol mother itself is not clear -cut because people's 
intellectual capacities provide for symbol interpretation and in 
this way the mind contributes to the social process. Thus there can 
be no one prescription for someone who bears children. The 
definition of who and how the caring and rearing will be organised 
is always open to debate. Therefore the general expectations 
associated with certain positions may be interpreted differently. 
When a symbol is introduced there appears a mix of possible 
definitions based on different people's viewpoints as to what this 
symbol conjures up. The term mother as a symbol forms a basis for 
communication and debate between people who share some understanding 
when the symbol is invoked. Mead thus allows for people's 
differences concerning their understanding of symbols and in the 
light of these differences, suggest that people will often revise 
their our own way of thinking to accommodate new meanings. 
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This way of understanding symbols through the intellect's ability to 
participate can also be applied to the work of other writers. 
Karl Marx's definition of worker or socialism thereby does not 
inhere one meaning, but is open to human interpretation of what 
these terms mean because all symbols are open to re-definition 
through negotiation and revision. In these terms Marx's definition 
of the worker as one who has no access to the means of production 
conflicts in Dahrendorf's terms with the worker as someone who holds 
a particular role/authority position. Both workers are defined with 
regard to their position in a structure: in Marx's terms the owners 
or non owners of the means of production and in Dahrendorf's terms, 
in relation to their role of either dominant authority position or 
subject ion . 
Mead's view of symbol indicates that the symbol, once invoked, forms 
a basis for communication and debate between people. In other words, 
no term can have a clear-cut prescribed meaning outside of people's 
meaning structures. Each symbol is open to question and 
renegotiation in specific contexts. (In chapter 4 of this thesis 
attention will be given in similar vein to the terms illness, 
diagnosis and treatment). However of import here is the need to 
recogn i se, as noted earlier, that : to live in what can be termed 
purely Meadian "Me" terms is not to experience human life to the 
full. It will be shown in the section to follow that in accordance 
with Alfred Schutz's theory , this way of experiencing life is to 
live in terms of what he calls typification. It is to Schutz's 
ideas that this thesis now turns . 
1.4.3 Schutzian social reality 
Alfred Schutz ' s sociological orientation is that of phenomenology . 
Phenomenology is principally concerned with the study of 
inter~ersonal social interaction and with how this interpersonal 
social interaction becomes meaningful to social actors . This is what 
William Skidmore refers to as " .. . to discover what the participants 
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in social action think they are doing . . . what rules 'they follow and 
why" (1979:236). E. Cuff and G. Payne locate SchUtzian sociological 
interpretation firmly at the feet of the phenomenological philosophy 
of Edmund Husserl who advocated that human experience is linked to 
the ability to " .. . grasp the essence of the phenomena we perceive" 
(1984:152) . 
Therefore interpretative reality is for SchUtz the key to the nature 
of humans and their social world. SchUtz argues that the social 
world is experienced by people as common and shared. This world has 
the appearance of being a given, out there, organised, independent 
existence the knowledge of which human beings assimilate. But this 
world has to be interpreted and made sense of, and this people do 
through particular experiences thereof. M. Rogers (1983) notes that 
" ... knowledge is a concern with experience ... All knowledge 
presupposes not only acts of consciousness but also experience" 
(1983:13). The human world is assimilated into consciousness by what 
SchUtz refers to as typifications which basically denote a common-
sense knowledge of the world . 
This common-sense knowledge of the world allows people to make 
practical assumptions about everyday activities, about how they 
should act and about how others may act in a given situation. This 
SchUtz refers to as reciprocity. This is what Michael Barber terms 
the SchUtzian view of socialised intentionality (in Cuff & Payne, 
1984:11), and what may be seen as merely another way of taking 
account of the intersubjective elements of a shared space and time. 
(Socialised intentionality refers to the common-sense shared aspects 
of social life - the knowledge of which allows for the practical 
assumptions mentioned above). 
1.4.3.1 SchUtz and intersubjectivity 
SchUtz explains his position with regard to intersubjectivity in 
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relation to common-sense knowledge and reciprocity in the following 
way. He argues that the world is intersubjective because " ... we 
live in it as men among other men bound to them through common 
influence and work, understanding others and being understood by 
them" (1973 :10) . This understanding operates wi thin what Schutz 
calls the historicity of culture and by this he means that any 
understanding we may realise is via a knowledge which encounters and 
involves our understanding of traditions and customs. The world we 
deal with today is instituted by human action " ... our own and our 
fellow men's, contemporaries and predecessors" (1973 :10) . Schutz 
says that in this respect we need to take into account that this 
world is not a private world, that knowledge is not a private 
affair, but an intersubjective one which takes for granted 
intelligent fellow-men who either know the objects in the world or 
who in principle have access to such knowledge. Schutz says that 
people know this and take it for granted . They also know that same 
must mean something different to me and to any of my fellow-men. 
Schutz explains the argument noted above in this way: 
My and my fe110w-man's biographically determined situations and 
therewith our respective purposes . .. must differ , at least to a 
certain extent common -sense thinking overcomes the differences 
in individual perspectives resulting from these factors by two 
basic idea1isations . .. the interchangeability of the 
standpoints : I take it for granted - and assume my fellow-man 
does the same - that if I change places with him so that his 
here becomes mine, . I shall be at the same distance from things 
and see them with the same typicality . .. I take it for granted 
- and assume my fellow-man does the same - that the differences 
in perspectives originating in our unique biographical 
situations are irrelevant for the purpose at hand of either of 
us and that he and I, that "We" assume that both of us have 
selected and interpreted the actually or potentially 
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common objects and their features in an identical 
manner ... (1973:11-12). 
In this way Schutz maintains that the section of the world 
taken-for-granted by us is also taken-for-granted by others. He 
argues that humans do not use the word "We" as "Us", to include only 
you and me, but to include everyone who is one of us, who shares our 
same situational world. Thus Schutz says the general thesis of 
reciprocal intersubjective living leads to objects being actually 
known by you and potentially known by me as the knowledge of 
everyone (1973:13). This does not imply consensus because whilst 
Schutz maintains that subjects do act in typification terms 
(taken-for-granted ways of action), he also argues that these 
typifications do not remain static, they are alterable because of 
biographical experience. 
This is especially true within what Schutz terms the "We" 
relationship where he indicates that people do not always act in 
terms of anonymous typification . Therefore, typifications can be 
seen as starting points, which can be thought of as recipes for 
action, whilst remembering that revision is possible in the light of 
experience or on the basis of encounters/interaction. This idea is 
taken up again in chapter 4 section 4.4.4 in terms of the encounters/ 
interaction of patient and doctor . 
1.4.3 . 2 The lifeworld - "We" and "They" relationships 
As has been indicated above, Schutz believes the lifeworld 
encompasses certain taken -for-granted aspects which can in certain 
situations find people tending to act in habitual fashion if they 
fail to exercise the capacity to make and remake taken-for-granted 
actions. Within the lifeworld the difference in relationships has a 
bearing upon the taken-for-granted aspects of social life and Schutz 
categorises these relationships as "We" and "They" . He argues that 
the pure "We" relationship is an intimate face to face interaction 
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where the two people involved enter into the consciousness of the 
other. On entering such a relationship people are initially armed 
with only typification knowledge, but as the interaction proceeds 
such typifications are re-written, revised, tested and modified. 
Schutz maintains that people are more comfortable with the recipes 
they know and trust but when they encounter inappropriate thoughts 
and actions, they are forced to reflect and come up with a unique 
response. On the other hand "They" relationships are interactions 
between impersonal contemporaries and as such are dominated by 
anonymous typifications. What Schutz is saying here is that 
typifications rule the day in the "They" relationship because 
culturally taken-for-granted typifications can be more easily 
applied to impersonal contemporaries. Individuals can of course 
define their own interpretations of these anonymous typifications in 
unique ways. 
But the idea that "They" relationships relate to impersonal 
contemporaries, according to Schutz, means that people work in ideal 
typical form which provides the common-sense practical knowledge 
necessary for everyday living. 
Schutz argues that: 
Only a very small part of my knowledge of the world originates 
within my personal experience. The greater part is socially 
derived ... socially distributed ... my actual knowledge is merely 
the potential knowledge of my fellow-men and vice versa ... 
(1973: 13,14) . 
However by making this point Schitz also indicates ways in which 
people can impart their own personal experience. He argues therefore 
that both "We" and "They" relations are the stock of knowledge from 
which people organise their negotiational input. Therefore "We" and 
"They" relations can be classified as different levels of anonymity 
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which are negotiated in terms of an intersubjective interaction, but 
which for the most part become hidden under a a cloak of ideal 
typical common-sense knowledge of the world. SchUtz states 
therefore, that typification and generalisation prevail within a 
linguistic in-group which exist " ... in an open horizon of unexplored 
content" (1973:14). 
By arguing in this way it can be seen that SchUtz defines 
intersubjectivity as operating within social life in the form of 
both "We" and "They" typifications which realise this unexplored 
content as precisely people's ability to make an input into the 
taken-for-granted stock of knowledge. In this way it can be argued 
that SchUtz implies "They" relations involve intersubjectivity in so 
far as people when making use of anonymous typifications still 
impart their own interpretation and appropriation. Whilst "We" 
relations are intersubjective to a greater degree because people's 
different subjectivities are brought into the interactional forum 
and negotiated meanings are arrived at in specific contexts. In 
this way people organise their negotiational input by utilising 
typifications as a starting point from which they impart personal 
meanings onto the shared stock of knowledge. People's subjectivity 
thereby comes into play within the interactional forum and involves 
a stock of knowledge which is ongoingly reinterpreted by the 
participants within the interactional process in order for them to 
make sense of the world . 
Therefore, within Schutz's theory clearly the term 
intersubjectivity, as he explicitly uses it, is accounted for within 
the operation of the "We" and "They" relationships in social life. 
Here Schutz can be argued to concur with certain ideas in Mead's 
theory. Although Mead does not use the term intersubjective, by 
mak i ng provi s i on with i n his theory for the ope rat i on of the "Me" and 
the "I", Mead does point to people's ability to make an input into 
the symbolic world of human meaningmaking. It can be argued that 
there is a clear connection between both models by the way in which 
people are seen to operate in terms of shared symbols onto which 
they are still able to impart their own definition . 
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Therein both authors within this section make provision in some way 
for the concept of intersubjectivity although SchUtz does so in a 
more explicit way because he actually uses the term. In this way it 
is suggested that both Mead and SchUtz can be argued to be humanist 
thinkers who provide a platform of humanist theory from which to 
search intersubjectivity within the work of contemporary humanist 
authors. 
In the chapter to follow, the basis of the humanist tradition which 
has been developed within this chapter will be expanded through the 
work of variously defined contemporary humanist writers, and will be 
diversified in order to explore issues such as, choicemaking, 
responsibility, freedom, etc . 
1.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter the work of various authors within the systems, 
conflict and humanist tradition have been searched in order to build 
a narrative account of the humanist term intersubjectivity . The 
rationale for building a narrative account by searching 
intersubjectivity within systems theory, conflict theory and then 
humanist theory, lies in the wish of this thesis to highlight the 
radical ontology of humanism as opposed to other perspectives within 
sociology . 
This means that the systems and conflict view of social reality was 
shown to relate to the structures of society. The humanist 
perspective (by defining Mead and SchUtz as traditional humanist 
theorists) was shown to contest what can be termed external 
structures, in favour of an ontology which argues that people make 
sense of the world through a process of ongoing meaningconstruction. 
This ontology indicates that people's knowledge of the so called 
societal structures can only be known and understood when taken into 
consciousness. In other words when experienced through a 
participatory interaction which debates what meaning these 
structures may have for people . 
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1.5.1 Systems perspective 
Within the systems perspective the work of Emile Durkheim, Talcott 
Parsons and Jeffrey Alexander was read. It was shown that 
intersubjectivity, in humanist terms, does not exist within this 
perspective . It was indicated that the interact i on which does take 
place between people is seen as being of a collective nature, rather 
than intersubjective . This means that within systems theory little 
provision is made for people's creative and meaningful 
of a lifeworld (as the humanist wishes to define it) . 
are free to make choices insofar as the dominant norms 
construction 
Individuals 
which uphold 
the system remain undisturbed, and furthermore, that roles are taken 
up in like respect . Therefore, there is a failure to address 
humanist intersubjective living because there is a tendency to see 
human interaction located within the collectivity of a consensually 
agreed upon system. Interaction therein can be termed one of 
consensual overlap . 
1.5 .2 Conflict perspective 
Within the conflict perspective the work of Karl Marx, Ralf 
Dahrendorf and Jurgen Habermas was presented. Marxist theory was 
shown to relate to a class struggle which is based upon the material 
production of goods . The proletariate were argued to have only 
labour power at their disposal and were shown to stand in opposition 
to the bourgeoisie who have direct owner access to the means of 
production. The bourgeoisie therefore were shown to control both 
the mode of production and its inherent relations . It was argued 
that interaction between the two opposing classes derives from what 
can be termed a collective struggle. The bourgeoisie form a 
collectivity which is intent upon upholding the capitalist 
structures - in order to further their interest of excess capital . 
The proletariate form a collectivity through membership of trade 
unions - i n order to promote amongst other things, the struggle and 
eventual overthrow of capital i st structures . In this respect it was 
argued that interaction takes place between the two opposing classes 
in the form of group interests, rather than intersubjective 
meaningmaking . In this way i nteraction was shown to relate to 
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group interests which were intimately tied to material interests 
rather than to the furthering of human discourse as advocated by the 
humanist tradition argued for within this thesis. 
The work of Dahrendorf was shown to locate antagonism in society 
within two separate groups identified as either occupying positions 
of authority, domination or subjection, rather than opposing groups 
l inked to material interests as in the case of Marxist theory. In 
terms of Dahrendorf's theory it was argued that, for interests to 
relate merely to group or individual role position and not to a 
human endeavour for dialogical living, forced his argument into the 
realms of group negotiation. Such a position fails in humanist 
terms to locate intersubjectivity because interaction takes place 
between role occupants in terms of role position of either 
domination or subjection. It was indicated in this respect that 
power based upon role prescription cannot provide the freedom and 
l iberating effe ct argued for by this thesis. 
Finally the theory of JUrgen Habermas was utilised to lay a 
foundation for the humanist perspective to follow. Habermas's 
theory was shown to relate not to specific structural elements but 
to communication in terms of a conscious rationality. Th erefore an 
indication was given that, in Habermas's terms, power does not l ie 
in either orthodox Marxist or Dahrendorf structures or roles, but in 
the potentialities of people to communicate. 
1.5.3 Humanist perspective 
Within the humanist perspective the work of George Herbert Mead and 
Alfred SchUtz was read in order to lay the theoretical foundations 
for chapter 2 of this thesis which will search the term 
intersubjectiv ity within the work of various (broadly def ined) 
contemporary humanis t authors. In this chapter Mead's theory of 
symbolic interaction ism was shown to denote the way in which humans 
interact, both with each other and with society, th rough the 
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development of a self. It was indicated that Mead argues that the 
self is not inborn but is something which develops over time in 
interaction with others. Mead's theory shows that the development of 
a consciousness of self is an essential part of the process of 
becoming a human being, and this becoming was noted to involve an 
intersubjective ability to place oneself in the position of others 
through the simultaneous interactions of the "Me" and the "I". 
Alfred Schiltz's theory of social typification was shown to indicated 
how Mead's theory of symbolic interactionism might be seen in terms 
an of operational theory. It was noted, that although Mead does not 
specifically use the term intersubjectivity (whilst Schiltz does), 
these two theories could be argued to be humanistic because both 
theorists make provision for people to input their own meanings into 
the world. In this way people take up the shared aspects of social 
life through the initial recognition of symbols - common typified 
meanings according to Schutz's theory - and then use their uniquely 
human intelligence to inject new meanings into the social matrix. 
This was shown to indicate that human life is continuously evolving 
as people interact together in order to make sense of social 
reality. 
This thesis now moves on to Chapter 2, where the foundations to the 
humanist tradition laid above will be built upon in order to 
indicate what intersubjective and meaningful worldconstruction means 
for the contemporary humanist. In this way a comprehensive 
framework is built in order to research scientific medicine in 
humanist terms. 
CHAPTER 2 
MAIN ISSUES IN THE CONTEMPORARY HUMANIST USAGE OF 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
2.1 INT RODUCTION 
Within the humanist tradition the basic ontology of 
intersubjectivity offers a radically different conception of human 
living. Social reality is conceptualised in terms of symbols and 
symbolic meaningmaking which is seen to form the very "stuff" of 
society. Thi s way of "see ing " presents a direct opposition to the 
systems and conflict perspectives because it allows for ongoing 
debate concerning the meaning symbols hold for people. Unlike the 
sys tems perspective which adheres to common norms and values, and 
role performance within predefined structures. Or the conflict 
r~rspective which defines in terms of m~terialist int~rp.ts in 
relation to class or role occupancy. The humanist perspective 
argues that these concepts are not clear-cut. Concepts like role, 
norm, value and interest, are ongoing1y re-defined within the social 
fabr ic: mediated by dialogical interaction which is intersubjective 
rather than subjective. 
2.1.1 Society is meaningful 
Symbolic living implies that to live dialogically is to accept 
" ... that each party aims to understand the other party through the 
assumptions and experiences which they share, whilst at the same 
time allowing the other to have a different viewpoint" (Alant & Romm 
in A1ant, 1990:49). Not only does this mean that people take 
cognisance of other viewpoints, but that they recognise the 
reflexive attributes necessary to make life meaningful. To be 
reflexive means to reconsider one's own ideas, as well as the ideas 
of others, in the light of different alternatives. Alvin Gou1dner 
(1980) refers to reflexivity as the ability of humans to accept both 
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the "good" news and the "bad" news of alternative positions (in 
other words to be open to the consideration of other people's 
"visions"). 
In this way people remain open to ideas which initially seem hostile 
or which contradict their original standpoint. Human beings can and 
do d ia 1 ogue both with others and with themselves, and thi s Goul dner 
notes is self-transforming in the sense that an open attitude to 
"bad" news (listening to information which runs counter to one's 
cherished standpoint), actually transforms one's very self. Human 
living therefore is not a private datum. On the contrary, it is very 
much a shared experience which depends upon not only "sharedness" 
but simultaneously upon "otherness" (a capacity to see the world in 
different ways), and reflexive confrontation. As Alfred Schutz 
(1973:490) has said: 
From the outset, we the actors on the social scene, experience 
the world we live in .. . not as a private but as an 
intersubjective one, that is, a world common to all of us, 
either actually given or potentially accessible to everyone . 
This in Schutzian terms is common -sense knowledge and by this he 
means that the categories by which we classify the world around us, 
reach agreement with fellow human beings and make sense of society 
through knowledge of the typifications operating within social 
reality. To say that people live in a shared world however does not 
mean that everything about social reality is completely the same for 
everyone. This would be far from the humanist argument. For the 
humanist, to possess self-consciousness means that not only do 
people have the capacity to take on common-sense knowledge, but they 
also have the capacity to be different, to make new meanings of old, 
to choose, to be innovative and in the final analysis to say no. 
Cornie Alant and Norma Romm explain humanist intersubjectivity in 
this way : 
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[to say that society] ... is an intersubjective reality . .. means 
that human beings share a common understanding of the world, 
but that they also tend to experience this world in different 
ways: human life is characterised by sharedness (common 
understanding) as well as otherness (different interpretations) 
(in Alant, 1990:46). 
Sharedness then is also simultaneously involved with differentness 
and these two areas of human living are intricately linked to the 
way in which humans perceive social reality within consciousness. 
To the humanist thinker the structures of human living can only 
exist in self-consciousness. This is not to wish away the fabric of 
social life, but rather to accept that the very fabric itself is 
only knowable to the human specie within human consciousness. As 
Alant and Romm further state: 
To really understand society one should, according to Mead, 
SchUtz and especially Brown (1978), recognise society as a 
symbolic structure. Being a symbolic structure, social reality 
does not have any status when abstracted or isolated from the 
consciousness [constitutive facilities] of participating 
members of society (in Alant, 1990:47). 
A closer look at what Richard Brown has to say about social reality 
will be undertaken later in this section, but for the time being 
this study takes up the important aspect of participation. 
2.1.2 Human participation 
Participation is the key to the humanist framework of social 
reality. Human living is participatory because, as indicated above, 
no one occupies a completely private world. All have the capacity 
via self-consciousness, to become creatively involved in the 
defining of the social world . To be otherwise is in humanist terms 
to be inhuman (alienated). Everyone has the capacity to take part 
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in the defining of their own, and others', experience of social 
reality. Because social reality is symbolic there can never be one 
right answer to anything, there can only be constant flux and 
re-formation. This is what is meant by the precarious nature of 
humanist -social reality, or what Alant and Romm refer to as 
" ... qualities of human existence .. . [which carry] ... different 
interpretative possibilities while at the same time appearing to 
express shared qualities" (in Alant, 1990:47). There is then about 
human social reality an openness towards alternatives in the 
knowledge that negotiated arrangements can, and more than likely 
will, be changed. Therefore in humanist terms, today's answers can 
only provide tomorrow's questions. 
2.1.3 Dialogical living 
To live dialogically takes up the non-finality of human existence as 
Alant and Romm note: 
.. . the conception of human reality as a hermeneutic 
circle ... [which] ... means that the human condition is never to 
be finalised but bears the trademark of incompleteness. To 
know what society is about one has to unravel how the 
structures of society appear in the minds of participants 
(in Alant, 1990:47) . 
The question need now be asked: how do people "unravel" the 
structures of society. According to the humanist thinker this takes 
place via a negotiation between tradition (the past) and novelty 
(the present) in the form of an ongoing debate. All individuals take 
part in this debate each to their own ability, and it is in the 
experiencing and taking part that the ideas of other individuals 
become part and parcel of our own ideas, to be considered and 
reconsidered (reflexivity) in the light of different alternatives. 
Therefore, human living is not a private enterprise. It is 
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intersubjective because even subjective knowledge is permeated by 
the knowledge, experience and participation we share with others. 
The humanist argument in denoting social reality in terms of a 
hermeneutic circle defines the ongoing debate as precarious and 
never finalised , If people forget, or give up the ideal, that human 
social reality should be conceived of in this way, they live on the 
periphery of human life in a state of what various humanist authors 
refer to as alienation. It will be shown in the following section 
that Jean-Paul Sartre interprets a human social reality, in relation 
to a reality which does not allow for human involvement, as lacking 
in freedom in the true sense of the word. 
In other words, if people do not take part in defining reality 
through their experience thereof, life takes on what could be called 
a straight-jacket type of existence which incarcerates the human 
consciousness. In this way when people accept the status QUO 
without Question, they are living an existence either in SchUtzian 
typified form or Meadian "Me" terms, and this means that they do not 
take account of the dialectic interplay between the lifeworld of 
people and society. In this way human potentialities become 
occluded and experiential participation in reality becomes confined 
to a form of "conformity" to external rules. 
Sartre's concept of humanity is rooted in human freedom and this 
concept forms a core which is threaded through the arguments of 
various humanist thinkers . Sartre introduces human freedom into his 
theory in order to highlight the importance of participatory 
existence. Sartre's argument for human freedom is the substance of 
contemporary humanism and forms the bedrock for many later writers 
on the subject, all of whom recognise that if people are to live to 
their full potential they must experience and take part in the 
dialogical encounter which is human worldconstruction. The next 
section thus turns to Sartre's position. 
2.2 FREEDOM - JEAN-PAUL SARTRE 
Jean-Paul Sartre is an existential theorist who is particularly 
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interested in the human condition. This condition Sartre sees as 
problematic in as much as he notes people striving for goals which 
are not only never attained but are invariably what could be called 
un-definable . People are therefore called upon to invent 
themselves, to make choices, to take responsibility for those 
choices and thereby to bear the weight of freedom and the suffering 
and anguish that such freedom of choice invariably brings. 
This means that in terms of Sartre's argument the concept of freedom 
is the essential starting point. In this way Sartre sets the scene 
for other theorists writing in humanism because he conceives of 
people as having to take part in social reality (even though he 
terms this painful), to achieve what he sees as a true human 
freedom. People have to interact and make choices and in so doing 
simultaneously and automatically have to accept responsibility for 
their choices. 
Norman Green writes the following about freedom in Sartre's sense of 
the word : 
Such freedom is, apparently, difficult to bear . . . man must feel 
that he has acted rightly and yet has no reliable guide to 
right action ... . Escape from freedom, while not strictly 
possible because of its central role in human reality, is a 
constant temptation (1966:9) . 
2.2. 1 Freedom as responsibility 
How can one escape the responsibility to live? Only, one would 
suppose, by not taking up the responsibility to act . Sartre however 
(1973) makes it quite clear that rather than not act, people must 
act . He says : 
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He is . .. nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else 
but what his life is . .. there is no reality except in 
action ... (1973:4l}. 
And thereafter reaffirms this belief by stating that existentialism 
cannot be a philosophy of quietism " . .. since it defines man by his 
action" (1973 :41). 
2.2.2 Sartre and intersubjectivity 
Intersubjectivity is also an important part of Sartre's theory. 
Using the starting point of the subjectivity of the individual he 
chooses his point of departure as being that " ... there cannot be any 
other truth than this, I think, therefore I am, which is the 
absolute truth of consciousness as it attains to itself" (1973:44). 
He argues that truth is attainable by all because it exists in one's 
immediate sense of one ' s self . Sartre's justification for this 
stance is that he sees this starting point alone as compatible with 
the dignity of people's very being . I am is the absolute truth of 
consciousness . It calls out a self-respect of true worth in that it 
sees people not as objects but as interacting subjects who unto 
themselves need to command self respect . Sartre does not speak here 
in individual i stic terms , rather he defines his subjectivity for a 
standard of truth as not only one's own self , but those of others 
too. He states: 
Contrary to the philosophy of Descartes, contrary to that of 
Kant, when we say I think we are attaining to ourselves in the 
presence of the other , and we are just as certain of the other 
as we are of ourselves (1973:45) . 
Sartre goes on to state what now is obvious , namely that the other 
is indispensable to one ' s own existence and vise versa . He notes: 
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Under these conditions, the intimate discovery of myself is at 
the same time the revelation of the other as a freedom which 
confronts mine .. .. Thus at once we find ourselves in a world 
which is, let us say, that of "inter-subjectivity" . It is in 
this world that man has to decide what he is and what others 
are (1973:45). 
He further argues that this is not to say that there is any such 
thing as a universal human essence, rather he sees it as a universal 
human condition. And he sums up his argument on the po i nts now 
covered in this way: 
In every purpose there is universality, in this sense that 
every purpose is comprehensible to every man . Not that this or 
that purpose defines man for ever but that it may be 
entertained again and again. There is always some way of 
understanding . . . in this sense we may say that there is a human 
universality, but it is not something given ; it is being 
perpetually made . I make this universality in choosing myself; 
I also make it by understanding the purpose of any other man 
(1973 : 46,47) . 
2.2 .3 Existence as participation 
Taking the existentialist stance advocated by Sartre, i.e . 
that existence precedes essence and that there is no a priori, 
unavoidable, or instinctual human nature, Maurice Natanson (1973) 
argues that people are seen as defining themselves through the 
actions and deeds they perform. Seen in this way the self is the 
result of the choices it makes and at the same time is open to 
change and alteration. This being so the self ii only in so far as 
it acts, and whether one desires it or not any choice within a 
situation involves not only oneself and others, but mankind in 
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general. What this means is that freedom of choice, with all its 
anguish in choosing is actually more painful, because it carries 
responsibility not only for oneself, but for others also . It is 
less painful not to choose but impossible not to do so because as 
already noted, the self can only exist at all in the act of choice. 
For Sartre the act of choice is one of total responsibility and 
total anguish. This is made more difficult in the knowledge that 
having chosen one's choice is not permanent because existence is in 
flight, and reconstruction is an ever present part of existence as 
long as one lives. 
2.2.4 Sartre's relevance summarised 
S. Stumpf notes that this dilemma in terms of human freedom prompts 
Sartre to state that " ... from the realisation that we are limited to 
what is within the scope of our own wills .... We cannot expect more 
from our existence than the finite probabilities it possesses" 
(1955:471). That people are finite, Sartre argues, brings forth an 
element of despair in human existence because as soon as one is 
conscious, one is aware that apart from essence there is 
nothingness, which Sartre notes " ... lies coiled in the heart of 
being , like a worm" (1955:471). This so called worm nibbles away at 
the very being because one cannot find anything either inside or 
outside on which one can rely . Human freedom thereby becomes 
condemned to be free, to act, to make choices and to be responsible 
for them in the knowledge that there is nothing forcing from behind 
or luring into the future. 
In Sartre's terms there is no determinism, and therefore no 
objective system of values to which one can simply submit without 
choice, and no built-in essence to determine our conduct. What one 
is is what one makes oneself and this making is dependent upon the 
"other". In this way people's experience of social reality becomes 
the definer of human action and interpretation and is dependent upon 
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a sharedness which takes the form of a recognition of the "other" as 
subject. 
In this way Sartre emphasises the notion that existence is manifest 
in the fact that subjects as individuals are called upon to mediate 
and filter social reality in accordance with what Sartre deems is 
the realisation that " .. . if there is an other then I have an 
outside" (1966:20). He alludes to the idea that human beings have 
to take account of the "other" in their actions. And he points to 
the ego as the primary source through which interpretation and 
expectations of the "other", and of the decisions as to how to take 
account of the "other", become taken up in human consciousness. 
Sartre states: 
The other appears, looks at me and I find myself no longer a 
free subjective relation to an ideal possible state of myself. 
Instead I am constituted as an ego, as a character with certain 
objective characteristics. Whilst I am responsible for this 
"being-for-others" in the sense that it is constructed from my 
behaviour, I do not control it. ... The being for others is in 
fact a new dimension of my own being, my being-as-object 
(1966: 20) . 
In this way Sartre suggests that the individual is social, not in 
the sense that people fit harmoniously into the collectivity, but in 
the sense that human reality for the individual is mediated through 
the other members of the collectivity. This mediation is focused 
upon experience and interpretation which, according to Sartre, is at 
one and the same time unpleasant and ineVitable, and furthermore, is 
suggestive of people as products of their own actions and 
situations . 
Al ant and Romm also argue that "Soc i a 1 real i ty is understood to be 
rooted in the experience of participants ... [and is] the method 
whereby the intersubjective experience of reality is established" 
(in Alant, 1990:50). The focus of this experiential nature is taken 
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up by Peter Berger in the form of a dialectic relation ship. It is 
to thi s idea that this thesis now turn s . 
2.3 THE DIALECTIC RELATIONSHIP - PETER BERGER 
Peter Berger introduces his theory of society as a dialectic 
phenomenon, by arguing that society is a product of people and 
people are products of society. He says: "It [society] has no 
other being exce pt that which is bestowed upon it by human activity 
and consciousness. There can be no social reality apart from man" 
(in Berger P.L. & Luckmann T.,1976:l3). According to Berger society 
was there before the individual was born and will be there long 
after that individual has died. It is the social processes which 
form individual into a person, provides identity, and makes it 
impossible for people to be defined apart from society. This idea 
can be seen to extend Sartre's notion of the inextricable nature of 
freedom, choice -making , responsibility and anguish: society and 
people are concomitant. The dialectic process of society is 
d t=~Cild2j'jt Gi~ vJh at Berger calls the lIthrcc ifIVrr:Ci1tS", vi z. 
externali sation , objectivation and internalisation. He states: 
Externali sation i s the ongoing outpouring of human being into 
the world, both in the physical and the mental activity of men. 
Objectivations is the attainment by the products of this 
activity ... of a reality that confronts its original producers 
as a facticity external to and other than themselves. 
Internali sation i s the reappropriation by men of this same 
reality, transforming it once again from structures of the 
objective world into structures of the subjective consciousness 
(1976:4) . 
What Berger is saying here is that humans externalise new meanings 
into the world, hear them as objectified meanings or structures and 
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internalise them into subjective consciousness as a facticity. This 
leads Berger to suggest that people are born into an unfinished 
world which they must finish, or fashion, for themselves - because 
the world is imperfectly programmed and remains open to definition 
and re-definition through the three moments. As such there is an 
instability, a precariousness, about the relationship between people 
and their world because it is in continuous flux. People construct 
cultures which are continuously in a process of being reproduced, 
and it is this continuous re-building which brings forth the 
inherent unstable character within human social reality. Berger 
states: 
The stuff out of which society and all its formations are made 
is human meaning s externalised in human activity. The great 
societal hypostases [such as the family, the economy, the 
state, and so forth] are ... the human activity that is their 
only underlying substance (1976:8). 
Berger argues that people's external ising brings forth not only a 
world of one ' s own making, but a world which then seems to confront 
one as a facticity outside of oneself (out there). Once society and 
its culture is formed it takes on the appearance of a 
non-negotiable reality. In this way people form institutions which, 
once formed, confront the individual as powerful controlling 
elements. 
Berger uses logical steps to set out his argument of how the 
socially constructed world may attain the status or character of 
objective reality. Some of the statements used to make this point 
are: " .. . [The] transformation of man ' s products into a world that 
not only derives from man, but that comes to confront him as a 
facticity outside of hi mself ... ". "Man invents a language and then 
finds thdL buLh nis speaking and his thinking are dominated by its 
grammar" (1969:18). 
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2.3.2 Social institutions as objectified reality 
What Berger is pointing out is that the values produced by us and 
objectified within social institutions, seem to take on a life or an 
identity of their own which fights off an intersubjective 
consciousness and leaves a reality which imposes itself upon the 
individual (Durkheim's sui generis has relevance here). A strange 
situation now exists, a situation whereby society and its people 
made institutions confront the human being as real, and in this 
respect Berger notes that " ... society is commonly apprehended by man 
as virtually equivalent to the physical universe in its objective 
presence" (1976:20). 
In this way any contravention of these (initially man made) values 
leads to a feeling of guilt - for people believe that they have to, 
or need to conform. Berger indicates that the socially constructed 
world must be continually mediated to , and actualised by, the 
individual because everyone experiences certain decisive 
cornerstones within ev~ryday experience Jnd conduct which require a 
personal addressal. He argues that: 
... [there appears] to be a ready-made world that is simply 
there ... to live in ... [and on the other hand that] ... man 
modifies it continually in the process of living in 
it ... validation ... must be undertaken by the 
individual ... [because there is need for] ... ongoing interaction 
with others who coinhabit this same socially constructed world 
(1976:7). 
By suggesting that this dialectic relationship between social 
structure and psychological reality is the way in which human beings 
in specific situations intersubjectively experience themselves, 
Berger is able to argue that: 
2.3.3 
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A particular social structure generates certain socialisation 
processes that, in their turn, serve to shape certain social l y 
recognised identities . In other words, society not only 
defines but shapes psychological reality .. . the relationship 
between the two ... is dialectical rather than mechanistic, 
because the self, once formed, is ready in its turn to react 
upon the society that shaped it (1976:28). 
Mead and Berger's theories join forces 
In this way Berger coalesces with George Herbert Mead's argument in 
that the two way dialectical process, in acting back upon society 
via externalisation, is not merely a process of internal ising 
cultural socialisation, but is at one and the same time a two way 
intermingling which makes and remakes meanings. Social reality for 
Berger, as for Mead, does not mean an objective reality because this 
immediately becomes fashioned by subjective mediation which 
hu manists argue is intersubjective living. Humanism draws together 
this dialectic in the concept of dialogical living whereby human s 
take account of both sharedness and differe ntness, thereby 
ma intaining that the same world can be seen in different ways. 
Like many other theorists within the humanist perspective, the work 
of Richard Brown (1978) focuses upon different forms of thinking in 
society which he links to human reality as symbol ic. Brown focuses 
upon a type of thinking which tries to reflect so called objective 
real i ty - this would be for him science. 
type of thinking which tries to show how 
And, he focuses upon a 
people attribute subjective 
meaning - this he terms art. It will be shown that for Brown 
subjective thinking which admits the importance of meaningmaking in 
society, and objective thinking which appears more scientific, are 
in fact theories of knowl edge which can be seen in the same terms: 
as vicwp:ints which become negotiated th ro ugh symbolic reality. 
It is to Brown's work that this thesis now turns . 
...... 
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2.4 COGNITIVE AESTHETICS - RICHARD BROWN 
Richard Brown (1978) sets out to try to "bridge the gap" between 
objective and subjective conceptions of social reality by indicating 
that both scientific and artistic thinking within society are 
theories of symbolic knowledge which are open to negotiation within 
human consciousness. He attempts this by developing what he calls a 
conceptual vocabulary which at one and the same time accommodates 
the areas of objective (science) and subjective (art) in terms of 
what he calls cognitive aesthetics. 
Brown utilises the term cognitive aesthetics to denote the idea that 
modes of thinking in society are always conceived of as an act, or 
faculty, wh i ch are symbo l ic. This means that both science and art 
become recognised as interpretations of reality. In the field of 
science this way of thinking is quite revolutionary because people 
tend to see science as what might be termed a true representation of 
reality. But Brown argues that science has to be seen as part of an 
intersubjective symbol ic framework berotlse it has to be interpreted 
to make any sense to people. When science is seen as providing a 
true reality, Brown suggests that people have forgotten the symbolic 
(and poetic) side of objective reality. In like manner he suggests 
that poetry is not merely a subjective pastime. Poetry too, seen in 
terms of Brown's cognitive aesthetics, becomes not subjective but 
intersubjective because it is part of a symbol system. 
Brown (1978) argues that Sociology, as a form of poetry, can also be 
seen in terms of his cognitive aesthetics. He notes that some 
sociologists have tried to make sociology into a science, whilst 
others have attempted to make it into a discipline which is more 
subjective and therefore focuses upon people's subjectivity. But 
Brown argues that sociology is merely another form of thinking -
another form Gf language within society - it itself is poeti c, and 
this means that the grand division between objective and subjective 
in sociology is non-existent. It falls away within the terminology 
of Brown ' s conceptual vocabulary. (See section 2. 4.3 for a fuller 
di scussion. ) 
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2.4.1 Science and art as a mode of thinking in society 
Seen in these terms, it can be argued that scientific theories 
require aesthetic adequacy and so do works of art. If both are 
viewed as presenting knowledge which is rational, organised and 
therefore experienced meaningfully, then a cognitive aesthetics of 
knowledge undercuts both scientific and sensual absolutes. In this 
way Brown suggests that: 
... for cognitive aesthetics, both science and art are 
rational ... they both presuppose various criteria ... such 
criteria are those by which we organise experience into formal 
structu res of which knowing is constituted (1978:3) . 
In this way the presupposition that science itself constitutes a 
commitment to values and that the appreciation of art does not, 
becomes nonsense when evaluated in terms of Brown's aesthetic 
criteria of rationality. In arguing that there is no fundam en tal 
diffe rence in the way in which science and art are empowered to 
articulate or inform the world, Brown focuses on way s in which 
symbolic form constructs reality: 
Just as science affects perceptual and cognitive 
tran sformations by changing our models of the world as a 
natural order, art similarly affects paradigm-induced 
expectations ... (1978:24). 
Because, in Brown's terms, both science and art are symbolic forms 
there is no reason to speak of internal versus external properties. 
Both are associated with feelings unique and particular. Both views 
transcend yet integrate symbolic realism despite their differences. 
At one and the same time there is agreement that all ways of knowing 
the world are both symbolic and perspectival because by implication, 
both science and art are symbolic forms that frame or create their 
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own domains of application. In arguing this point Brown suggests 
that the debate between science and art comes down to hard versus 
soft research techniques. In this regard he notes: 
Physical science ... assumes a natural standpoint from which 
reality is strictly distinguished from the symbols that 
represent it. From th is position the meaning of a word or 
expression is the thing or behaviour to which it refers. 
Statements that are true are those that correspond to 
object ivel y verified events or conditions out there. Statements 
which cannot be so verified are false, nonsensical 
or emo tive (1978:25). 
In these terms the part of communication that cannot be reduced to 
mathematics i s declared su bj ective and hence epistemologically 
invalid. In chapter 3 it will be shown that certain thinkers do 
indeed argue that knowledge of history and the social world is 
uncertain if not impossible, because it can never be objective in 
the manner of mathematical physics. Hum 3n ism concur~ that 50ci21 
reality is precarious (or uncertain), but not in terms of an 
objective verification. According to humanism the precariousness of 
soc ial life is relative to its intimate dependence upon symbolic 
reality and this means that not even in mathematical terms can 
anything be known in concrete. 
In opposition to this way of thinking - a social reality which can 
be verified - Brown argues that this kind of conceptual ising forms 
what he calls a symbol cloak ben eath which reality remains hidden 
and where personal meaning is pushed into the realms of symbolic and 
subjecti ve (and thereby argued to be unworthy of any note), 
consigned, he says, to the field of poetry and viewed as nothing 
more than ingenious nonsense. 
Applied to mediCine, Brown's argument for a merging of science and 
art points to an ideal in which medical science and human intuition 
become one in the fabric of human meaningmaking. (This idea is 
taken further in Chapter 4 to follow.) In this way, with the fall 
of absolute distinction an opening is created which addresses 
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viewpoints that are at once scientific and humane and Brown argues 
that this means there can be be no one correct doctrine because each 
approach is reliant upon the other for completeness. The point which 
Brown is endeavouring to make is that rationality, as it operates 
within society, can be seen to involve a form of communicative 
rationality in the sense that there exists a communication between 
different viewpoints. In Brown's terms these viewpoints can come 
from either a scientific or a more romantic direction, and still be 
seen in terms of a symbolic negotiation alluding to a communicative 
rationality which embraces differing points of view . 
2.4.2 Rationality and norms 
Brown's use of rationality in terms of embodying different 
viewpoints can also be used to point to the way in which his view of 
norms within society do not have an exact ambiguous meaning. For 
Brown everything in society is at one and the same ti me poetic and 
scientific and therefore even norms are open to symbolic 
reinterpretation. This way of thinking has implications for the 
normative relationship between people because it highlights Brown's 
belief that norms have also to be interpreted and not just 
ass imulated into consciousness. He notes: 
No longer ... [should) ... we search for the out there structure of 
reality but should ask, how is reality socially constructed? 
.. . interaction becomes not the reciprocity of roles and norms 
or a situation where hapless actors serve as media of social 
forces, but instead a situated process of inference and 
interpretation ... sharability is treated as a problematic 
feature for actors to create and realise (1978:19). 
This in turn indicates that different viewpoints and ways of 
thinkina in ~ ~(iety, whetf!er scientific or artistic, or' inv ol yina 
norms and roles, are ongoingly open to people's symbolic 
reinterpretation. Therefore, roles and norms should not be conceived 
of as constraints (as for example in the systems approach), but 
rather as invitat ions for interpretation on what particular roles 
and norms mean for people . Language as poetry, therefore, is seen 
to encompass science, art , norms and roles in terms of Brown's 
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cognitive aesthetics. And, as symbolic, both the language of 
science and art (norms and roles) are rational in terms of an 
experiential participation and interpretation of the symbolic fabric 
of social reality. This in turn points to the idea that 
communication within society is also rational in the sense that it 
allows for an exchange of different viewpoints between ways of 
seeing social reality. (This can be seen to link with Habermas's 
conception of rationality as an exchange of viewpoints. See chapter 
1 section 1.3.4.) Thus Brown indicates that by offering a theory 
which is seen to be symbolic and interpretative in all its forms, 
for example in normative structures for action and in all modes of 
thinking (science and art), his theory can be shown to take up and 
utilise the ideals of humanist intersubjective living . 
2.4.3 Brown's view of sociology in terms of cognitive aesthetics 
By suggesting that everything in social life is symbolic Brown can 
be seen to be offering a view of sociology which in his terms 
encapsulates the humanist argument . However, it would appear that 
he also wishes to draw attention to the idea that humanism as a form 
of sociology itself draws upon ways of "seeing" which have 
traditionally been called scientific. But humanist sociology can 
only encapsulate those ways of seeing by recognising that all 
sociological perspectives on reality, themselves have to be 
interpreted in a specific way. In other words, even though certain 
perspectives pose themselves as being scientific, for instance 
certain traditions within systems theory and Marxism, for Brown the 
fact that they pose as scientific is not sufficient grounds to call 
them scientific and thus objective . 
What Brown is alluding to here is the idea that sociology as a form 
of meaningmaking amongst other forms of meaningmaking, should not be 
seen in terms of either objective or subjective representations of 
reality. He wishes to make the point that humanism, usually placed 
within the arts side of thinking in society and argued to embrace 
areas of intuition and emotion, for him is a sociological form of 
thinking in society which can at one and the same time encapsulate 
scientific, as well as intuitive, elements. 
the humanist argument which happens to focus 
Therefore, for 
upon how human 
Brown, 
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symbolic meaningmaking takes place in society, is neither totally 
scientific nor intuitive. 
As was noted above in section 2.4.1, Brown's argument points to the 
idea that normative relations and roles within society do not exist 
independent of people's interpretation thereof. That science, art, 
norms and roles can all be seen as negotiational concepts within the 
social fabric of society, denote them as debatable entities which do 
not inhere one meaning or action and which are, therefore, open to 
what Cornie Alant refers to as intersubjective dialogue. It will be 
shown that Alant argues that social reality functions dialogically 
and that this dialogical concept, encompasses all people in an arena 
of intersubjective meaningmaking which allows for people's symbolic 
interpretation. In this way Brown's cognitive aesthetics in the form 
of a conceptual vocabulary is taken up and extended by Alant in the 
form of dialogical living. It is to Alant's theory that this thesis 
now turns. 
2.5 INTERSUBJECTIVITY AS DIALOGUE - CORNIE ALANT 
Cornie Alant states his position on dialogical living in this way: 
What dialogue reasoning actually does is to show effectively 
the paradoxicali ty of the world-taken-for-granted. The 
concepts of culture, value, and norm do not represent 
objectively specified truth in society as they are often 
thought to do; rather do they constitute primary vehicles of 
communication for the continuing dia logue on the content of 
social reality (1990:53). 
In short this quotation of Alant's theoretical standpoint has 
encapsulated the spectrum of concepts inherent within the humanist 
perspective : save for one, that of freedom . (The i~sue of freedoM 
was taken up earlier in section 2.2 of this chapter and is addressed 
by Alant in section 2.5.1 to follow.) In terms of the above 
quotation Alant argues that dialogical reasoning shows up the 
paradoxicality of the world-taken-for-granted because cultural 
values and norms are not objective truths, they are elements of our 
personal lifeworld which function in terms of negotiation. 
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So many times in this chapter has the idea of interpretative reality 
been alluded to. (For example, Mead's interrelationship between the 
"Me" and the "I", Berger's people as both product and producer of 
social reality, and Romm's sameness and otherness, etc.). This 
paradoxical situation becomes problematic for the humanist when 
the concepts of culture, value and norm present as so called 
objectified truths in society rather than negotiated symbols. How 
can these concepts relate to so called external truths if they are 
only knowable in consciousness? 
2.5 . 1 Intersubjectivity as symbolic 
It has been noted in this chapter that intersubjectivity is not a 
private individual experience - it operates socially . Meadian 
symbols are not defined individually. They rely upon social 
encounter for their meanings (see Chapter 1 section 1.4.2.3). 
"Rather, (symbols) constitute primary vehicles of communication for 
the continuing dialogue on the content of social reality" (Alant, 
1990 :53). This means that social reality is precarious, ever 
changing and open to redefinition. As Alant notes, socialisation is 
not merely the passing on of culture, or the mere choosing between 
past, future and present situations. It is: 
. .. [A] process by means of which society constantly confirms 
and revises its own being; a process whereby the socialising 
agent also participates as socialisee, and the socialisee 
likewise fulfils the role of socialising agent ... children are 
formed by their elders but the elders themselves are also 
formed by the children (1990:53). 
Symbols, as traditional culture, in this way are continuously either 
reaffirmed or opened up to reconsideration and the bringing forth of 
new meanings . People create the world in which they live because 
they are creatively involved in its very definition. To suppress 
discourse within a dominant ideology or culture is (as shown in 
Chapter 1 section 1.4.2.4) to take on a life of moronic existence . 
Therefore as was noted in Brown's argument, interaction is not 
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merely the reciprocity of roles and norms but a process of 
interpretation and shareability (but not consensus). To live 
dialogically then accepts the taken-for-granted aspects of life 
whilst at the same time questioning its validity. Or, as A1ant 
further states: 
The dialogue approach clearly recogn i ses that truth does have a 
distinct fact, but that its face is never cast in concrete, and 
always remains human .. . . As a feature of human real i ty truth 
just as fact and validity is produced intersubjective1y; it 
does not pertain to one or other formula [logical or otherwise] 
existing independently from consciousness .... As a process truth 
is located in dialogue; as a structure, truth is always of a 
dialectical constitution (1990:10). 
Seen in this way, people are free - free to choose from 
alternatives; free to accept tradition or to contribute to revlslng 
it; free to make such choices in the knowledge that others do the 
same; and furthermore in doing so, to acknowledge that others may 
have different perspectives on the situation. A1ant's definition of 
freedom considers the concept in terms of a social phenomenon (i .e 
choice, redefinabi1ity in the light of alternative options , etc . ), 
which become negated by the operation of power structures within 
society . As was noted in Chapter 1 section 1.3 .4 JUrgen Habermas 
considers that power within society rests firmly within the 
communicative arena . It is to this idea that we now turn . 
2.5.2 Power as a distorter of intersubjective living 
JUrgen Habermas's argument , and indeed the argument of Michel 
Foucault (chapter 3 section 3.6 .2), focus on the problem of power 
distortion. As noted, in Habermas's terms distortion can and often 
does cause a constraint in communication. In this respect Ar i e Brand 
(1990) who was mentioned earlier in Chapter 1 section 1.3.4, 
suggests that the "Steering media [of] money [as] power takes over 
the integrative role of language ... in the field of action" 
(1990:54) . 
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Brand explains this point by noting that the functional conditions 
of system reproduction in modern societies " ... penetrate via money 
and power, into the lifeworld and destroy communicative 
processes .. . " (1990: 54). 
There is a reification of what Habermas calls the rational 
foundations of communicative action in the lifeworld which can 
result in blockages to truly communicate because people believe that 
a particular ideology is the only way to see things. Patrick 
Scambler (1986) in this respect makes note that: 
The lifeworld is seen in terms of communicative action 
[whereas], social systems are seen in terms of purposive-
rational-action. These concepts of system and lifeworld, which 
are interrelated but cannot be reduced to one another, provide 
the key to Habermas's theory of social or cultural evolution 
(1986: 171) . 
In terms of Habermas's theory, purposive-rational-action relates to 
communication in terms of strategic action, and this Habermas 
indicates is a communication which is orientated towards success. 
He explains strategic action in this way: 
Strategic action is judged along one particular dimension of 
rationality. It can be appraised from the standpoint of the 
efficiency of influencing the decisions of rational opponents 
(1982:264) . 
Medicine can be argued to fit into Habermas's framework of 
purposive-rational-action which is geared to success in terms of 
science. In this way communicative action does not incorporate 
emancipatory and discursive elements because it flows from a 
Pdlti":u~2: idt:oloyy; scier:i.i('ic ~roveability. 
On the other hand the interests of communicative rationality are 
relative to emancipation as discursive, and Habermas argues that 
these interests are incorporated within what he calls the 
"critically oriented sciences" (1971a:308). Romm (1991) notes that: 
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These are the sciences which focus specifically on criticising 
the given state of affairs in society in order to engender a 
society in which an unrestrained discursive communication can 
reign (1991:138). 
In these terms, purposive action does not allow for emancipatory 
elements or for the possibility of reflection and Habermas argues 
that the social sciences have a part to play in bringing about a 
human freedom which rests firmly in what he calls the potentialities 
of people. By this Habermas alludes to the idea that critical 
theory needs to highl ig ht this potential in the form of 
communicative discourse. And he further argues that by pointing to 
commun icative discourse in terms of drawing out the potential 
inherent within the lifeworld of human beings, critical theory paves 
the way for people to be able to communicate in a truly discursive 
(emancipatory) fashion. 
Habermas argues that in the current situation the social sciences 
(unless critical) have tend ed not to fn~ I J ~ on ~ommunir.tive 
discourse. By indicating that there is indeed a different way of 
organising thin gs whi ch can make the social science s more relevant 
and hence their input into soc iety more appropriate for human 
enterprise, Habermas argues for a "genuinely emancipated 
society . .. in which individuals actively control their own lives" 
(1987:167). 
On the other hand, if these emancipatory elements become blocked, 
there exists the possibility for what Habermas calls a di stortion of 
communication which results, according to Romm (1991), in the 
" . .. conceal[ment) from members of society the fact that th ere i s a 
possibility of reflecting upon, and reconsidering and subjecting to 
debate, particular existing social ... [action)" (1991 : 135) . This 
distortion of communIcation can ~anifest in the form of Brand's 
steering med ia (power and mo ney [purposive-rational)), and thereby 
lead to a destruction of the lifeworld (in Habermas's terms). If 
this is to be prevented, Habe rmas argues that the social sciences 
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must focus on the potential of people for communicative rationality. 
When these "blockages" in communication patterns are addressed Romm 
indicates that: 
Habermas's dialectic approach in shifting emphasis from the 
theoretical and empirical to the realm of experience, can 
facilitate an experience wherein the subjects of society 
themselves come to utilise the theorectica1 hypotheses as a 
basis for their (self) emancipation (1991 : 144) . 
In this way Romm is able to allude to Habermas's suggestion that 
" ... under1ying the fact of distorted communication and the 
suppression of genera1isab1e interests .. . is the potential for an 
alternative " (1991 :134). There is a need to " .. . account for the 
interests underlying the logic of empirical scientific analyses -
otherwise it will operate behind our backs and ... contro1 us" 
(1991:142) . In line with this argument, Brand indicates that 
" .. . when we engage in communication to conduct a discourse ... which 
is by its nature, a true discourse ... (rather than) just a forced one 
or one which is proclaimed only for the sake of peace" (1990 :20), 
reality does not operate behind our backs because it actually 
involves people in its definition - in true emancipatory 
communication . This means that in the process of di scourse, 
different alternatives are addressed and negotiated and th i s Brand 
notes " ... leads not to truth as might be expected in disputes 
concern i ng the objective world, but to rightness" (1990 :20) . 
2.5.3 Distorted communication as distorted intersubjectivity 
The main point, however , is that through the medium of distorted 
communication and the backing power of ideology , certain individuals 
gain power by impressing this ideology upon others and causing what 
Habermas calls a distortion of intersubjectivity . Ideology serves to 
make the symbolic network in society appear rigid. It attains this 
by stifling people's consciousness to such an extent that they 
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themselves do not think in any other categories. Whilst Habermas 
suggests that this takes place via a distortion in communication, 
Foucault argues that power distortion in the form of state 
intervention ensures that people internalise power ideologies, not 
through coercion, but through an infiltration of people's meaning 
patterns which allows them to forget that there are other ways of 
seeing the world and constructing reality. In this respect Foucault 
argues that the: 
... effects of power circulate through progressive finer 
channels, gaining access to individuals themselves, to their 
bodies, their gestures, and all their daily actions (1980:77). 
In other words power has an insidious mechanism. In chapter 3 
section 3.6.2 of this study it will be noted that in particular 
Fou cault suggests that in the medical field the effects of such 
power have been highly successful in fostering a medical ideology 
upon people which is both pervasive and impersonal. Therefore the 
effects of power upon the symbolir worldconstruction of human living 
becomes an effective block to intersubjective dialogue and to th e 
ideal of Alant's concept of freedom. 
But whatever the anguish, in seeking a humanistic sociology David 
Friedrichs argues its worth in relation to a human " ... commitment 
which promotes the obliteration of demeaning and degrading 
dimensions of human existence" (in Alant, 1990:2-3). In these terms 
he suggests that humanistic relev ance lies in its "[commitment] to 
studying the principal barriers to a fully realised human dignity, 
autonomy and equal ity ... " (1990: 2) . 
2.6 CONCLUS ION 
It h~s been rroposed In this chapter that dialogical llving purports 
to living a life of ongoing meaningmaking in the knowledge that if 
freedom is to be found at all (remembering Sartre's comments, even 
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this is open to debate), it lies not in the security of objective 
truths, but in the experiential nature of social reality . Social 
reality of this type is QDly located (in the terms of this thesis), 
through the intersubjective arena of a negotiated experience of the 
world. 
In this way it was suggested that the humanist perspective presents 
a radically different ontology to that of the systems and conflict 
perspectives read in Chapter 1. The "difference" was explained by 
indicating that the symbolic nature of social reality implies that 
the concept of intersubjectivity relates to the way in which people 
make meaning in their lifeworld, rather than in a belief that 
reality can be located as an external entity. The arguments of 
various authors within the humanist tradition were used to highlight 
this radically different approach to human living . 
Firstly the work of Jean-Paul Sartre was read and the concept of 
human freedom was shown to indicate that although it is painful to 
enter into the negotiatory interaction of human life, the human 
being has no other way open to him/her. It was shown that according 
to Sartre, to live means to enter into the dynamism of life and this 
in turn involves taking a co-responsibility for human decisionmaking 
and action, and at the same time accepting the anguish that this 
type of living presents. 
The argument of Peter Berger was shown to suggest that whilst people 
do not live in a private world, a common world cannot become a 
consensual world because worldbuilding is actually about human 
beings having the freedom to make choices. Berger indicated that 
choicemaking and questioning form the basis of his theory of the 
dialectic, and this in turn was shown to imply that there can be no 
clear -cut norm for human beings to follow. 
The theory of Richard Brown focussed on the issue of meaningful 
cognition and argued that people have to be involved in a form of 
cognitionmaking which encompasses all understanding. Brown's 
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argument for cognitive aesthetics was shown to bridge the so called 
objective and subjective areas of human social reality. It was 
noted that he suggests both objective and subjective ways of 
defining social reality (so called science and art) be seen as 
integral parts of the same continuum, and therefore, in terms of 
a meaningful experience within the consciousness of peopl e . 
The argument of Cornie Alant indicated how the theories of the 
various authors utilised within this chapter, can be seen to negate 
a mere subjective living in favour of a focus on the experiential 
participatory elements of symbolic reality in terms of 
intersubjectivity . In this respect Alant argued that subjectivity 
cannot exist in isolation outside of the human framework for 
worldconstruction, because in order to be meaningful, worldbuilding 
must take place intersubjectively through a process of dialogical 
living . 
In the chapter to follow, the suggestion is made that the medical 
model hampers, rather than enhances, the symbolic ~ssence of social 
reality argued for by this chapter in relation to health and 
il l ness . 
CHAPTER 3 
THE MECHANISTIC MEDICAL MODEL: THE ABSENCE OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the mechanistic medical model will be explored in an 
effort to highlight how the implementation of a purely biomedical 
model of health care has grown through scientific theories of 
reductionist medicine which today place the human being, not at the 
epicentre of responsibility for their bodily health, but at what 
would seem to be the periphery in sociological theory and medical 
sociology. Fritjof Capra's explanation of what this means for the 
treatment of illness cannot be bettered and is reproduced here in 
full: 
Through the history of Western science the development of 
biology has gone hand in hand with that of medicine. Naturally 
then, the mechanistic view of life, once firmly established in 
biology, has also dominated the attitudes of physicians toward 
health and illness. The influence of the Cartesian paradigm on 
medical thought resulted in the so called biomedical model, 
which constitutes the conceptual foundation of modern 
scientific medicine. The human body is regarded as a machine 
that can be analysed in terms of its parts; disease is seen as 
the malfunctioning of biological mechanisms which are studied 
from the point of view of cellular and molecular biology; the 
doctor's role is to intervene , either physically or chemically, 
to correct the malfunctioning of a specific mechanism. Three 
centuries after Descartes, the science of medicine is still 
based on the notion of the body as a machine, of disease as the 
consequence of breakdown of the machine, and of the doctor's 
task as repair of the machine. 
By concentrating on smaller and smaller fragments of the body, 
modern medicine often loses sight of the patient as a human 
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being, and by reducing health to mechanical functioning, it is 
no longer able to deal with the phenomenon of 
healing ... (1987:118} . 
In this respect Karl Figlio (1987 :77), writing on sociological 
theory and medical sociology notes what he calls " .. . the loss of the 
subjective dimension .. . (which} alienates health and illness from the 
1 ife history of the individual and of the society .. . " leaving the 
actual human experience, or what can be referred to as the 
individual lifeworld, un-involved. 
3.2 THE MEDICAL REGIME 
3.2.1 . Medical truths 
Medicine seen in this light seems to suggest that we can obtain 
scientifically proven truths for diagnosis and treatment which can 
repair the ailing machine. And furthermore, that such truths once 
discovered, exist in a sort of scientific isolation which excludes 
the complex interplay of physical, psychological, social and 
environmental aspects of the human condition . However, as noted in 
the previous chapter, the human being is essentially not an 
automaton but a questioning interacting individual who constructs a 
meaningful lifeworld . This in turn implies that to picture health as 
a static condition rather than a continually changing and evolving 
process, is unrealistic . The same must apply to the condition of 
illness. Therefore truth is not unquestionable - it is redefinable 
within a forum of ongoing choice making . 
This study argues, therefore, that however far science has taken us 
(and within the medical field we have to acknowledge that science 
has advanced the human state considerably), facts do not speak for 
themselves . They are open to an interpretative element which can be 
approached from alternative directions. The medical field seems to 
be saying that truth is to be found in the correct representation 
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of facts. However the humanist would argue that there is a gap 
between knowing and believing one knows, and this gap is filled by 
intersubjective meaningmaking. As Martin Buber notes: 
Truth in the world of man is not to be fo und as the content of 
knowledg e, but only as human existence. One does not reflect 
upon it, one does not express it, one does not perceive it, but 
one lives it and receives it as life (1970:89). 
Applied to the modern day scientific medical mode l th ere is a 
realisation that medical sCience, for all it s expertise, still seems 
to have a lot to learn. In the words of Capra: 
In the long rise of scientific medicine, physicians have gained 
fascinating insights into the intimate mechanisms of the human 
body and have developed their techniques to an impressive 
degree of comp lexity and sophistication. Yet in spite of these 
great advances . .. health does not seem to have improved 
significantly ... (1981 ' 130). 
Capra goes on to give his reasons for this statement which basicall y 
suggest that whilst scientific medical regimes have made the lives 
of many thousand s of individuals longer (through the employment of 
scientific med ical truths), it is also possible to argue that at the 
same time it has burdened many people with lives of lesser quality -
what one mig ht call saved by medica l science and yet condemned to 
live lives with increasing dependence on medicine and high 
technology . This means that medicine in th ese terms not only has to 
do with patient and doctor but also with the much broader social, 
economic and moral issues. 
In this respect (as noted in chapter 2 section 2.5.2 of this 
thesis), JDrg en Habermas, Arie Brand and Norma Romm take up this 
issue of how truth is located. Social reality as intersubjective and 
symbolic, allows for choice and revision in the light of alternative 
options, new knowledge and other's meaning structures. This means 
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that no one person can define the symbol truth alone and, therefore, 
no one person can decide what truth might be or what the right 
course of medical action is. As indicated, Habermas, Brand and Romm 
stand firmly in the Buberian camp of truth not as the content of 
knowledge, but only as human experiential existence. Romm takes up 
Brand's notion of a true consensus by noting Habermas's point that 
" ... true theories of society are always moulded by their connection 
with the emancipatory interest" (1991 :139). The only way in which 
verification of truth can come about therefore is " ... when it 
initiates a process of self-reflection on the part of the subjects 
in society, which results in their becoming emancipated" (1991:139). 
Romm goes on to note Habermas's reference to the field of 
psychoanalysis in order to show how this point of truth as human 
emancipation can be verified. In this respect she indicates that 
patient neurosis is only considered as proved " ... when it becomes 
accepted by the patient and utilised as a basis for his or her 
self-reflection" (1991: 139). This point is further expanded upon in 
the chapter to follow. 
3.2.2 The extent of medical knowledge 
Along these lines it is also not difficult to show that there is 
still much that scientific medicine cannot explain mechanically and 
yet, it sits in a position of what appears to be unreproachable 
superiority when it comes to dealing with human health because it 
applies a subjective rather than an intersubjective framework. 
Doctors have achieved considerable success in the field of 
transplant surgery, they can reasonably successfully address 
conditions like diabetes, furred arteries, broken bones and open 
heart surgery to name but a few medical conditions which have 
benefited from scientific medicine. Medical science, whilst not 
claiming to know everything, claims superiority because of the 
belief that it has the best knowledge available through scientific 
investigation and provability. 
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But it is possible to note that medical knowledge is still limited 
in certain areas, for example the integrative action of the nervous 
system which appears, in spite of all manner of diagnostic technical 
advancement, to remain something of a profound mystery. 
Neuroscientists have been able to clarify many aspects of brain 
functioning but not how neurons (nerve cells which have the ability 
to receive and transmit nervous impulses) work together, how they 
integrate themselves into the functioning of the human body. The 
argument in this thesis is that because nothing is ever fully known 
(the humanist tradition indicates that everything is open to ongoing 
definition), medical science and the treatments it offers should be 
seen as somewhat precarious rather than a facticity which inheres a 
one and only truth. 
3.2.3 Medical knowledge and patient involvement 
In the light of the above it can be proffered that the medical 
profession work with the knowledge they have, but this knowledge is 
invariably utilised in terms of a scientific irrefutability which 
appears to negate human involvement. This thesis argues that medical 
knowledge can be much enhanced when human intersubjectivity is also 
taken into account. Seen in this way, medicine needs to remain open 
and to facilitate any and all areas of human life, not only the 
scientific . To discard human meaningmaking in the field of human 
sickness because it is seen to be un-scientific, is to discard the 
open matrix of collaboration which accepts alternatives and affords 
medicine that humane element necessary for human life to be 
meaningful in humanist terms . 
In chapter 2 section 2.4.1 Richard Brown was shown to suggest that 
both science and personal meanings be seen in terms of criteria 
which are organised through experience, into formal structures of 
which knowing is constituted. In this way medical knowledge is 
enlarged, enhanced and strengthened, because it can be seen to 
facilitate the involvement of people by allowing them to become a 
part of their own treatment and healing programmes which encompass a 
personal responsibility. This responsibility means that people make 
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choices between alternative paths of action and in so doing, accept 
some accountability for their own health, and furthermore, for the 
construction of their own social reality. The next chapter examines 
this situation with reference to the concept of intersubjectivity. 
3. 2.4 Medicine - partnership or radical monopoly? 
What this study argues for is not only that patients become involved 
in diagnosis and treatment regimes but that professional personnel, 
rather than being trained to deal with smaller and smaller 
fragmented pieces of the body machine, join patients in a two-way 
interactional undertaking which takes account of the intersubjective 
elements of human living. This implies a process of participation 
by all parties in arriving at an account of the illness and the 
decisions involved in how to explain and deal with it. Martin Buber 
highlights this pOint when he notes that: "All real living is 
meeting" (1970 :48) . If this meeting does not take place, the stage 
is set for what Ivan Illich (1977) calls social iatrogenesis (all 
impairments to health that are due to the institutional shape of 
health care), or a medical monopoly. 
Illich argues that medicine causes as many medical problems as it 
solves by allowing for " . .. professional autonomy (to) degenerate 
into a radical monopoly (whereby) people are rendered impotent to 
cope with their milieu" (1977 :41) . Thereby the condition of social 
iatrogenesis becomes the main product of the medical organisation. 
Radical monopolies impinge upon freedom and independence because the 
physician decides who is sick, and very often this means that little 
or no consideration is given to how the patient sees the sickness or 
to how the patient's meaning structures are affecting that sickness. 
The argument of Illich is expanded upon in section 3.6.4 of this 
chapter . 
3.2. 5 Medicine as negotiational status shift 
With this argument in mind , it can be suggested that some serious 
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illnesses like cancer may be effected and even induced by 
psychological disturbances, and that treatment may be more 
successful if these disturbances are taken into the diagnostic 
framework. Intersubjectivity within the medical framework allows 
not only for medical science to play its part but also for the sick 
to be considered as human beings who have physical, psychological 
and social needs which impinge upon their state of health and which 
should therefore be granted equal weight with science. 
Intersubjective living (meaning that none of us inhabit a private 
world, or have a private experience of it) joins forces with 
dialogical living (meaning that human reality can only manifest 
itself as an ongoing process of interpretation between opposing 
positions) to echo Buber's words that all real living is meeting. 
Such meetings are two way affairs which require not only that the 
doctor imparts information, but that the patient does likewise. 
Veronica McKay's (1990:290) status shift referred to earlier in the 
introduction of this study is applicable here. In this way all 
available knowledge and meanings actually conflate. Interestingly 
Capra (1987) highlights just this point when speaking of the healer 
as a mechanic: 
The best results proceed from a "negotiation" in which the 
practitoner's viewpoint and that of the patient come close 
enough together for true communication ... 1 (as doctor) often 
tell patients how I would treat myself if I had their illness. 
My choices may not include some of the things they're doing . 
Likewise, their choices may not include some of the things I 
would do. But I do not take away the benefit of their methods 
by saying they're no good . Instead I work to see how our 
beliefs can mesh (1987:56) . 
Capra's concept of negotiation captures the idea of intersubjective 
dialogue. (This point in relation to human choicemaking is 
-87-
expanded in the chapter to follow). However, Capra i ndicates that 
he was not trained to negotiate. He states that throughout his 
training he learnt not to empathise with patients and he emphasises 
this point by saying that even when called to a heart attack victim 
the hospital page operator calls "Code 5". Capra mai ntains that this 
impersonal emotional distance hurts both parties. How has th i s type 
of impersonal scientific training within the medical model come 
about? 
3.3 THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MECHANISTIC MEDICAL MODEL 
3.3.1 A historical overview 
During the seventeenth century the world was character ised in 
organic terms as having to do with the interdependence of spiritual 
and materia l phenomena. The reasoning behind the world as organic 
relied upon "faith" as a means to inject meaning and significance 
into human life and Capra notes that: 
Medieval scientists, looking for the purposes underlying 
various natural phenomena, considered questions relating to 
God, the human soul, and ethics to be of the highest 
significance (1987 :38). 
But changes and advances in the understanding of astronomy and 
physics brought to the fore names like Descartes, Newton and Bacon. 
With them came the idea that the hitherto notion of the universe as 
organic, living and spiritual, be replaced by a mathematical 
analyti c reasoning which advocated that the world and everything 
within it be thought of as an entity which could be reduced to 
quantifiable measurement. 
This change UT Lhinking about humans and their universe became known 
as The Scientific Revolution and was due in no small measure to 
th inkers like Ga1i1eo, who for the first time advocated that both 
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nature and human life cou ld be thought of in terms of mathematical 
postulates . The psychiatrist R. D. Laing, quoted in Capra (1987:30) 
notes a fundamental problem with thinking about human living in 
quantifiable terms: 
Out go sight, sound, taste, touch and smell and along with them 
has since gone aesthetics and motives, intentions, soul, 
consciousness, spirit. Experience as such is cast out of the 
realm of scien tific discourse. 
3.3.2 Mechanistic medicine - understanding or control? 
The scientific quest for understanding and wisdom was replaced by 
what can be termed the Baconian spirit which sought to control 
through science. In other words, to develop verifiable 
experimentation which could provide knowledge aimed at controlling 
nature, rather than as hitherto, to understanding it through the 
powers of deduction. E. Gilson and T. Langan (1965:9 ) note th i s new 
start as follows: "Bacon w~ s the spokesman for the new ideal of a 
scientific view of the world based upon observation and experimental 
reasoning". Philosophising was to be de molished because of its 
" ... unwholesome mixture of things human and divine" (Gilson and 
Langan 1965:37) in favour of " ... a true and lawful marriage ... 
between the empirical and rational faculty" which was to conquer 
nature via " ... the mind's machine" (1965 :38). Rather than following 
the philosophers who Bacon saw as working from axiom to conclusion 
(within the realm of speculation), science need ed to work from 
experiments and observations up to axioms. 
According to S. Stumpf (1982:213) Bacon advocated that learning had 
become stagnant: 
Philosophy was still dominated by Plato and Aristotle, ~;hose 
teachings Bacon denounced as shadows and phantoms. Because he 
emphasized the uti lity of knowledge, having said that 
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knowledge is power, he was particularly agitated by the 
uselessness of traditional learning. What made this learning 
useless was that science had become mixed up with 
superstition, unguided speculation, and theology . Bacon 
challenged this approach to science as having no adequate 
method for discovering what nature and its workings are really 
1 i ke . 
And so whilst Bacon set forth an empirical theory of inductive 
procedure, scientific experimentation was combined wi th the use of 
mathematical language to describe nature. 
properties of material bodies which could 
Only the essential 
be measured were to be 
called scientific (deduction), whilst subjective qualities were to 
be considered secondary mental projections which had to be excluded 
from the domain of science . 
3.3.3 The medical machine 
As was noted in section 3.3.2 above , according to Bacon learning had 
become stagnant . It came from studying literary texts, and in the 
field of medicine the qualification for medica l practice was an 
abil i ty to quote the texts of Hippocrates and Gal en rather than to 
understand the experiential and participatory elements involved in 
human health and sickness. This meant that medical practice was 
usually undertaken by poets, rhetoricians and clergymen . The 
discovery of machinery, and in particular clockmaking with it s 
precise automatic moving parts, soon found animals and people 
likened to living bodies formed with wheels and springs . This view 
fostered all the potential necessary for Bacon ' s call to conceive of 
the universe in mechanistic terms , and furthermore, to join forces 
with Galileo ' s mathematical language . 
3.4 HUMAN EXPERIENCE : AN ABSENT ENTI TY IN THE MECHANISTIC MODEL 
It quite naturally followed that to be scientific in the field of 
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medicine not only required that one think of the body in mechanistic 
terms, but that one actually had to conceive of human illness devoid 
of all human experience . This meant that the human aspects of 
sickness - together with its meaningful experience in consciousness 
- were discarded in favour of the body as a machine which when 
broken was mended by the physician as mechanic. In this respect 
Capra suggests that with the Cartesian revolution the hitherto 
addressal of the interplay of body, mind and soul was replaced by 
the Descartian division between mind and body, which led physicians 
to concentrate on the body machine and to neglect the psychological, 
social and environmental aspects of human living. 
As noted above, Figlio (1987:77) argues that it is in fact 
" ... subjectivity [which] distinguishes a sociological approach to 
health and illness from an epidemiological one", and he makes clear 
his point that unless we try to reclaim the subjective element in 
medical sociology, we will never be free from the medical hegemony 
to which we seem to have grown accustomed. The claim of this thesis 
is that intersubjectivity (which this thesis distinguishes from 
subjective exclusively on the grounds that interaction is not only 
two way but takes account of all human meaningmaking), has to be 
fostered if a medical model is to become more humane. 
Figlio in arguing that medical sociology has lost its individual 
subjectivity indicates that people's consciousness or essence is now 
uninvolved in medical theory, or as he puts it: " ... alienated . .. from 
the life history of the individual and of the society' (1987:77). 
This study however, in keeping with the humanist criticism levelled 
at the mechanistic medical model put forward above (and in view of 
the humanist tradition towards social reality as laid down in 
chapter 2), would indicate that Figlio, whilst advancing in the 
right direction can be extended. 
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In the terms of humanist theory, human subjectivity has to be 
replaced with human intersubjectivity as the primary concept needed 
to avert medical hegemony. (In chapter 4 the theories put forward in 
chapter 2 will be expanded upon to highlight this point). The 
primacy of intersubjectivity is noted by Suber in this way: 
... fulfilment ... between men, means acceptance of 
otherness .... The strictness and depth of human individuation, 
the elemental otherness of the other, is then not merely noted 
as the necessary starting point, but is affirmed from the one 
being to the other (1970:112). 
Therefore there can be no individual self because subject equals 
mutual , reciprocal subject. Intersubjectivity develops and is 
reliant upon the symbolic nature of human living which Suber refers 
to as We-ness. In noting this, Suber says that man n ••• will not 
persist in existence if he does not learn anew to persist in it as a 
genuine We" (1970:86). Does We-ness manifest itself in medical 
practice? In seeking an answer to this question the effort will hR 
to point out that in many instances medical science does not 
successfully (i.e in humanist terms) account for We-ness or 
intersubjectivity within the currently implemented medical model. 
This chapter now moves on to consider these concepts in terms of the 
doctor-patient interaction. 
3.5 THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP 
The doctor-patient relationship is of paramount import in any 
evaluation of medicine and no study can hope to be fu l filled without 
the inclusion of Talcott Parsons's (systems theoretical) account of 
the sick-role. In this section a short account of this theory is 
offered, both from the patient and doctor point of view. It is 
argued that intersubJectivity , in humanist terms, does not present 
within the Parsonian appraisal of the doctor-patient relationship. 
An indication is then given of how the humanist tradition can afford 
a more humane way of conceiving the roles of patient and doctor 
within the medical model, by engendering intersubjective 
meaningmaking. 
3.5.1 
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Talcott Parsons and the concept of self-interest in the 
doctor-patient relationship. 
Grappling with the notion of self-interest as the principal 
characteristic of modern industrial society, Parsons could not 
easily ally on the one hand rational science and on the other the 
sensitivity of the emotional attitudes concerning patient-doctor 
relationships. Uta Gerhardt (1987) argues " ... the sick role is 
regarded [by Parsons] as a complementary counterpart to the 
practitioner's role, and both are ... elements of the social system 
of medical practice" (1987:115). 
Between 1951 and 1958 Parsons developed his theory on roles within 
the medical profession. His theory on patient illness and the role 
of the physician suggests that the doctor's task is to confirm 
the individual in the sick role - a soc iall y sanctioned set of 
behaviours to which people are expected to conform when s ick . 
Working from a basis of functionalism, Parsons regarded illness as 
dysfunctional for society because it interfered with the more usual 
societal roles performed by people when in health. In this way 
illness can be viewed almost as deviant because it deviates from the 
ro l e norms of non-sick behaviour which usually apply, and which 
uphold system equilibrium. Gerhardt (1987:118) makes note of the 
systematised collectivity in this way: 
... both the sick role and the physician's role follow a 
collectivity orientation .... for the former, it ensures that 
getting well is seen as accomplishing a common task in 
co-operation with the doctor .... for the [latter], collective 
orientation above all [denotes the] motive for all diagnostic 
and therapeutic action. Thus ... the value orientations of 
universalism, achievement, affective neutrality, functional 
specii'ic i ty, and col l ectivity uf spi r it, make the sick rule arid 
the practitioner's role into a social system [which upholds the 
whole]. 
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3.5.2 The si ck role 
In Parsonian th eory the patient role is subordinate to that of the 
doctor who holds an elitist pos ition because of superior medical 
knowledge in relation to that of the patient. Gerhardt in this 
respect notes that there is a " ... two-way rule-governed acceptance 
of the one side's claim to dominance and the other side's 
will ingness to comply ... " (1987:130). Gerhardt observes that this 
professional dominance aids an exclusionary and expan sion i st social 
control which ha s an influence upon the interaction of any 
consultation because the roles of doctor and patient are associated 
with certain expectations. And, furthermore, in terms of Parson's 
theory denotes a rationality aimed at system maintenance . 
This two-way acceptance denotes the patient as expecting the doctor 
to diagnose and treat illness from a base of elite specialist 
knowledge. The patient is required to passively accept the diagnosis 
and treatment suggested by the doctor without question. Figlio 
(1987:89) notes that in relation to the med ical mode l and 
rationality, these expectations " ... do not f it the mode l of 
rationality that one would expect from ... sociological 
typifications .. . ". This point was expanded in section 1.4.3.2 of 
chapter I in terms of Schutzian theory. 
3.6 THE POWER STRUCTURES WITHIN THE MEDICAL RELATIONSHIP 
As was noted in section 3.5 of this chapter, Parsons's theory points 
to a power element within the doctor-patient relationship. For 
Parsons the authority of the doctor is legiti mised by a mechanism 
within contemporary society which defines illness in terms of 
anti-social or deviant behaviour. In this way sickness is viewed as 
a negatively achieved role (which should be righted as soon as 
po~::,ible) ) bEcause it reJllOV~;::, U1I:! tole occupant from the mor'e 
important role in terms of the functional pre requisites of the 
social system. In this respect the doctor 's role can be seen as one 
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of preserver of the social system: a high incidence of illness is 
dysfunctional for the system as a whole . Gerhardt (1987:119) 
therefore notes that: "The doctor's role ... is to provide the 
legitimation to enter the sick status as well as to spur the urge to 
leave it". The power element here points to the doctor as definer of 
sickness and the patient as mere submissive recipient of a doctor ' s 
suggestions. 
3.6.1 Medical power as a col onisation of·the lifeworld 
Other authors too have debated and theorised on the power element in 
the medical model. Graham Scambler (1986) suggests that Jurgen 
Habermas views the power structures inherent in medicine as having 
co 1 on i sed people's 1 i feworl d " ... by means of its power as an expert 
occupation . .. (and its) distortion of communication caused by medical 
expertise in doctor-patient exchanges" (1986:165). Scambler defines 
the use of the term lifeworld in this way: 
It refers to the distinctive, pre-reflexive form of background 
assumptions , co;wic;;lons and relations which functiull as a 
resource for what goes into explicit communication ... the 
lifeworld is the medium, or symbolic space within which 
culture, social integration, and personal ity are sustained and 
reproduced (1986:170 , 171). 
Habermas's reference to power as a colonisation of the lifeworld 
(as discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis), becomes increasingly 
important towards the end of this chapter when the strength of the 
intrusion by mechanistic medicine into the meaning structures of 
people is evaluated. It is noted that Habermas, in calling for a 
society which is genuinely emancipated, can be seen to argue for a 
medical profession in which individuals actively control their own 
l ives. 
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Therefore, by drawing on Habermas's argumentation concerning 
emancipation and by allowing for intersubjective participation (as 
intimated in chapter 2 section 2.5.3), this thesis endeavo urs to go 
beyond the idea of consensual l y agreed upon norms to suggest that 
norms are not unnegotiab1e, but are rather a debatable entity 
reliant upon a dialogue of viewpoints in which all participate and 
make choices. 
3.6.2 Medic i ne as a controlling agent 
Another way in which power can be considered within the medical 
model is in terms of Michel Foucault's argument which suggests that 
power can be viewed as double sided. This means that power can at 
one and the same time incorporate welfare with supervision and 
control. Foucault's theory evolved in relation to his interest in 
state control, and primarily to state contro l linked to surveillance 
of the so cal l ed deviants in soci~ty (the mad, the sick, the 
prisoner, etc.). Foucault's argument is that state institutions seem 
to be ·orqanised in such a way as to allow the control of many into 
the hands of a few - often one person. (He uses the example of the 
Benthamian Panopticon* to show that in th i s situation successful 
control by the few actually results in the controlled controlling 
themselves). 
In this respect Foucault's argument can be utilised to argue that 
medicine has become a" ... c10sed domain reserved for it alone" 
(1980:75). By a process of extrapolation this can be seen to suggest 
that medica l personne l exert power over many through an 
interventionist elitist technology available to, and utilised by, 
the few. 
*A prison building which was so design ed to enable one guard to 
effecciveiy observe (controi) a number of prisoners at one and l~2 
same time. Because prisoners had no way of telling when they were 
being watched - the guard cou ld be removed and the prisoners 
controlled themselves in expectation of the mere possibility of 
surveillance. 
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In this way it can be argued that so successful has medicine been in 
infiltrating people's consciousness, it is now " ... associated with a 
general amplification of power which does not curb or limit [its) 
forces, but rather produces [its) enhancement" (1980:111). 
Clearly both Habermas and Foucault criticise the Parsonian view of 
the legitimacy of physician power because it can be indicated that 
it occludes an intersubjective relationship in which opposing 
positions may be expressed in terms of negotiation (this is 
elaborated upon in the following chapter). 
3.6.3 The conflict view of power relationships in the medical model 
Yet another way of perceiving the power relationship within the 
medical model is in terms of a conflictual interaction. E. Friedson 
suggests that " ... the separate worlds of experience and reference of 
the layman and the professional worker are always in potential 
conflict with one another" (in Patrick & Scambler 1986:60) . By this 
Friedson means that the doctor's dominant knowledge ncgate3 any 
knowledge which the patient may wish to bring to the interaction, in 
terms of a superiority of knowledge. Contrary to this view Friedson 
argues that the doctor-patient role be seen in terms of symmetry 
rather than division due to elitist powers. And in this way 
Freidson can be argued to uphold the suggestion put forward by this 
thesis - that all potentially conflicting areas of social life can 
be addressed via (symmetrical) negotiation. To negotiate thereby 
implies an intersubjective arena whereby human interaction can 
facilitate the views of all parties. 
However, Friedson argues that conflict within the doctor-patient 
relationship can be viewed in various ways. Firstly it is noted 
that there is often oppositional principles present between the 
doctors obligation to help the individual patient and their 
obligation to administer their professional duties on behalf of not 
only the person but also the state. This problematic can become 
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compounded by differing evaluations on the part of doctor and 
patient concerning the seriousness of a condition - viz. , the 
patient may perceive his/her particular illness as important enough 
to lose time from employment whilst the doctor does not. The 
humanist thinke r would suggest that a truer definition can be sought 
through the mediation of intersubjective negotiation. 
It can be argued that health education and awareness campaigns do 
aim to equip the individual with as much health knowledge as 
possible so that the patient can aid the doctor in arriving at a 
diagnosi s . But Patrick and Scambler note that this situation 
actually places the patient in a double-bind position in that they 
are expected to have and to offer personal knowledge of illness 
whilst at the same time accepting unquestioningly the doctor's 
diagnosis and suggested course of action. According to Friedson 
(in Patrick, S. & Scamler G. ,1986) medical expertise is in part 
founded upon , and generally legitimised in society, by what Friedson 
calls a formal knowledge . (Note the difference from Parsons who 
believe s in thp legitimation of medi~al expertise because it is 
fu nctional for the system, and therefore beneficial to all). By 
this Fri edson means knowledge of a higher degree which is the domain 
of a few - in this case the medical profession - and which therefore 
cannot be deemed as beneficial to all. According to Frieds on t he 
use of formal knowledge to order human affairs can in this way be 
seen to constitute an exercise of power , or an act of domination 
over tho se who are the object. 
In this respect Ralf Dahrendorf ' s argument referred to in chapter 1 
section 1.3.3.2, which locates power within role occupation, can be 
seen to compleme nt Friedson's concept of power as exercised through 
elitist formal knowledge . Power is exercised by the doctor over the 
patient by virtue of his or her priviledged role in having access to 
more scientific medical know-how. This, however, is not to say t hat 
the patient does not have knowledge which can be brought to the 
consultation and more will be said about this point in chapter 4 to 
follow. 
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3.6.4 Critique of contemporary over-medicalisation 
Ivan Illich (1977) - whose position was briefly touched upon in 
section 3.2.4 above - offers a systematic critique of the nature and 
practice of modern medicine. Illich's critique of the medical model 
can be used to highlight some of the reasons identified by this 
study as problematic for human intersubjectivity. He argues that 
the appli cat ion and influence of modern medic al practice with its 
scientific character and aspects of control over human lives, is 
serving not so much to improve health but to advance the 
med ica l isation of life. According to L. Doyle and I. Pennell (1981) 
it is Illich's proposition that medical techniques can be both 
harmful and ineffectual and furthermore that medicine, on the whole, 
does more harm than good. Illich advocates that more and more areas 
of human living are being bro ught into the medical sphere of 
influence and he suggests that not only is immense control exerted 
upon people's autonomy in controlling their own lives , but that this 
is the fa stest growing epidemic of modern times which irrefutably 
and unqu es tionably occupies a position he refers to as a sacred cow. 
Illich ' s theory shows not only how a different view of the power (in 
other words a view which questions the power structures of the 
medical model by pointing to their failings) within the scientific 
medical model can be defined, but also points to the far reaching 
effects upon the impleme ntation of health care. Health care tends to 
be seen in terms of the good it provides in keeping the populace 
free from disease. This study suggests, in line with Illich, that 
medicalisation has permeated the human being so thoroughly that it 
has instilled a desire in people for health not at any price, but 
possibly to the detriment of other areas of human existence. 
3.6.5 The increase in medical intervention 
Increasing medical intervention and the growing pressure of the 
medical profession over social life, has led authors like Friedson 
to speak in terms of monopolisation. Questions of a monopoly, the 
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professional ising process in terms of growth of knowledge and 
service, and areas of coercion and control, suffer from what D. De 
Swan calls " ... the same fault : they overestimate the conscious, 
active part of the individual . .. "(in Siegel, 1987:66) . 
De Swan argues that this increase of medical intervention permits 
the medical regime to exercise more and more power over modern 
society . He states: " . .. over some people totally and even 
permanently, over almost everyone for many aspects of daily life, 
and at decisive moments in the life-cycle . . . (and this) involves an 
authority relation and a hierarchy, a professional ethos and a 
world-view" (in Siegel, 1987:66) . De Swan notes that this increase 
of medical intervention comes about for two reasons. Firstly the 
medical profession owe their elitist position to their specialist 
expertise. This expertise is protected by the profession itself, by 
its personnel and by technical -scientific knowledge founded upon 
explicit theories and demonstrable results of research. Secondly, 
the medical profession are legitimised by the state, whose bodies 
they permeate through professional organisations and administrative 
apparatus. 
3.6.6 The expansion of the medical regime 
Doctors through their professional status are continually opening up 
new areas within social life which require their specialist 
intervention, and this intervention can often be seen to impose what 
can be termed a restrictive influence upon the individual. For 
example an application for a post within a company is often 
dependent upon medical clearance of one sort or another . In the 
case of the elderly within society, entry into sheltered 
accommodation or an old home invariably rests upon a medical 
recommendation. In this regard De Swan (in Siegel, 1987:68) notes 
that : " . . . personal situations .. . which once counsellors and pastoral 
workers had to solve ... " are more often than not re-defined as 
medical problems. He states : 
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Whenever social contradictions are involved, also in their 
individual form as personal conflicts, the reduction to a 
medical problem is a derivative application of medical 
knowledge; medical expertise is used to cover for conflict 
management (1987:68). 
This type of intervention is not initially aimed at control and 
quite often results in the upgrading of the population as a whole. 
But the benefit to the individual is more often than not 
overshaddowed when compared to the benefit received by the medical 
doctor whose services are required in more and more areas of human 
life. What results is an increasing dependence of patients and 
potential patients upon the medical profession which excludes other 
relevant areas of support and aid. 
As the areas of medical intervention grow and other support systems 
diminish, there is a growth in the institutionalisation of certain 
members of the community who would once have continued to occupy a 
place within the family unit. The disabled, the terminally ill, the 
elderly, the feeble -minded are all cases in point. Also the diverse 
categorisation of mental illnesses - in an effort to afford 
rehabilitation programmes aimed at improving the quality of life of 
the mentally ill - label many individuals as in need of specialist 
treatment and this often relegates them to a life of 
institutionalisation . Rehabilitation programmes which once offered 
support mechanisms to equip families for aiding the disabled at 
home have fallen away, and help is now invariably only obtainable 
within the confines of the institution or hospital. This requires 
the services of more and more specialist medical personnel and at 
the same time removes involvement and responsibility from the 
private and individual, into the arena of professional medical 
expertise. 
As diagnostic techniques have improved, so more and more people have 
found their lives invaded and taken over by medical expertise. 
Thereby, society is faced with a medical model which recommends the 
worth of modern technology and at the same time encourages the 
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conditioning of a population who accept this worth unquestioningly. 
This means that ethical and moral considerations are of much import 
and although this topic will be elaborated upon in the final chapter 
of this thesis, a brief resume is offered here in terms of ethical 
considerations relating to medicine as a mechanistic mode l. 
3.7 AN ETHICAL VIEW OF THE MECHANISTIC MODEL 
It will be noted in chapter 5 of this thesis that one of the most 
crucial areas of medica l ethics is the question of rightness or 
wrongness of medical action. It is not only about the good to be 
obtained in either medical care or medical investigation, but rather 
what constitutes right action in medical practice. And furthermore, 
it is concerned with whether or not there exists a reasonably free 
and adequately informed consent (which consent has of course to be 
founded upon intersubjective negotiation as a basis for the 
interaction necessary) between patient as subject, and the person 
instigating the medical procedure. 
When discussing the principles involved with informed consent Paul 
Ramsey (1987) argues that: 
... the common cause is some benefit to the patient himself; but 
this is still a joint venture in which patient and physician 
can say and ideally should both say "I cure". Therefore, I 
suggest that men's capacity to become joint adventurers in a 
common cause makes possible a consent to enter the relation of 
patient to physician or of subject to investigator. This mea ns 
that partnership is a better term than contract .. . (in Siegel, 
B., 1987:105). 
Ramsey's "joint adventure" can effectively make provision for the 
medical mOlJei t~ becvrne more humane in that t.hoic~$ are initiated 
from a platform of humanist status shift (see general introduction 
to this thesis) . This would involve the doctor making his/her 
scientif ic specia list knowledge available and the patient making 
his/her ideas and beliefs known. 
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But it is not at all certain that this way of involving both doctor 
and patient in decisionmaking is actual ly taking place. Rather, the 
medical model appears to operate in terms of its irrefutable 
scientific framework which promotes scientific "right" answers in 
opposition of negotiated decisionmaking . In this way medical science 
can be seen to argue that it, and it alone, has the best 
answers to illness . And, furthermore, that questions concerning 
illness and treatment can only be answered in terms of science. 
In chapter 5 it will be shown, by referring to the theories of 
Illich and others, that the medical profession (in denying what this 
thesis suggests is the very human need to participate in an 
experiential manner towards the defining of illness and diagnosis) 
does not come to terms with the "essence" of human social reality . 
Rather the medical model in offering medical truths and denying 
choice, stunts the very frames of human reference by its 
medicalisation of people's lives . 
In this way it can be argued that formal specialist knowledge 
infiltrates human consciousness to the pOint where the patient 
believes unquestioningly in the value of scientific medicine . 
Medical decisions become accepted as no choice situations. People 
come to believe that there is only one way and that one way must be 
the right way because the medical profession convincingly promotes 
the idea that medical science is irrefutable. In these terms the 
medical answer to ethical questions is "more scientific medicine". 
This is what Peter Berger means when he suggests that institutions 
l ike the medical profession appear to be unquestionable . What needs 
to take place is a "healthy" reconsideration of the medical model in 
the knowledge that people-made institutions can be redefined, or to 
use Mead's term de-institutionalised. In this way ethical questions 
in medicine can be taken up within a more humane framework which 
does not acquiesce to scientific medicine in terms of 
non -accountability. 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
In chapter 2 of this dissertation the theoretical foundations of 
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humanist intersubjectivity were traced, in order to provide a 
framework with which to investigate the medical model. In this 
chapter the extent to which the contemporary mechanistic medical 
model can be seen to have colonised human lives has been searched in 
order to highlight the overmedicalisation of modern living. 
In the chapter which follows the mechanistic medical model will be 
brought together with a humanist critique, in order to suggest that 
intersubjectivity and the framework of the medical model are 
incompatible. And, thereafter, an attempt will be made to offer a 
more humanistic framework, a framework which may serve to bring "new 
life" into matters of human health and healing. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE HUMANIST CRITIQUE OF THE MECHANISTIC MEDICAL MODEL 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding chapters, the theoretical tradition of humanist 
intersubjectivity was outlined as being the way in which people give 
meaning to their lives by participating together with their fellow 
human beings. The mechanistic medical model was shown to adhere to a 
scientific framework which for the most part does not involve 
people's meaning structures as the humanist would define it. 
The argument in this chapter is that there exists a discordance 
between the humanist sociological view of intersubjectivity and the 
practical application of the medical model in relation to issues of 
human health . Because the scientific medical model does not offer 
theoretical provision for intersubjectivity, the aim of this fourth 
chapter is to apply some of the concepts developed in chapters 2 and 
3 (theory and the medical model respectively) in an effort to 
evaluate the practice of medicine in humanist terms. In this way it 
is hoped to develop an alternative model which addresses human health 
in humanist terms. 
Firstly the chapter utilises the theory of George Herbert Mead and 
then moves on to examine other theorists from the preceding chapters 
in not quite so much detail. The theoretical arguments thus taken up 
will be systematically applied to the medical model in order to show 
their relevance for intersubjective meaningmaking within the medical 
framework . 
4.2 THE MEDICAL MODEL AND TRUTHS 
In chapter 3 it was indicated that the scientific medical model 
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appears to offer truths to which the doctor has access but not the 
patient . This situation arises because medicine entertains a 
knowledge which it is not the prerogative of patients to question. 
However, attention was also drawn in chapter 3 to what might be 
called Martin Suber ' s more humanistic ideal, that truth is not so 
much the content of knowledge, but something which can only be 
related to human existence and to the experience thereof . Therefore , 
it was indicated that this leaves the humanist with a question about 
what truth in human terms might be rather than an answer which can be 
simply provided by science. 
4.2.1 Medicine. truths and Mead 
As noted i n chapter 3, the medical model purports to offer cures for 
human illness in the form of scientifically testable treatments . The 
doctor's role within this model is one of knower and fixer and the 
patient's role is often perceived to be one of passivity. 
Furthermore, it was noted that these role prescriptions can be seen 
in mechanistic terms: the doctor as the mechanic, the patient as the 
mach i ne to be repaired . This in Meadian terms means that both role 
prescriptions operate in purely "Me" type areas . The doctor offers 
predefined remedies which do not involve the "1" component of the 
self of either interlocutor, and this in turn stifles the otherness 
of both . 
What this means is that people are seen only as objects who passively 
accept the rigidified generalised expectations imposed by the 
accepted norms of the societal institution of medicine . In so doing 
they become what in Mead's terms is a moron . The scientific medical 
model by not making provision for an operative "1" does not aim to 
foster negotiation between doctor and patient, and because of this 
any interaction which does take place is not undertaken 
intersubjectively. What rather seems to be occurri ng is a rigidified 
interaction which far from leading to a freedom of human spirit by 
involvement of the Meadian "1", reduces people to a condit i on of pure 
object. (Chapter 1 section 1.4 .2.2 refers) . 
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This study suggests that because there appears to be no interplay 
between the self of doctor and the self of patient (except in terms 
of a required conformity to the expectations relative to their 
positions), these rigidified interactions reduce other to an 
objectified state which is not conducive to the healthy mix of "Me" 
and "I" which Mead advocates is necessary if humans are to reach 
their full potential. 
4.2.2 More science, more objectivity 
The medical model, in striving to become more scientific rather than 
less, can be seen to deny the existence of any other way of seeing, 
or at least does not encourage any mode of action which does not 
measure up to its scientific framework. This means that the doctor 
may employ an impersonal attitude which aims not to involve the 
patient's knowledge of a possible diagnosis but to control the 
interaction. Uta Gerhardt (1987:117) notes this point by stating: 
The physician is expected to treat an objective problem in 
objective, scientifically justifiable terms. For example, 
whether he likes or dislikes the particular patient as a person 
is supposed to be irrelevant ... affective neutrality in the 
doctor's role is the necessary corollary of the fact that 
medical practice is applied science ... 
Ivan Illich (1977:252) also sounds a word of warning in this respect 
by noting that: "As a science, medicine lies on a borderline. 
Scientific method provides for experiments conducted on models. 
Medicine, however, experiments not on models but on subjects 
themselves". By adhering to scientific objectivity when dealing with 
patients the doctor conducts diagnosis as if patients are specific 
cases rather than autonomous persons. Thus rigid adherence to 
insL; Lutionalised patterns are observed with the patient almost 
expected to be no more than a puppet who does not take part. 
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4 . 2.3 The doctor as dominant role prescription 
In this way the doctor is seen to be in charge of the interaction and 
the conversation which takes place during the consultation. Should 
the patient try to take part by stepping out of the role prescription 
previously noted as passive, for example to question the doctor's 
diagnosis, this behaviour may be seen not only as unconventional but 
is often considered by the doctor in a light of interference rather 
than of a shared responsibility for illness as the humanist would 
prefer to define it. 
It is possible that the doctor in this situation will attempt to 
control the interaction in such a way as to discourage its happening 
again. This type of discouragement would seem to be legitimated by 
the medical model and in this respect Illich (1977 :41) suggests that 
one of the reasons for this is a " ... professional autonomy [which 
has] degenerated into a radical monopoly [whereby] people are 
rendered impotent ... ". Because of this, sick people have grown used 
to accepting control from the doctor and rather than appear deviant 
to what is seen as acceptable societal norms, patients comply with 
the institutionalised patterns unquestioningly. 
4.2.4 The dominant role of doctor and truth 
In relation to medical truths this means that the doctor holds the 
key. He/she can proffer scientific regimes which will right the sick 
machine and which, even more to the point, are often advocated to be 
failure proof when in fact they are not. As noted in chapter 3 
Illich has much to say about the medical model which offers truths in 
this fashion . In arguing that the scientific medical model is often 
shown to cure one illness whilst at the same time inducing another, 
Illich is able to propose the idea that to give medication or to 
attempt diagnosis without involving the sick person, is tantamount to 
saying that medicine and only medical personnel have the truth of 
illness . 
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4.2.5 A more humane sharing of knowledge 
This study would suggest that specific knowledges come together at 
specific times in consultation, due in no small part to the 
interaction between specific individuals. If the doctor is a 
particularly good communicator, or if the patient is particularly 
intelligent/interested (or vice versa), the interaction which takes 
place will be far different from an interactional situation where 
neither party is intent upon involving the other intersubjectively -
or even a situation where a particular patient finds difficulty in 
explaining symptoms, etc. All of these areas can be of much 
importance to the outcome of an interactional situation. There is no 
way of knowing before hand how that interaction will proceed, what 
knowledge will be imputed into it and therefore what decisions will 
come out of such a meeting . 
With this in mind it is suggested by this thesis that scientific 
theories of illness need to be seen as approximations (likewise 
diagnosis and treatment) in the knowledge that reality is always 
re-definable. Thus, rather than being seen as complete definitions, 
the terms illness, diagnosis and treatment should be seen as symbolic 
and provisional, serving only insofar as they offer an invitation for 
dialogue which takes up the re-definability of the meaning of the 
terms. The section which follows will indicate that all information 
should be seen in terms of a re-definability which can only be 
validated contextually through a process of social discourse . 
4.3 THE MEDICAL MODEL, SYMBOLIC INTERACTION ISM AND TRUTH 
4.3.1 The patient 
The medical model seems to befit a process of invitation to 
communicate between doctor and patient. The patient explains to the 
doctor the symptoms he/she is experiencing and the doctor applies 
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his/her specialist knowledge to the symptoms in order to effect a 
cure. In Meadian terms this means that the "Me" component of the 
self is operating here according to prescribed institutionalised 
patterns . The patient by responding to questions set by the doctor 
concerning symptoms, and the doctor in initiating the questions 
asked, can be seen to conform to the role pattern variables 
highlighted in Mead's theory within chapter 1 section 1.4.2.2. 
In this respect the patient may perceive of the doctor in elitist 
terms (the doctor has knowledge and they do not), they may be 
frightened of the knowledge they think the doctor has about them and 
their illness . They may indeed be afraid to tell the doctor the 
complete details - this may be due to embarrassment or fear of 
prognosis, etc. - and they may even be trying to influence the 
doctor's decision on their illness to ensure a sick break from 
employment. Whatever the reason, the interaction which takes place 
bears very little resemblence to the health mix of Mead's "Me and "1" 
and, therefore, to the elements of intersubjectivity and truth 
discussed in chapter 1, which are thereby not provided for . 
Intersubjectivity seems to be stifled by what can be termed the 
"normative" role prescriptions to which each party adheres. 
4.3 .2 The doctor 
The doctor as a busy professional allows only a certain amount of 
time to consult with each patient. When the doctor lived and worked 
in his own particular community diagnosis was given from a base of 
not only the reported symptoms, but also the personally known social 
aspects of the patient's life . The doctor, as a friend and 
neighbour, would often be aware of any personal problems which mayor 
may not be affecting the patient ' s health and would take this into 
account when trying to address an illness. 
Today with more and more areas of life becoming medicalised and 
therefore additional numbers of people seeking the professional help 
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of a doctor , less and less time is allocated for the patient to give 
the doctor full information about her/his condition . Added to this 
is the problem mentioned above that the doctor probably does not know 
the patient personally and thereby has to rely more and more on the 
small amount of information the patient i s able (or i s willing) to 
give in the restricted time limit . Illich maintains that this lack 
of time and knowledge can often result in the prescribing of 
unnecessary drugs. In this respect it can be suggested that to give 
an anti-biotic when one is not sure of diagnosis not only affords the 
patient what the doctor believes is protection medication, but at the 
same time can be construed as protection for faulty diagnosis or even 
promotion of drugs for promotion sake . 
4.3 .3 The doctor and prescription drugs 
In this respect Illich (1977:65) discusses the drug Chloramphenicol 
as a good example of how such a reliance on prescription drugs can be 
useless in the treatment and protection of patients when prescribed 
indiscriminately, and thereby can be seen to promote abuse . 
Chloramphenicol, Illich explains, was developed for use against 
Typhoid (interestingly, in line with Illich's argument, this drug 
increases the risk of dying with aplastic anemia), but has been 
prescribed - due to the success of the manufacturer (Parke Davis) in 
promoting their product, for diseases as far apart as acne, sore 
throat and hangnail . Illich says that "Since typhoid is rare ... no 
more than one in 400 of those given the drug needed treatment" 
(1977 :66) . 
This means that the doctor is not only treating the patient from a 
stock of pre -defined knowledge, but it could be argued that he/she is 
employing the use of modern scientific drugs to compensate for what 
this study sees as a lack of intersubjectivity within the 
consultation setting. Furthermore this also means, in terms of 
Meadi an theory, that only the "Me" part of the self is operant with 
neither doctor nor patient entering into a communication which seeks 
to employ the full self of both parties. Both doctor and patient, as 
noted for a variety of reasons, often stick to what they see as the 
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rigid and unquestionable institutionalised patterns of their 
individual roles. And again there is little here which resembles 
intersubjectivity and truth in the humanist sense. This is so because 
if diagnosis were to be discussed in terms of the argument put 
forward in this thesis for intersubjective living, negotiation 
between doctor and patient might more successfully be able to address 
the problem without the need of scientific drugs. 
4.3.4 The dominant "Me" 
As indicated from the reading of Mead chapter 1 section 1.4.2.4, what 
prevents human beings from becoming morons is their capacity to think 
out choices between alternatives. In this respect it should be noted 
that even given the same stimulus, the response will be different 
time and time again. As indicated in chapter 1 this happens for a 
variety of reasons amongst which is noted the differences in 
biographical background (attributes of the unique human being) and 
the contextualities of the interactive process. 
When humanist intersubjectivity is employed it should give rise to a 
continuous interpretation and negotiation in the area of 
meaningmaking, thereby affording a symbolic reality which is humanly 
meaningful in the sense that it allows for dialogue concerning what 
things mean for people. 
It is the contention here that having applied the concepts of the 
scientific medical model to the interaction which takes place between 
doctor and patient, there appears to be a rigidity which restricts 
communication to a pure Meadian "Me" interaction . This, it is 
argued, forces the "I" to remain dormant and fosters the operation of 
a form of concensus. For the patient this means that the doctor has 
the best knowledge or truth of the situation and the patient merely 
accepts the definition offered by the professional believing they 
have no knowledge to bring to the interaction . 
The conceptualisation of thinking and communicating in the 
consultative model laid down here, does not allow any focus on human 
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intersubjectivity. As noted previously it can be argued that, given 
the rigidified situation noted above, communication between doctor 
and patient does not incorporate the full selfs of both doctor and 
patient . In Meadian and humanist terms, only when these areas are 
addressed will communication lead to a more humane definition of 
truth and human reality within medicine which in Buber's terms is not 
knowledge alone, but the experience of living. 
Humans do not live by law like facts . Rather, as noted in chapter 2, 
the humanist way of thinking suggests that it is not possible to know 
anything outside of the individual consciousness, and therefore human 
consciousness has to enter into, and to participate in, any 
negotiation which takes place. This indicates that the symbolic 
experiential nature of meaningmaking allows people to continually 
revise their lifeworlds in the light of new alternatives. With 
regard to the institutions of society (the medical model is one), 
this means that people are capable of de-institutional ising them by 
an ongoing reconsideration in the light of these new alternatives. 
For instance, the institution of medicine as a treating machine can 
be questioned. 
In this way new ideas as to what the role or role performance of both 
doctor and patient may be, can be seen as open to choice between all 
alternatives. Here is how and where people are able to avoid a 
moronic type of existence by choosing to live to the full in the 
exercising of one's whole self; not to live subjectively (where 
either doctor or patient as exclusive subject imposes his or her will 
on the other), but intersubjectively. This would mean that both 
parties do not become estranged from life and the difficulties of 
choice; they enter into choicemaking in the knowledge that only in 
participation do humans take up the challenge to live to their full 
potential. 
4.4 HUMANISM, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM, TRUTH AND THE MEDICAL MODEL 
4.4.1 The patient 
When patients visit the doctor they are armed with many ideas 
-]]3 -
and much knowledge about their own situation, and from a reading 
(interpretation) of Meadian theory, it may be suggested that the 
patient knows quite a lot about the doctor also. Not about specific 
or personal areas of the doctors 1 ife, but from their abil ity to take 
the role of the other the "Me" component of the self allows for a 
generalised knowledge of other. There is already in existence, 
before communication begins, what may be called a typified shared 
arena of symbols whereby humans utilise a knowledge of each other 
(sameness). In Mead's terms, this knowledge is coupled with an 
awareness of the possibility for uniqueness (otherness in terms of 
the "I" component of self) and novelty denoting any interaction in 
terms of a mediation which does not revert into the mere following of 
recipes for "expected" conduct. 
The information which the patient gives to the doctor is in the form 
of significant symbols, and as noted in chapter 1, Mead argues that 
these symbols themselves impart information in specific ways. This 
means that within the interactional arena the information the patient 
is qiving is alw.ys subject tn interpretation by the doctor. After 
all the doctor is making sense of the stimulus offered from a base of 
different biographical meaning structures. 
The humanist makes allowance for this by arguing that significant 
symbols, far from relaying truth, actually should be seen as starting 
points for negotiation - a sort of hypothesis which recognises the so 
called "symbolic space" within interaction. Once this is realised it 
becomes apparent that to operate from a purely "Me" type component of 
self does not lead to the negotiation of human truth as an ongoing 
dialogue between different positions. 
In telling the doctor the symptoms of illness the patient actually 
opens up a communicative area which should become an invitation for 
botn the doctor and patient to explore the "good" and "bad" news (the 
options between alternatives) of various ideas for both diagnosis and 
treatment of illness. Within the shared platform of "good" and "bad" 
news both the Meadian "Me" and "I" become operational and the doctor 
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is placed in better stead to understand the patient's illness through 
what can be termed the experiential elements of the shared platform. 
4.4.2 The doctor 
Likewise, the doctor faced with a patient who is communicating' 
information should be capable of responding to such stimuli in 
reciprocal manner. Rather than to make a diagnosis on the initial 
information offered by the patient, the doctor also needs to invite 
the patient's knowledge of possible diagnoses and possible 
treatments, and to explore the "good" and "bad" news of these 
alternatives in order to raise the consciousness, not only of the 
patient but also of him/herself. In this way the interaction 
proceeds in terms of what was noted earlier as Veronica McKay's 
(1990) status shift. In other words there is a shared arena of 
generating knowledge of the case which is not just one way - from 
doctor to patient - but a truly intersubjective arena where both 
parties share knowledge - each to their own capabilities. Through 
corroboration and the ethical principle of enlarging the choice 
making process, an equalising of knowledge takes place. In this way 
Meadian theory is operating fully, both doctor and patient self is 
active and there is now much more chance that something nearer the 
humanist truth - as a product of dialogue - might be found . Any 
information which is taken into consciousness, and thereby becomes 
part of the individual's meaning structures has become experienced 
and therefore even in Buber's terms can be considered to be something 
akin to truth. 
4.4.3 The "Me" and "I" in the shared arena 
It has been shown that the self as a product of the relationship 
between the "Me" and "I" provides for the individual to take account 
of all meanings in society. Applied to the institution of medicine 
and the treatment of illness this calls for the recognition of a 
shared arena in any communicational setting and by this is meant that 
both doctor and patient spend time elaborating on the feelings and 
meanings concerning alternative courses of action. 
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If the doctor prescribes a pill as a cure he/she should ensure that 
all alternatives are fully discussed with the patient. The patient 
needs to know why the doctor feels the pill should be prescribed, and 
what the doctor believes will happen when the pill is or is not 
swallowed. Then from the patient's side, the doctor needs to know if 
the patient's ideas concerning the prescribed treatment are in 
harmony with his/her advice on treatment. 
In other words: is the patient worried about the treatment offered, 
is there a problem with swallowing pills, is the patient worried 
about side effects, etc? All of these areas and probably very many 
more need to be addressed. On the other hand not every patient has a 
need to have questions answered, some patients do prefer the doctor 
alone to take the responsibility for their illness so the doctor is 
not always required to offer information: but doctors should be open 
to offering their knowledge if the patient requires it. 
What this dissertation wishes to highlight is the idea that choices 
exist in every situatio~ and that it should be the prerogative of all 
human beings in all situations, not only medicine, to be able to take 
up these choices should they wish to do so. Justification for this 
ideal in medicine is offered by Mark Chesler and Oscar Barbarin 
(1984), and it is suggested that this idea be borne in mind when the 
study moves on to consider the areas of human choice and 
responsibility, a) in the existing model of scientific medicine and 
b) in humanistic terms, making note that according to Chesler and 
Barbarin: 
... satisfaction ... correlated significantly with ... ratings of 
communication with [the) physician ... in addition, patient/ 
physician rapport may play an indirect role in effective 
treatment ... [and] the quality of these relationships may also 
affect the patient's emotional status and the patient's and 
family's ability to cope [with illness] ... (1984:49). 
4.4.4 Sharing of responsibility 
Chesler and Barbarin (1984) further note that there is often an 
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intense need to know a great deal about one's condition and suggest 
that this can be seen as a sort of " .. . intellectual mastery to gain 
some sense of control" over the situation. They also indicate that 
this need to "know" is often not forthcoming because 
" .. . ofofessionals expect passive acquiescence rather than activp 
participation from powerless clients" (1984:51) . It does appear 
however, according to Chesler and Barbarin, that patients are often 
willing to take up the potential to choose and also to accept 
responsibility for their own illness. This has a great bearing on 
the humanist idea of truth because it actually detracts from the 
medical concept of the doctor as the only possessor of that truth and 
highlights the need for possible shared accountability. 
In the next section it will be indicated that according to Jean-Paul 
Sartre, responsibility and choice are not just individual, or even 
mere intersubjective concepts, but "wholly" jOint concepts which 
involve a co-responsibility for all humanity. Such ideas are akin to 
Mead's view on the formation of self which rejects the idea that 
,here can be individual selfs: hUlfldns need each other if they are to 
exist as humans at all. These ideas can be seen to accommodate 
Chesler and Barbarin's suggestion that satisfaction within 
doctor-patient comm unication is related to having the choice to take 
part on reciprocal terms. 
4.5 THE MEDICAL MODEL, CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY 
As was shown in chapter 2 section 2.2.2 the idea of a shared 
communication proceeds with each party taking what Sartre (1973) 
argues is a co-responsibility towards each other. This 
co-responsibility for oneself and for others is intimately linked to 
human action and choice and provides, in Sartre's terms, the only 
opening for human freedom. Human beings have to act to live and that 
action means to take up the responsibility to exercise choice. In 
choosing humans do so not just for personal freedom, in other words 
not just individual human freedom, but in fact for multi human 
freedom. 
I 
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It was noted in chapter 2 that for Sartre existence precedes essence, 
and therefore people cannot avoid the responsibility of making 
choices because the self cannot exist alone devoid of the interaction 
with other selfs . This intersubjective interaction, which by its 
very nature requires that people make choices on the basis of a 
shared reality, does not mean that the parties aim at concensus, or 
for that matter that they assume agreement, but rather that in taking 
part people aim to become involved each to their own ability in a 
process of negotiation . In this way Sartre argues that a shared 
reality impinges intrinsically upon what can be termed the shared 
realities of others . 
This obviously means that people have to act to live and that that 
living calls upon human beings to invent themselves and at the same 
time to take responsibility for the choices they make during those 
acts. The idea argued by Sartre that I think, therefore I am, 
identifies people as subjects - at the same time identifying the 
other as indispensable to one ' s own existence and vica versa. 
4.5.1 The doctor, the medical model, choice and responsibility 
What this means in terms of the existing medical model as it equates 
to legitimation within that model (and to the areas of 
institutionalised practice and the interaction between doctor and 
patient), is as follows . The doctor, in control of the interaction, 
will define diagnosis and treatment on the basis of the questions put 
to the patient - this can restrict the patient's choice of reply . 
Therefore although the aspect of choice appears to be exercised by 
the patient, such choices are made within a rigidified situational 
interaction which does not spring from a dialogical exploration of 
options. 
Sartre would argue that this situational interaction does not allow 
for the taking of co-responsibility for the choices we make in the 
knowledge that such choices indirectly affect everyone . And by making 
note of this problematic within the interactional sphere, it can be 
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argued that if this type of (rigidified) interaction is allowed to 
take place, all such interactions will continue along similar lines 
because role prescriptions continue to be seen as un-negotiable. 
Doctor and patient will merely take up the role prescriptions 
inherent within their situations and consensus will rule. What the 
doctor should attempt to engender is a situation in which the fors 
and againsts of various ways of seeing the symptom, diagnosis and 
treatment is tantamount to raising the consciousness of the patient 
concerning various alternatives. The relevance which the doctor 
assumes when putting forward these for and against alternatives, need 
be recognised as negotiational areas rather than explicit forms of 
action. 
By consulting in this way the doctor is offering a form of 
responsibility to the patient in regard to the illness definition and 
taking responsibility for the development of a knowledge of the case. 
By operating in this way the doctor may serve to facilitate a status 
shift. This means that the consciousness of both doctor and patient 
is raised as medical knowledge is negotiated, re-interpreted, 
re-defined and re-thought out, etc. 
4.5.2 The patient, the medical model, choice and responsibility 
In the same way the patient must also accept responsibility for the 
type of communication which takes place with the doctor. Here Mead's 
theory is applicable because even though both parties may not be 
equal in terms of knowledge, social position or even intelligence , 
both are nevertheless armed with a generalised knowledge of the 
other. Even if they are akin in these areas, their biographical 
backgrounds - their stock of past knowledge - is different. 
Whatever the position concerning initial equal status, by applying 
the humanist ideals of choice and responsibility to the medical 
model, a sharlng of both common ground and unique understanding is 
possible . As noted earlier in chapter 2 section 2.2.1, Sartre argues 
that human freedom is linked to responsibility and choice . Such 
freedom of choice means that both doctor and patient are free to 
participate in defining any so called solution and this situation 
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cannot, indeed should not, be suppressed. Norman Green notes why in 
this way: 
The other's freedom ... is the limit of my freedom ... It is given 
to me as burden which I carry without ever being able to turn 
back to know it ... ·(1966:20) . 
The common ground which exists between doctor and patient actually 
seems, in terms of Sartre's argument, to be that anyone reality is 
mediated through and by the realities of others: being-in-the-world 
is very much tied to the idea that the other makes us what we are. 
The patient then must not sit back expecting the doctor to make 
individual decisions on their health because such decisions are 
actually already mediated by their very joint being-in-the-world. 
The only way to solve this situation, in other words to make choices 
which are purposefully taken, is to participate in the negotiation 
which addresses the looking for answers. When the doctor asks what 
symptom has brought the patient to the surgery, any answer given 
should form part of negotiational mediation rather than a factual 
account. The aim thereby is to further discussion with a view to 
finding terms of tentative agreement. Likewise, with diagnosis and 
treatment the same facilitating platform should be employed: to act 
in any other way is to try to avoid the total responsibility which 
Sartre maintains is part of the very act of living. If this does not 
take place the individual as a social being becomes alienated from 
what should be a social reality which is purposeful, meaningful, 
creative and experiential. 
Sartre (1956) considers the stresses and strains attached to such 
responsibility in social life and comes to the conclusion that 
• . .. the social nature of man appears unpleasant and at the same time 
inevitable· (1956:566). This mutual inevitability concerned with 
choice and responsibility can cause a conflict of interests. In the 
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medical field doctors are called upon to give loyalty to many, not 
only the patient, themselves and other medical doctors (in fact the 
whole medical institution/profession), but even the state. 
This thesis does not refute conflictual situations, but suggests that 
when conflict is present it is negotiable . When conflictual 
situations are addressed in humanist terms the negotiational platform 
provided allows for all parties to express their opinion rather than 
one party to impose its views upon the other. This is an important 
point and in the light of Sartre's argument concerning 
responsibility, will be taken further in the following section. 
4.5.3 Modern medicine. choice. responsibility and control 
The contemporary medical model because of its vast advancement along 
scientific and technological lines, has become an enormous finance 
revenue maker. This applies to the medical model in all its service 
areas, but for the purpose at hand the investigation will be confined 
to the role of the medical operative (doctor/physician). In terms of 
the modern doctor, and working from a purely scientific medical model 
(non-humanist form), not only the patient's health but the patient's 
financial situation is in the hands of the doctor. Should the doctor 
so decide, the sick may find themselves faced not only with a high 
consultation fee, but also the cost of various diagnostic 
examinations which are reliant upon modern technology: blood tests, 
X-rays, radiological scans and a whole array of invasive techniques 
which mayor may not be really necessary. 
Added to the cost of a doctor consultation fee and possible 
specialist exploratory examination, will be the cost of medical 
treatment itself in the form of medicine. If this situation is 
handled in a humanistic fashion then negotiation will have taken 
place between doctor and patient and some sort of mediated agreement 
(never consensus) concerning diagnostic need and required treatment 
will have been made. If not, then it is possible that many of these 
procedures will have been effected because either the doctor truly 
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believes they are necessary, or perhaps having been given such a hazy 
picture of symptoms from a non -communicative patient, feels that 
further investigation is advisable for protection of both parties 
alike (doctor and patient). 
4.5.4 Choice as co-responsibility 
In terms of Sartre's argument the decision to investigate a medical 
problem, taken in a context of co-responsibility, means taken in an 
attitude of what can be called humility. This means in the knowledge 
that such decisions and choices are actually made not only for the 
patient at this time, but bearing in mind Sartre's concept of 
co-responsibility, possibly for the doctor also at some time in life . 
Such decisions, according to Sartre, affect not only the patient and 
doctor of this interactive situation, but in effect possibly all of 
humanity. If diagnostic examination becomes the "norm" for certain 
conditions there is the possibility that decisions of this sort 
become routinely necessary, and thereby are rigidly applied to the 
exclusion of intersubjective negotiation in terms of necessity rather 
than need. 
Doctor protection, as considered earlier in Section 4. 5.1 of this 
chapter, very often leads to far too many investigatory procedures 
and the over use of modern drugs, not for medical reasons, but 
because it has become the "norm" within certain set conditions or 
circumstances . Therefore, decisions taken to investigate in one 
situation will invariably have an impact on the choices and 
responsibilities taken or withheld concerning other human beings and 
investigatory procedures. Doctors will find themselves in the 
position of patient at some time during their lives and they too will 
be at the receiving end of procedures they helped to initiate by 
their professional involvement and adherence to purely scientific 
regimes . 
It has been noted that in terms of Sartre's argument, there is no way 
out of taking up the responsibilities and choices which present 
during life . In terms of the medical model it can be argued that 
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there is an unequal distribution of power and authority operating 
within medicine and that this power is more often than not held by 
the doctor due to his/her "superior" knowledge in terms of scientific 
irrefutability . Within this context, to have power and authority 
means that one individual is able to act at, or against, another 
person ' s will. This happens within medicine not so much in 
the form of coercion as we might see in state structures, but in 
terms of not facilitating the involvement of people in the 
intersubjective process of negotiation and decisionmaking which 
allows for personal participation. This JUrgen Habermas refers to as 
a suppression of voices (chapter 2, section 2.5.3). 
4.6 CO-RESPONSIBILITY VERSUS COERCION 
It can be argued however that a form of coercion does exist in the 
medical condition of childbirth if for example a doctor resorts to 
manipulative language to ensure that a mother delivers her child in 
hospital. (In terms of scientific medicine, to deliver within the 
confines of the hospital delivery room is considered by medical 
personnel to be the safest place for both mother and newborn.) The 
doctor bases his/her advice to enter hospital for the birth of the 
child upon a belief in scientific care as being the right way to 
handle the condition of giving birth . But it can be suggested that 
verbal manipulation might be seen in terms of a form of violence when 
seen from the perspective of a mother to be who requests to give 
birth somewhere other than in a hospitalised environment . The 
scientific doctor, because of his/her belief in scientific care, may 
perceive this request as oppositional not only to the accepted 
"norms" of the medical model, but also in terms of the doctor-patient 
hierarchical relationship. 
However, in terms of the humanist framework advanced by this thesis, 
if the doctor does not facilitate the mother's own meanings/feelings 
concerning whether she wishes to deliver her child in hospital or at 
home, within an intersubjective arena - if he/she gives only the 
"good" news of hospital del ivery and does not offer the "bad" news 
also (for instance that the birth atmosphere is clinical , that she 
may be required to accept medication she does not really want, or 
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that her husband and family may not be allowed to be present, etc.), 
then this can be argued to be a form of violent coercion whi ch 
f unctions in terms of JUrgen Habermas's distorted communication/ 
intersubject;~ity. 
In the case of childbirth, the medical model in transforming people 
into patients, pushes the mother-to-be into a potentially violent 
situation. It may also be argued that hospital delivery brings to the 
fore the over use of drugs and induction birth which can be 
considered in terms of violence done to the unborn child. It can be 
argued that a child may be born more quickly within the hospital 
environment in order to facilitate the hospital/doctor's timetable, 
and also may have been subjected to heavy doses of synthetic drugs 
running through the placenta before and during the birth process. 
Although this point is not fully expanded within this thesis it 
should be seen as a relevant factor when considering a doctor's use 
of manipulative language in order to promote scientific regimes. It 
can also be seen to highlight how Sartre's idea of co-responsibility 
operates, even on what might be termed a secondary level: 
responsibility for the mother to be and the unborn child. The doctor 
involved should not take responsibility for deciding what is best for 
mother and unborn child in terms of his/ her belief of having access 
to the right decisions. 
Right decisions, in humanist terms, can only be accessed if decisions 
are recognised as not being clear-cut. Otherwise what exists is the 
situation whereby the doctor makes a decision and takes 
responsibility for that decision. In terms of humanism this type of 
decision equates to rigidified choice, because it does not involve 
the mother within an interactional intersubjective framework where 
the "good" and "bad" news of various alternatives are mediated in 
terms of a co-responsibility for decision making. This thesis now 
moves on to consider Ralf Dahrendorf's theory of power within rule 
statuses, initially addressed in chapter 1 section 1.3.3. 
4.7 THE MEDICAL MODEL - RALF DAHRENDORF'S CONCEPTS OF 
POWER AND AUTHORITY 
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4.7.1 Power/authority defined by role 
The concept of role plays an important part in analysing the medical 
model/profession from either a functional or conflictual perspective. 
In section 3.5.1 of chapter 3 it was noted that Talcott Parsons saw 
the role of doctor and patient as separate; regarding the sick role 
as complementary to that of the practitioner's role . It was earlier 
indicated that as a functionalist , Parsons viewed sickness as 
dysfunctional for society because of its interference with the roles 
people normally fulfil within the social structure when in health. 
Therefore, sickness in Parsonian terms can be seen as deviant because 
it deviates from the role norms which usually apply. It can 
furthermore be argued that in accordance with Parsons's theory, the 
role of patient is subordinate to that of doctor because of superior 
elitist knowledge held in the hands (or role) of the doctor in 
relation to that position. 
It was noted that Dahrendorf, rather than locate power and authority 
in terms of systems maintenance (Parsonian theory), or within a 
dialectic conflictual tension between the haves (the doctor) and the 
have nots (the patient) as Marxian theorists would do, preferred to 
argue that power and authority are intrinsic within the role taken 
up. Here it should be stated that the concepts of power and authority 
are used by Dahrendorf interchangably to suit his arguement, and in 
both cases refers to the stratifying elements within roles in 
society. Chapter 1 section 1.3.3.2 indicated that seen in terms of 
Dahrendorf's theory a person can have power within one role in 
society, i.e. in the role of doctor, and have no power at all in 
another role , viz. , as a mere congregation member in the church . 
4.7.2 Power/authority - the doctor's role 
By applyillg Dahrendorf's theory it can be argued that the doctor can 
be seen to exercise power over the patient in terms of the authority 
inherent within the doctor role . The patient passively accepts this 
power division believing that their own role is devoid of both 
knowledge, in terms of medicine, and power in terms of role status. 
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As noted in Chapter 1 section 1.3 .3.2 : 
. .. here it is not voluntary cooperation . . . some positions are 
entrusted with the r ight to exerci se control over other 
positions .. . in other words that there i s a differential 
distribution of power and authority (1969:165). 
Dahrendorf indicates that it is this differential in the distribution 
of power and authority which causes conflicting areas in social life . 
The doctor can use his or her influence to convince a patient to 
swallow the recommended pill or to accept a recommendation for 
invasive diagnostic investigation, etc. In the example of childbirth 
discussed earlier, the resolving of different ways of seeing 
particular options is more often than not in the form of the doctor 
exercising his or her authority over the mother in such a way as to 
cause her to acquiesce . What this type of interaction promotes is in 
effect the medicalisation of the natural condition of childbirth into 
a condition which is now almost conceived of in terms of an illness. 
4.7.3 Power/authority - the patient's role 
In the light of the foregoing section it may appear as if the patient 
has little to offer in the way of power/authority in the doctor-
patient interaction. But the reverse can be argued if one considers 
that it is possible for the patient also, by withholding information 
from the doctor or by the manipulation of knowledge/information 
proffered during the interaction, to manipulate the doctor in terms 
of the same distortion of communication discussed above . One can 
also argue that by adding or falsifying "phantom" symptoms, etc., the 
patient may be successful in acquiring unnecessary medication or a 
doctor's certificate to secure sick-leave from employment . But 
nevertheless the doctor does appear to hold an authority within 
his/her position which is dominant to that of the patient situation 
and therefore can use the power inherent within his/her role to say 
no to both manipulative patient examples given above. 
It is possible, if the patient is a forceful type of person and the 
doctor is more reserved or intraverted by nature, that the so called 
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power structures operating within the interaction may be distributed 
a little differently. But whatever the case, it does appear that the 
differentials of power and authority in the medical situation is what 
Dahrendorf refers to in terms of domination and subjection. This can 
give rise to conflicting interests when a patient does indeed wish to 
participate in the defining of a condition and the rendition of this 
condition to their satisfaction. 
4.7.4 Power/authority - Humanist terms 
The situation of doctor and patient roles in relation to 
stratification, invested power and authority, are also tied to the 
concept of status. Some roles carry status (the doctor) and some do 
not (the patient), and the concept of status can either enhance or 
decrease the amount of power within particular roles. Therefore the 
concept of status, in terms of role, is of concern to both Mead and 
Sartre in relation to human society/social reality . It has been noted 
that both authors argue that people do not exist in isolation 
because, in Mead's terms one's own self is very much a part of the 
others self, and in Sartre's terms similarly, personal being is 
nothing without other . In this way it can be argued that status is 
very much determined by the manner in which a person is regarded by 
others, or in other words people's role status in part becomes that 
which is bestowed upon them by others. Interestingly Norman Green 
(1966) notes Sartre as suggesting that " ... status is associated with 
profession but cannot be reduced to it" (1966:42). And furthermore 
that: 
The status of a particular individual will vary from group to 
group, and supposedly even from person to person, although one 
can speak loosely of an individual's social status. The 
individual finds that in order to act in society he is obliged 
to assume the roles which others set for him by thelr 
expectations ... ( Sartre in Green, 1966:42). 
By using the authors referred to above and extrapolating their 
theories, the urgent need for intersubjectivity within the medical 
model is highlighted . In humanist terms any situation calls for 
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interactional skills which take account of both 'sameness", 
"otherness' and shared responsibility of choice. This takes 
cognisance of the idea that the unequal distribution of knowledge and 
power within the doctor patient role can reach potential equalisation 
if each party accepts the participatory elements necessary for human 
existence. Therefore by accepting responsibility and taking up the 
potential to act whilst expecting others to do the same, leads to a 
rendering of human life in terms of experiential participation. 
How people take up the potential to take part, to live within an 
experiential framework of meaningmaking, is according to Richard 
Brown (1978) a matter of taste (to make choices) and to Cornie Alant 
(1990) the way in which people enter into society dialogically (to 
choose between alternatives), and this in turn denotes a specific way 
of "seeing" social reality. It is to these two authors and their 
conception of social reality which this chapter now turns. 
4.8 NEGOTIATED REALITY - RICHARD BROWN 
4.8.1 Richard Brown - Medicine as aesthetics 
As noted from the reading of Brown's theory in chapter 2 section 2.4, 
social reality is usually conceived of by theorists in terms of 
structure, or a meaningfully making sense of the world through 
experiential participation. Brown manages to build what might be 
called a pontoon between societal structures and people's 
understanding or meanings thereof. He achieves this by suggesting 
that the two camps, in his terms science which stresses logical 
deduction and controlled research, and art or intuitive knowledge 
which stresses insights and subjective understanding, can be fused by 
applying what he terms cognitive aesthetic theory. Basically Brown's 
proposition is that societal structures can only be understood in 
human tel 'lllS . . 1. _ ._ ~: ~ O:::l: V:~~Y take on uoarJ (:ogn "itivp. e>qJer i~flU= - i"11 uLher 
words, when they are taken into human consciousness. 
This argument applied to the medical model becomes substantiated when 
one accepts that the scientific regimes offered by the med ical 
profession have no way of becoming relevant in human terms unless the 
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experiential elements of people become involved. As noted in the 
previous chapter Norma Romm's (1991) reading of Jurgen Habermas 
points to human validation in terms of a truth-content which 
initiates a "process of self-reflection on the part of the subjects 
in society" (1991 :139). To be self-reflexive can only come about 
when people come to recognise their own power to overcome constraints 
which appear given or unalterable. This, Romm notes, means that: 
.. . so called facts and laws and cultural traditions in society 
which had been regarded by people as incapable of al teration 
will become recognised to be, on the contrary, alterable 
constructions (1991 :139). 
When the doctor provides treatment, in the form of pills or advice to 
a patient, the success of such is dependent upon the patient being 
able to accept into consciousness (becoming reflexive) the background 
knowledge from which this advice stems. Unless this happens the 
mother-to-be will be just as unhappy and unaccepting at being 
"coerced" into hospital for the birth of her child as will an elderly 
person "forced" to accept diagnostic investigations which they 
themselves view as unnecessary. 
According to Brown's argument for cognitive aesthetics, both medica l 
science and intuitive elements of experience are part and parcel of 
the one rationale or continuum. Both must be accommodated in 
consciousness if knowing is to be constituted. Brown therefore 
argues that in this context the presupposition that science itself 
constitutes a commitment to values and that the appreciation of art 
does not, becomes nonsense when evaluated in terms of his aesthetic 
criteria of rationality. What this means for the medical model is 
that the science of diagnosis and the patient's meaning structures 
are all part and parcel of the one same thing (science and art in 
Brown;s terms) and ~~ ~~ch both ~re constit~!t2d 11! consciousness and 
both warrant like emphasis. 
4.8.2 Aesthetics as symbol 
The word pontoon used earlier to depict Brown's bridge building 
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between art and science was chosen in order to highlight the symbolic 
nature of social reality . By choosing this word, which means flat 
bottomed boat used to support a temporary floating bridge, it is 
possible to refer Brown's reference to a cognitive bridge with 
symbolic social reality as precarious (just like the floating bridge 
support) . The negotiational aspects inherent in all symbolmaking, 
can be likened to the semi-permanence of the bridge-like structure. 
Both rely for their continuance upon human reconfirmation/ 
maintenance . If successful, this chapter has placed human living 
firmly in an arena of symbolic reality which leaves little doubt that 
human enterprise, in terms of humanistic sociology, is one of an 
intersubjective reality which functions dialogically. 
4.8.3 Mead's symbol (language) 
As noted in Meadian terms , it is this ability of people to acquire 
language and to use this language in the form of symbols, which sets 
people apart from other forms of life. The modern day doctor knows 
much about symptoms, but unless both doctor and patient are prepared 
to interact in terms of an intersubjectivity as defined by the 
humanist model, it is impossible for either doctor or patient to 
share knowledge , and thereby to co-look at alternative meanings of 
symptoms. If co-looking at the alternat i ves of diagnosis and 
treatment does not occur it is suggested by this thesis that the 
patient may feel less inclined to follow the advice or treatment 
offered by the doctor because personal meaning patterns did not 
become involved through dialogical participation . 
4.9 DIALOGICAL REALITY AND THE MEDICAL MODEL - CORNIE ALANT 
Alant's theory, as noted in chapter 2 section 2.5, rests firmly upon 
the premise that human beings live intersubjectively in a social 
matrix which operates dialogically. By this is meant that people's 
shared world accommodates both the taken -for-granted aspects - the 
invent ion of culture - and its possibility for re-definition in 
unique ways (or otherwise stated, what Alant refers to in section 
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2.5.1 of chapter 2 as to accept tradition or to revise it). In the 
humanised medical model it could be argued that there is an 
acceptance of the doctor's medical knowledge not in terms however of 
an objectively specified truth, but rather as vehicles of 
communication for continuing dialogue. Spelt out in this way it can 
be argued that the truth offered in terms of medical diagnosis by the 
doctor need actually be seen as the starting point for an "open" 
reconsideration by all parties. Dialogue within such a defined 
medical field throws light upon the precarious and ever changing 
nature of the medical model as applied in practice because it 
continually throws into question its validity. The doctor and 
patient raise each other's consciousness with the "good" and "bad" 
news of alternative meaning patterns and in so doing it becomes 
possible to reach the ongoing flux invisaged by "status shift" 
effectively equalising specialist knowledge and laymen concerns. 
The mother-to-be in the example cited earlier in section 4.6 of this 
chapter, through intersubjective dialogue with her practitioner, may 
decide that it is preferable to deliver her child in hospital rather 
than at home. In entering into dialogue as to how the doctor sees 
her medical condition, it is quite possible that she will understand 
his reasons for offering this advice and accept them (tentatively), 
and act on this basis . On the other hand, it is also quite possible 
that such dialogue will enable the doctor to understand her feelings 
on the matter. It may be that the patient's fears of hospital 
confinement are found to have some relevence after all and through 
negotiation the doctor may come to see that the patient's fears of 
hospital confinement could be detrimental to a successful hospital 
birth (or at least that they do deserve recognition). 
Even if no decisions are changed concerning the medical arrangements 
for birth, a decision will at least have been taken from a platform 
of intersubjective debate which required that both doctor and patient 
consider the alternatives involved with any decision, and 
furthermore, in the knowledge or recognition, that there is no one 
and only right answer or solution. In this respect Alant notes that 
intersubjectivity is not to be seen as a formula but rather as a 
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means of choice which at one and the same time requires people to 
make their own reality and to take responsibility for their choosing. 
This dialectic relationship is referred to in the work of Peter 
Berger to whom this chapter now turns . 
4.10 THE BERGERIAN DIALECTIC WITHIN THE MEDICAL MODEL 
As noted in chapter 2 section 2.3, Peter Berger considers human 
social reality to be dialectic by nature. Arguing that society is a 
product of people and that people are a product of society Berger 
highlights the paradox inherent in human living. Related to the 
medical model it can be suggested that people having formed the 
scientific medical model must now answer to it. Berger argues that 
to live merely by the existing structures (answering to what appears 
to be objective reality which cannot be questioned), is to live in a 
condition of alienation. People-made institutions like medicine can 
and must be questioned if people are to exercise their full potential 
for human living. Seen in this way the medical profession, far from 
being an objective structure which is unquestionable, is actually an 
ongoing debate, part and parcel of what Alant considers is merely a 
vehicle for communication. 
For the institution of medicine this means that patients should not 
just accept the status quo (status quo here refers to the doctor's 
ideas on diagnosis and treatment) of any situation, and doctors need 
not try to offer pure truths of treatment to their patients . When 
the doctor suggests a particular type of treatment the patient should 
take up his or her capacity to question the validity of such, and 
thereby take part in what Berger suggests is a participation in the 
co-production of reality. 
Berger further argues that there has been a rise of science as an 
autonomous secular perspective (note this point in chapter 3 section 
3.2.2 with regard to Fritjof Capra's argument) and he suggests that 
unless people exercise their human ability to make choices the 
ready-made-world of medicine will come to be seen and accepted more 
and more as a field which becomes validated in terms of people as 
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machines rather than as human beings. What happens is that we begin 
to see the world as a world of predetermined institutions and the 
people who staff those institutions, and ourselves included, in terms 
of what Alfred SchUtz calls typifications . It is to SchUtz's theory 
of social typification that this chapter finally turns. 
4.11 THE MEDICAL MODEL AS SCHUTZ IAN TYPIFICATION 
Within the theory of SchUtz, as laid down in chapter 1, it is noted 
that the field of phenomenology is primarily interested in the way in 
which interpersonal interaction becomes meaningful to actors. In 
line with many of the other theorists applied to the humanist medical 
model in this chapter, SchUtzian theory argues that the social world 
is experienced by people as common and shared. What this means is 
that the world manifests itself as having an out-there existence 
which humans assimilate into their consciousness in terms of a 
commonsense knowledge or, in typification form . Reciprocity of this 
commonsense view of the world ensures that people become confirmed in 
their actions and views because others too take-for-granted the same 
aspects of the world . 
4.11.1 Medicine as shared expectation 
Applied to the medical model this means that our expectations of the 
medical doctor are shared by everyone else in our own particular 
culture. This means that if the medical profession is seen as 
irrefutably scientific and therefore unquestioningly sound, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to suggest even in our own minds that 
this is not so, because everyone confirms it. However, by expanding 
upon SchUtz's concepts further it becomes clear that people do not 
live by typification alone . 
4.11.2 The pure "We" relationship and medicine 
SchUtz's way of addressing the more humanist theory of social reality 
suggests that the pure "We" relationship (the face-to-face 
interaction whereby two people enter into the consciousness of the 
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other - explained more fully in chapter 2) can fend off typification 
living by revision and modification of thoughts and actions in 
reflexive consideration. For our medical model this means that 
although we enter into the consultation armed only with anonymous 
typification knowledge of the other, as the interaction proceeds, 
both role occupants (doctor and patient) rewrite their typifications 
in order to make sense or make meaning of what takes place. What 
takes place of course is an intersubjective encounter during which 
typification knowledge, as indefinite recipes, become starting pOints 
(or vehicles) for negotiation . 
4.11.3 Medicine as mediated understanding 
In this way understanding of a particular medical condition becomes a 
mediated understanding and the doctor as expert has to become a 
negotiated expert in as much as expertise needs to be defined and 
confirmed through intersubjective dialogue . At the same time the 
meaning of his or her expertise 
through the actual interaction. 
questions as to how much or how 
can become altered and shifted 
Mediated expertise does pose moral 
little patients should be told about 
the doctor's perception of their illnesses, especially in the case of 
the more serious illnesses of our time like Cancer and Aids. (For 
this reason medical ethics forms the basis of the final chapter of 
this thesis and will therefore be developed fully later) . For the 
time being, mediated understanding need be seen in terms of a 
partnership between the medical profession and its patients. 
4.12 HUMANISTIC MEDICINE - A ROUND UP 
In Meadian terms this partnership indicates that selfs need other 
selfs to survive. In Sartre's terms such a partnership means that in 
order to live freely everyone has to make choices and to accept the 
anguish that choicemaking brings. 
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In this respect Sartre argues that choicemaking encompasses an 
acceptance of co - respons i bility for human social reality and this 
co-responsibility in terms of Brown's and Alant's theories, indicates 
an intersubjective dialogue which provides for the symbolic nature of 
human living. 
For Berger and SchUtz the partnership takes account of the di alectic 
tensions within society which need constant addressal if alienation 
and rigidified typification (uninterpreted by human involvement), is 
to be avoided or prevented. This indicates that humanist authors 
can be seen to unite in many areas of their individual theories . It 
furthermore points to the conceptualisation of social reality as a 
concept which promotes the ideal of there being no one and only right 
way of making sense of human existence . 
With this in mind it is here argued that humanist sociology in 
providing for the participatory experiential essence of people to 
make choices, provides for an arena of creativity which is not given 
due credence either within other sociological perspectives, or within 
the contemporary scientific medical model. 
4.13 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter the opposing poles of humanist intersubjectivity and 
the medical model have been brought face -to-face in order to 
highlight their lack of accommodation . The work of theorists 
introduced in chapter 2 and the ideas propounded about the scientific 
medical model in chapter 3 have been systematically applied to areas 
within the medical framework. 
The theory of George Herbert Mead gave an indication of how, through 
the utilisat i on of symbol and self, the human being both makes and 
revises personal social reality . In the medical field this was shown 
to mean that diagnosis and treatment cannot be defined as having 
truths or the correct and only answers to medical problems. Correct 
answers would mean that people interact in purely "Me" type mode and 
Mead ' s theory actually points to the simultaneous interactive 
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qualities of the self through both the "Me" and "I" interplay . 
Jean-Paul Sartre ' s theory of co-responsibility was shown to address 
illness in terms of choices which when made affect not only the 
choice maker, but all humanity . 
Ralf Dahrendorf's theory of power within role occupation indicated 
the inequalities inherent in the power distribution within the 
medical consultation. It was noted that the doctor has access to 
elitist knowledge and that this superior knowledge locates both power 
and status within the doctor's role and within the doctor-patient 
relationship. 
The work of Richard Brown (cognitive aesthetics) and Cornie Alant 
(dialogical social reality) were shown to argue that all meanings 
(scientific or otherwise) are taken up in consciousness via the 
vehicle of dialogue . It was suggested that only in this way can 
social reality be seen to provide human freedom. This was shown to 
mean that people are seen as free to either confirm or redefine 
symbolic meanings . Applied to the humanist medical model it was 
indicated that confirmation or redefinition of illness, diagnosis and 
treatment are primary for a humane medical model. 
Peter Berger's theory of the medical institution as people-made, and 
therefore revisable by people, was shown to pinpoint the dialectical 
nature of human living. 
Finally, Alfred Schutz's concept of typification (meaning that actors 
conceptualise the world as taken-for-granted) was used to show that 
although typification allows for commonsense understanding, 
interaction via the "pure We" face -to -face relationship can provide 
an alternative way of seeing social reality . Applied to the medical 
model SchUtz's theory pointed to the ability of intersubjective 
interaction to re-write anonymous typified knowledge. 
In the next chapter this thesis moves on to consider in more detail 
how medical ethics can be utilised to facilitate personal autonomy 
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when considering health, illness and treatment. This ideal is 
motivated in terms of what can be called a more humane interpretation 
of medicine through the mediatory facilitation of intersubjective 
dialogical living. 
CHAPTER 5 
HUMANISM AND ETHICS IN PRACTICE 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter the humanist tradition was brought face-to-
face with the scientific medical model . It was indicated that the 
scientific medical model is at variance with the humanist tradition 
in terms of intersubjective living because it fails to address what 
has been termed elsewhere in this thesis "the creative and 
meaningful construction of the human lifeworld". (See chapter 1, 
section 1.4). It is thereby suggested that if people are not invited 
to take part in the defining of illness, diagnosis and treatment, a 
block is effectively created which prevents intersubjective 
meaningmaking. 
In this respect, it was suggested that people who subscribe to the 
medical model, use its scientific character to define the terms 
illness, diagnosis and treatment without the involvement of people's 
meaning structures. It was shown that pre-definition of human 
illness can occur within contemporary medicine for several reasons . 
For the most part, people within the medical profession rely on 
elitist skills and knowledge (patients are often considered 
knowledgeless), and it was argued that there appears to be a power 
element at work within medicine which seems to uphold the 
profession's seeming right, or sole prerogative, to provide the only 
answers to medical problems, etc. It was indicated that the 
"profession" has so successfully infiltrated the human consciousness 
with its scientific irrefutability, that people have come to accept, 
expect and believe in the medical fraternity as sole definer of 
their medical ills. 
In terms of the humanist perspective defined within this thesis, 
this was shown to mean that most personnel within the medical 
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model appear to function in a mode which can be likened to the 
Meadian "Me" component of the self, to Schiitzian typification and 
Bergerian social reality as a pre-defined facticity (see chapter 4) . 
In these terms, what takes place is according to Jiirgen Habermas 
(1987) that the power structures within medicine successfully 
"colonise" people ' s lifeworld through a distortion of communication 
caused by medical expertise in doctor-patient exchanges (see Chapter 
3 section 3.6.2) This prevents human discourse from occurring . 
In this chapter the concept of medical ethics will be searched in 
order to try to discover how far there is an allowance for shared 
(intersubjective) definition in medical decisionmaking in terms of 
humanist theory. This means that the chapter will not be looking at 
the reasons for why particular moral decisions are taken, but rather 
at the way in which decisions are made in terms of human 
intersubjective communication through a shared arena . In other 
words not at whether moral decisons can be considered good or bad, 
because such decisions in humanist terms are symbolic and therefore 
open to multi definition. Decisions made in terms of humanist 
communication, involve what is termed a "co-responsibility" and a 
willingness to face what have become reified meaning patterns within 
society . 
In this respect certain aspects of communicative interaction will be 
of import. For example, what effect does an unequal knowledge and 
power relationship have on the type of interaction which takes place 
between medical personnel and patients? Do doctors consider 
patients as knowledgeless? Is there an attempt by the actors 
involved to equalise the interaction which takes place? Are 
patient-doctor consultations normally conducted in terms of "closed" 
interaction, or does the potential for "open" interaction exist? 
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In the previous chapter the theories of George Herbert Mead, Alfred 
Schutz, Richard Brown, Cornie Alant and Peter Berger were read, to 
highlight the failure (in humanist terms) of contemporary medicine 
to address human participation and meaningmaking. In this chapter 
JOrgen Habermas ' s theory of distorted communication - leading to 
distorted intersubjectivity - will be utilised to address the areas 
noted above, and to try to initiate what can be termed a more humane 
platform from which to consider human worldconstruction and 
meaningful reality within the medical model. The work of other 
humanist authors will be integrated where necessary to elaborate 
upon the argument at hand . 
Finally, it is necessary to document the fact that this chapter on 
ethics is limited in terms of particular selected aspects. The 
field of medical ethics is vast . It extends into many and varying 
areas of human life which cannot be fully addressed here. Questions 
of moral concern between people and medicine begin even before life 
itself (as will be indicated later in this chapter when genetic 
engineering is considered), and extend far into the realms of death. 
It will be shown that in relation to death and transplant surgery, 
the pressure upon the dying and their families to agree to donate 
organs once death has taken place , is great . At times the 
wellmeaning concerns of the organ transplant team can be argued to 
preempt the use of life-support machines in order to prolong the 
death process and thereby allow medical science time to preserve 
organs and save the life of others . This in turn can be seen to 
deny the dying and their family what can be termed the dignity of 
dying under natural circumstances . The moral issues involved become 
complicated when one realises that this type of decisionmaking has 
equally as much to do with the rights and dignity of the dying, the 
donor recipient requirement for new organs, the medical professions 
need to further its scientific involvement and state provision in 
terms of medical facilities and financial backing for transplant 
programmes . 
Also of import is the point of view from which questions of medical 
ethics are approached. The philosophical view, in relation to the 
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writings of various authors within chapter 1 of this thesis, offers 
a far different account of human meaningmaking than the account 
proffered by the medical model . Philosophy thrives upon self doubt 
and questioning whilst medical science has to do with the 
achievement of success, linked to more and more technological 
advancement in the ability to heal, cure, prevent disease and 
preserve life, in terms of the unquestionability of scientific 
regimes. But this achievement and success also involves power, and 
power brings with it both responsibility and anxiety. In this 
respect according to Samuel Gorovitz (in Moral Problems in Medicine 
1983) , this is the urgent area of medical ethics today, and should 
be seen as a "symptom" of the success of contemporary medicine. 
Whatever one's personal belief concerning modern medicine (as noted 
earlier , it is not the prerogative of this thesis to make any form 
of moral judgement in this respect), one has to acknowledge that the 
field of medical ethics is both extensive and pervasive. As 
mentioned above, for this reason the ethical issues read within this 
chapter have to be perused in limited fashion in order to facilitate 
and utilise the primary concern of this work, which is to search 
humanist intersubjectivity in terms of ethical considerations. 
5.2 MEDICAL ETHICS RELATED TO HUMANIST THEORY 
Initially an attempt will be made to locate medical ethics 
historically in order to give brief consideration to the area of 
growth in technological medical intervention, and thereby the 
increase in what can be termed an ethical dilemma within the 
contemporary medical model. This in turn will be related to the 
rise of moral decisionmaking within contemporary medicine, and 
defined by this thesis as due in no small part to the growth of the 
so called scientific "regime" . The chapter then moves on to discuss 
"operational" ethics within both the doctor-patient consultation and 
within the wider concerns of public debate . 
To achieve this aim certain concepts within the area of medicine 
relative to medical ethics will be highlighted. Some of these areas 
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are: confidentiality, decisions on how much or how little to tell a 
patient about their condition, what to tell patients to expect from 
particular therapies and drugs, etc., - in other words, how far to 
involve people in the decisionmaking process concerning medicine and 
its sc i ent ifi c procedure·s. Interact ion in these areas is i ndi cated 
to be two-way and "shared", and it will therefore be argued, cannot 
be considered merely in terms of an issue where the doctor takes 
autonomy to inform or decide procedure. Therefore the point at 
issue here is , if the patient requests knowledge how does the doctor 
handle this enquiry for more information? 
Does he/she merely answer the questions and then feel that the 
patient has taken part in deciding (in other words that the 
patient's cognitive structures have become involved). Or are his/her 
actions "humanistic" enough to involve the patient's real feelings 
and meaning structures through a truly shared arena of all knowledge 
available - rather than avoid contradiction between the interests of 
those exercising power (the doctor) and the interests of those they 
exclude (the patient)? It will be indicated that in many of these 
areas there exists the possibility on the part of medical personnel 
to impart only the "good" news of possibilities in order to retain 
scientific autonomy . In this respect this chapter argues that 
intersubjective living - to impart both "good" and "bad" news of 
decisions/possibilities - is blocked by the medical profession's 
adherence to its own scientific morals rather than to what Jean-Paul 
Sartre in Chapter 4 section 4.6 of this thesis refers to as 
co-responsibility for decisionmaking . 
5.3 MEDICAL ETHICS - FROM HIPPOCRATIC OATH TO CONTEMPORARY MEDICINE 
The idea that medicine involves both ethical and moral dimensions 
has been evident since the Oath of Hippocrates. It was the Greek 
physician Hippocrates who, around 400 B.C., became instrumental in 
formulating principles of health which relied upon the rejection of 
so called supernatural phenomena (see chapter 3, section 3.3.1). 
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Hippocrates argued that medical knowl edge should be derived not from 
a total belief in the dominance of God, but from an understanding of 
the natural sciences and the logic of cause and effect 
relationships. 
W. Cockerham (1989) notes that it was Hippocrates who first pointed 
out that human well-being is influenced by a totality of 
environmental factors - living habits, climate, topography etc. It 
was these ideas, combined with an approach based upon thorough 
observation of the patient's symptoms and a logical plan of 
treatment according to proven procedures, which l aid the foundat i ons 
for the "Hippocratic Oath" which medical personnel still swear to 
uphold today on completion of medical training. Therefore, the 
Hippocratic "system" considered the "whole" person to be an 
important factor in the understanding of illness and it was, 
according to Cockerham (1978), the Roman Catholic Church who 
preserved this belief in knowledge and intellectual orientation 
after the fall of Rome. 
Within the Oath of Hippocrates lie the elements relative to medical 
morality and ethics: medical personn el swear to refrain from 
intentional wrong-doing or harm, to keep confidential ity in all 
matters pertaining to the doctor-patient relationship and to do all 
that can be done to search out the reasons for illness . In all 
these areas there is an element of choice which is not always 
extended to the patient concerned because, as argued within this 
thesis, medicine believes it has the right answers . In this respect 
Gorovitch (1983) notes that the concerns of the Hippocratic Oath to 
"do no harm" are often quoted haphazardly in that, " ... the maxim is 
abruptly cited, as if its import is quite obvious ... " , whilst most 
physicians who quote the venerable text " ... know little of its 
origin and are unaware of the range of possible meanings it might 
have in arguing a case in medical ethics" (1983:99). 
Humanism also refutes belief in the "venerable text" if it is seen 
in terms of "set" unquestionable criteria, because humanism argues 
that content/meaning is only "understandable" when taken up within 
• 
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the framework of the human consciousness. This means that all things 
are questionable and redefinable - even science and the Oath. 
Therefore the areas mentioned above do not have clear-cut answers 
(definable by science), and in this respect the humanist would ask, 
what does "intentional wrong doing or harm" in the scientific 
context mean? Who should the physician keep confidentiality with 
and how do physicians "search out the reasons for illness" without 
at times "stretching" the goals of their Oath? K. D. O'Rourke and 
D. Brodeur (1987) note in this respect that these crucial elements 
between doctor and patient can become severely pressurised when a 
team of healers become involved with a patient. They note that 
reductionist contemporary medicine has to find a balance between the 
ca 11 of medi ca 1 sci ence and the "patient's ri ghts ... and need for 
information" (1987:62,3). 
This called for "balance" in itself would seem to uphold the 
humanist ideal for a shared intersubjective arena, which according 
to O'Rourke and Brodeur now has increased relevance because modern 
medicine equates " ... quality care [as] ensured only through a larger 
number of people having access to a patient's [personal medical 
knowledge]" (1987:63). Therefore, if personal information is not 
"humanistically" delineated between the "team" and the patient 
concerned, conflictual elements may easily arise in the treatment of 
patients which actually prevents success rather than enhance it. 
This "cleft-stick" situation is now taken up. 
5.4 HIPPOCRATIC IDEALS APPLIED TO CONTEMPORARY MEDICINE 
As noted above, the situation concerning ethics within medicine now 
seems to encounter difficulty in keeping pace with the technological 
advances and changes taking place within contemporary medicine, and 
at the same time remain true to the ideals contained within the 
Oath. More and more ethical decisions seem to promote scientific 
medicine in opposition to human enterprise and this thesis argues 
that this can cause harm in human terms. Within the realms of 
doctor-patient consultation the elements contained in the Oath can 
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be noted as not so clear-cut because they often embody decisions 
being taken on behalf of the patient (as noted earlier, patients may 
indeed be asked on certain issues - but asked in such a way as to 
merely elicit the response that science requires, to coalesce), 
without their truly becoming involved. 
Medicine has advanced so far in technological terms that it is often 
difficult for medical personnel to impart to patients and their 
families what certain medical decisions entail. Because of this 
difficulty - bridging the gap between medical scientific regimes and 
laypeople understanding - medical personnel make what they consider 
to be the best "scientific" decision under the circumstances which 
prevail. But at times this can be seen to leave the patient 
unknowledgeable about the true (or viable) choices involved in 
certain treatments. And this means that the rigidified meaning 
structures within society - and in this case the medical model - are 
not addressed . They are "skirted" by both doctor and patient alike 
as decisions are discussed and taken from a reified set of meaning 
structures . This point is taken up further in section 5.7 of this 
chapter where it is indicated that ethical decisionmaking in 
contemporary medic i ne involves both the well-being of the person and 
the concerns of this thesis: that real choices be made available to 
people in order to prevent stagnation of medicine in humane terms . 
This is not to say that the medical profession restricts or 
eliminates personal choice on purpose. On the contrary, it will be 
noted later that the medical model does believe it offers choice of 
alternative options to its clientele. It does ask questions about 
what people want but in the terms of this thesis it does so in what 
can be called a form of set agenda, or in the case of medicine, a 
set policy which utilises both scientific irrefutability and 
reification in its planning . This means that decisions are made in 
terms of its (medical science's) own scientific irrefutability, in a 
belief that science has the right and only answers to human illness. 
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It will be indicated that part of this reification is due to the 
social context (i.e. social and economic elements which involve the 
population at large and the state apparatus), and the "problem" of 
people having become used to operating within set conceptualisations 
or categories within society. This point is expanded in section 5.7 
to follow, where it is suggested that medical policy is framed in 
restricted reified terms. In this way medical ethics as a set of 
written and unwritten rules (unwritten rules relates to decisions 
made from a basis of what could be called "normalised" procedures 
within a set situation), regulate and prescribe behaviour which 
reflect scientised values and attendant norms rather than the 
well-being and worth of human existence. 
5.5 ETHICAL DECISIONS IN MEDICINE RELATED TO THE HUMANIST TRADITION 
Ethically (within the terms of the Hippocratic Oath), medical 
personnel are required to advise patients on various courses of 
action which may be taken. However, if that advice is given from a 
base of so called scientific irrefutability - a base which answers 
questions with routinised answers - this can be shown to hold the 
possibility of coercion (on the part of the doctor), through what 
Habermas calls distorted communication (see Chapter 2 section 
2.5.3), leading to distorted intersubjectivity. 
In this way, if a patient questions the medical practitioner's 
decision - rather than accept his/her "expert" advice - the doctor 
will either provide answers which he/she believes to be correct in 
terms of his/her scientific background (and therefore offer no real 
choice to the patient in humanist terms), or perceive the patient's 
behaviour as deviant because what is taken to be the accepted "norm" 
is seen as violated. The patient is expected to listen passively or 
acquiesce, and therefore does not embark upon a search for 
participation in the construction of a meaningful reality. This is 
not to say that the patient becomes unhappy (it was noted earlier 
that due to the successful infiltration of medical science into 
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human consciousness, people have become used to operating in set 
categories - which in this case 
knowledge of medical science) . 
uphold the so called "superior" 
Therefore unhappiness does not 
feature because both scientific doctor and patient alike operate in 
terms of "colonised" meaning structures which appear to be correct 
(see chapter 2, section 2.5) . 
But in effect this lack of participation leads to a process of 
dehumanisation in humanist terms because the scientific medical 
model seems to offer "correct" answers to ethical questions which 
present themselves without the involvement of people's true 
meaningful participation, and which thereby do not provide for real 
choicemaking. 
5.6 THE POWER ELEMENT INVOLVED IN MEDICAL ETHICS 
When medical ethics is seen in the wider setting of social and 
economic concerns the situation becomes more complex because a power 
element becomes apparent . For example, if consideration is given to 
the area of moral decisionmaking concerning the postponing of death 
- or the prolonging of human life - it i s apparent that both involve 
personal values and norms regarding the treatment of the individual 
which impinge upon both the personal well-being of that individual 
and his/her family . Whilst to withold medical assistance and allow 
death to take place "naturally" may appear the best course of action 
in terms of the people concerned , such action could be argued to run 
counter to the medical code of ethics which is directed at 
saving/prolonging life for as long as possible . Also, in the 
broader context of this thesis the decision to allow death to take 
place "naturally", has to involve intersubjectivity in terms of not 
only the actors involved in this particular "scene", but also in 
terms of a consideration of what such decisions mean for everyone 
living in the same society. As Alant (1990:46) notes : 
From the outset, we the actors on the social scene, experience 
the world we live in . . . not as a private but as an 
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intersubjective one, that is, a world common to all of us, 
either actually given or potentially accessible to everyone. 
This means in effect that our thoughts and actions - being non 
private entities - are affected and indeed have an effect upon 
fellow human beings. As noted in chapter 2, section 2.2.3, Sartre 
argues that "Whether I desire it or not, my choice of a situation 
involves others about me, and mankind in general (1973:374). In 
this way the choices made within any situational arena automati cally 
involve everyone and carry the responsibility of knowing that 
people's experience of social reality is the only definer of human 
action. 
It may also be argued that such decisions (due to technological 
achievement in the field of life-support machines) conflict with, 
(a) the Hippocratic Oath which aims to preserve life (as noted 
above), (b) the concerns of medical science in the field of 
scientific advan cement (transplant surgery), and (c) the wider 
concerns of pub1ic .accountabi1ity. In this way, to preserve life 
"scientifically" may facilitate a life for someone else in the form 
of a healthy kidney, but at the same time has to balance the 
responsibility to utilise scarce resources in the form of 
public/state funds and medical expertise/technology (thereby 
embodying decisions of both a financial and ethical nature which 
concern public debate), with the emotions of the individual and 
his/her family. 
This type of decision can further be related to the debate on 
euthanasia and involves not only decisions being made with regard to 
painless death versus an existence compatible with human dignity. 
But also to the above mentioned concerns of scarce state resources 
in the form of medical personnel, medical costs for machinery and 
drugs, and the question of decisionmaking in terms of the broad 
intersubjective rationale debated above . In this area procedural 
courses of action have had to be effected (see endnote 1) , in order 
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to rational ise medical procedures and thereby "routinise" and 
protect human decision-making. B. A. Rix (1990:5) states in this 
respect that " ... new medical technology, for example the 
respirator, has affected the process of death ... and raises new 
ethical questions of very practical import" which involve the human 
emotions . If these emotional elements can be removed through 
rationalised procedures (a systems approach rather than a humanist), 
Hans-Martin Sass notes what he terms one of the advantages of 
brain-oriented definition of death in this way, 
Human life that can no longer communicate or feel pain need no 
longer be supported; severe moral, emotional, cultural, social, 
and economic costs that would have been associated with the 
artificial extension of the life of such entities are thus 
avoided. Organs then become available for patients who would 
otherwise die or face severe suffering ... " (1989:49). 
But Rix argues against this so called "advantage" by pointing out 
the dilemmas involved with any definition of death. He notes: 
Though certain legal and medical dilemmas are solved by the 
brain death criterion, questions such as what is death and what 
conditions should be provided for the dying cannot be summarily 
answered [because] our experience of death transcends the 
medical and legal purviews, and relates to our most fundamental 
beliefs, attitudes and practices. The new medical technology 
necessitates a practical and precise definition of death, but 
this definition cannot be arrived at without a consideration of 
deep -lying human values (1990:5). 
In this respect the concern with public accountability is taken up 
by Rix (1990) who quotes The Danish Council of Ethics as stating 
that " ... a change in the criterion of death is an event of such 
significance that it should not be permitted without a major public 
debate" (1990:5) . This would involve consideration of scarce public 
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(and health profession) resources, and furthermore in the terms of 
this thesis, although it still does not involve real choicemaking on 
the part of the patient and his/her family, it does highlight the 
growing complexity of the ethics debate within the contemporary 
medical model . 
In Chapter 3 section 3.6.2 Foucault ' s argument concerning control 
versus power highlighted this double sided controversy . Here it was 
noted that medicine can sometimes be regarded as a "closed domain" 
whereby life and death decisions are taken by medical personnel from 
a platform of power which is backed by elitist knowledge . There is 
an apparent dilemma between the doctor's position of power in such 
situations and also his/her handling of the elements of 
confidentiality and belief concerning how much patients and their 
families need to know - and furthermore, to the public debate 
surrounding medical moral ising. This thesis adds a third area of 
concern to Foucault's double sided controversy by calling for the 
recognition of people's potential to take part in this negotiational 
arena. In this way the very definition of death becomes ongoingly 
debated and takes into account not only people's meanings of the 
concept death, but also a "consideration of [the) deep-lying values" 
pointed out by Rix above. 
In the case of death, the prolonging of life through the use of a 
life support machine involves the medical profession in offering its 
"expert" scientific advice to the patient's family on the fors and 
againsts (presuming in this case that the patient is unable to 
understand the position for him/herself). But as noted earlier, due 
to a concern for scientific advancement, the medical profession may 
have its own reasons for seeking permission to prolong life . 
Again, according to Hans-Martin Sass, the moral options which such 
decisions involve often become confused between ethics and emotion . 
Sass notes that: "The first heart transplant a generation ago and 
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the actual debates [involved with prolonging the life of someone 
through technical means] serve as examples of emotional rejections 
of morally acceptable or even desirable new options" (1989 :45). The 
public obviously wishes to exercise its right to enter i nto the 
debate surrounding "improved" medical technology . This debate 
centres around the so call ed "good" news for the patient and the so 
called "bad" news for many who are called upon to fund expensive 
technology which it may consider undesirable. 
On a different level, the debate and choices involved with improved 
medical technology are not always spelled out to patients. Where 
the situation of "repair" to the body is concerned the "good" news 
may be that life can be supported until a kidney improves or a heart 
becomes stronger, etc . In these terms medical science can achieve 
great success. But humanism's problem is that the "bad" news may not 
always be given to the patient and/or his/her family, i.e., the bad 
news that even when the heart gets stronger it may not return to 
full strength and the patient may thereafter have to accept a life 
of semi-invalid. Or the transplanted kidney may not be accepted by 
the host body and the patient may be placed in an even more critical 
position . 
The medical model answer to such questions is always scientific, 
i.e. if this happens then there is much that can help the patient 
technically. But this thesis argues whatever the decision made all 
parties within particular situations should be offered both the 
"good" and "bad" news from which to decide, not merely the 
scientific "good" news. In this way real participation becomes 
accounted for and more humane ethical decisions are taken because 
they involve the meaning structures of all concerned . The concept of 
confidentiality has much import to what has been said so far and for 
this reason it is now taken up in more detail. 
5.7 CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP 
In terms of confidentiality there are always decisions to be made in 
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the area of how much knowledge a patient and his/her family should 
be given, or need to be given, concerning courses of action. The 
dilemma noted earlier is directly related to what can be called the 
unequal elements within the doctor-patient relationship . The 
doctor's interest is primarily professional and his/her skills 
underwrite an authority over the patient. This means that for 
varying reasons the doctor may decide to withhold important 
information concerning illness - e.g. the doctor's possible need for 
an unemotional involvement with a patient in order to offer the best 
scientific/objective advice, or a belief that patients require, or 
are entitled to protection from unnecessary worry or distress. 
Todd and Still (1984), discussing impending death, note the dilemma 
involved in this type of situation in this way: 
There is conflict ... between the doctor's not telling his 
patients because it is better if they don't know, and his 
recognition that in fact they do know either through their 
experience of the illness or through talking about it 
with ... [othersj ... the doctor experiences a conflict between his 
role as a doctor and what he faces ... (1984:669) . 
This conflictual aspect is understandable in the situation of death 
(although the humanist would argue that even in this situation 
choices need to be made which should involve all parties), but in 
humanist terms conflict can be shown to exist in other areas of 
decisionmaking involving ethical consideration within the 
doctor-patient arena. For example, a doctor who calls for extensive 
X-rays to aid diagnosis may offer only the "good" news of this 
decision. The X-rays will probably show what is wrong. In this 
situation, withheld from the patient is the "bad" news of the 
situation. Too many X-rays can involve the body in overdoses of 
radiation - leading to what Ivan Illich notes as medicine which does 
more harm than good. 
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The same can be said of drug therapy . Many drugs can be seen to 
cure one thing and at the same time induce another problem . In this 
respect Illich's argument (Chapter 3 section 3.6.4) indicates that 
medicine causes as many medical problems as it solves and points to 
the medical model in terms of a radical monopoly. This argument has 
a direct bearing upon confidentiality and a doctor's willingness or 
abil ity to provide both the "good" and "bad" news of various 
options. It also has a direct bearing upon the way in which medical 
ethics can be seen to operate within the communicative arena because 
it stifles certain information in order to promote the "good" news. 
R. M. Veatch (1989) suggests that confidentiality is basic to the 
physician-patient relationship and is " . .. closely linked with basic 
human dignity and respect for persons, just as with lucidity" 
(1989:83). He indicates that to keep confidentiality does not only 
have to do with keeping one's mouth shut about a patient's private 
affairs because in some cases " .. . where physicians th i nk that 
violating confidentiality would benefit the patient in some way, 
they would be encouraged to seek that benefi t at the expense of 
patient privacy" (1989:83). But confident i ality also has to do with 
threatened harm towards others, for instance a patient who discloses 
to a doctor that he/she intends to help a terminally ill patient to 
end his/her life. Therefore Veatch maintains that deciding when 
confidentiality mayor may not be overridden is one of the most 
difficult problems in medical ethics, and furthermore in these 
terms, highlights the humanist argument that symbolic concepts are 
not clear-cut and predefined within the operational area . 
Along these lines Veatch indicates that the family physician may 
encounter a double-bind situation. He notes that, " .. . [physicians 
in the terms of their oath of confidentiality] owe a duty to respect 
the privacy of a patient, but [can] also feel a duty to other family 
members of that patient, who are also members of that physic i an's 
practice" (1989 :86). He cites the situation where an adolescent 
asks for birth-control pills and does not want her family to know. 
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In terms of the argument put forward by this thesis, the doctor who 
assumes his/her role to be one of deciding for the patient by 
allowing only "surface" choicemaking (for example, this is my 
recommendation do you agree? [the "good" news]), in humanist terms 
negates the integrity of the personal lifeworld through the possible 
withholding of certain information/knowledge in order to further 
what the doctor thinks is the best course of action in terms of 
his/her scientific background/belief. What this may mean in terms of 
the above example is that the doctor either advises the adolescent 
to tell her parents first, or takes the authority and prescribes the 
birth control requested. C. J. Todd and A. W. Still make note that 
this type of situation causes " ... deliberate barriers to overt 
communication" (1984:667). 
What humanism calls for in answer to the above examples is that 
"real" choices be availed . Not only that the patient's point of 
view be discussed, but that the doctor's point of view and situation 
concerning confidentiality also be confronted in a negotiational 
sett i ng. In thi sway, even the patient who admits to someth i ng 
untoward (i.e a patient who confesses to a wish to aid the death of 
a terminally ill family member) should through consciousness raising 
and a discussion of the "good" and "bad" news (various options and 
alternatives) be able to see not only his/her own appraisal of the 
situation, but also the physician's difficulty in being expected to 
keep confidentiality in a situation which in this sense is illegal. 
This means that the physician is no longer seen in terms of a power 
position, or in this case, in terms of a listener who is expected to 
listen (in confidence) and make no moral judgement because of the 
patient's expectation of confidentiality. The doctor does have 
personal moral ideals and in the case of the adolescent and birth 
control, may even be prejudiced for or against. Humanism allows for 
all of these conflictual elements to be mediated through the 
platform of "good" and "bad" news negotiation. 
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By not attempting to mediate both doctor and patient "knowledge" 
highlights the way in which medical expertise legitimates its action 
in terms of set criteria (patient confidentiality). It achieves 
this by deriving power from its roots in formal knowledge (science 
and technology), thereby effecting what was referred to in terms of 
Habermas's theory as a colonisation of the lifeworld (see chapter 2 
section 2.5 .3). This can be seen to place both patient and medical 
personnel into an area of what might be called "illusionary" 
communication. The expectations contained within the concept of 
confidentiality are now taken up using Habermas's theory of 
distorted communication. 
5.8 CONFIDENTIALITY AND JUGEN HABERMAS'S THEORY OF DISTORTED 
COMMUNICATION 
In Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action it was noted 
that the lifeworld is seen as a sort of "symbolic space" within 
which mediation between differing (and sometimes opposing) 
standpoints takes place. In terms of humanism , and the concept of 
confidentiality, this means that what takes place within that space 
is very much open to definition by the particular actors who take 
part and, therefore, to their particular meaningful understanding of 
the situation. However, due to what was noted earlier as an unequal 
distribution of knowledge , power and skills, the symbolic nature of 
communication becomes distorted within the medical model in terms of 
the scientific frame of reference. This thesis suggests that rather 
than an acceptance of medicine in terms of unquestionability, the 
symbolic space in medical interaction be recognised in a light of 
revisability and of choicemaking on the part of all involved. 
What this means in terms of ethical decisions within medicine is 
that medical decisions should not be presented as "technical" and 
"scientHic", d" llln'evisable and unquestionable, because t hh type 
of presentation involves the necessary use of one best method. In 
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this respect Habermas is noted by Patrick Scambler (1986:174) as 
suggesting that this gives rise to a critique of modern medicine in 
terms of its " ... medical expertise [which] has become increasingly 
technocratic and un-accountable ... involving a progressive 
medicalisation of everyday life". 
In these terms the meaning of ethical decisions is provided through 
what can be termed abstract rules which successfully decontextualise 
events and remove them from particular personal experiential 
contexts. Rather what needs to take place is what J. Mishler (in 
Todd and Still, 1984) argues to be the need for a more symmetrical 
power relationship between physician and patient. In this way the 
sharing of knowledge between doctor and patient can achieve a humane 
empowering of patients by inviting patient entry into the 
experiential area of decisionmaking. 
This effectively draws upon Habermas's theory of communicative 
action because it is oriented to understanding rather than the mere 
acceptance of reified knowledge, to " ... symbolic structures [which] 
remain restricted to a language in which conscious intentions are 
expressed (1971a:216). If this does not take place, then the 
communicative arena is set in terms of a distortion of 
communication/intersubjectivity. Medical knowledge is thereby 
denoted in terms of a formal knowledge which affords the medical 
profession the only true expertise. This relegates laypersons into 
the realms of unknowledgeablility and limits choice relative to a 
doctor's suggestions (backed by scientific accountability). In 
humanist terms, limited choice has to be seen as no real choice 
because it does not involve all people and all possible knowledge. 
In the next section of this chapter, the argument presented here is 
applied to various ethical debates within contemporary medicine. 
Here it will be shown that medical ethics often function in a 
framework of "good" news only, which does not always identify the 
real choices to be made as open for debate between patient and 
doctor. As noted earlier, in promoting the "good" news of 
scientific medicine the patient is often not made aware of the "bad" 
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news of various decisions or of the real cho i ces to be made, because 
choice is offered from a reified base . Therefore, options and 
alternatives become relegated to an area of what Arie Brand calls 
the "steering media" of power and elitist knowledge (in this case 
scientific accountability), which in tur n st i fles the symbolic space 
within communication (Chapter 1 section 1.3.4) . The identified areas 
of confidentiality - how much or how little to tell patients - will 
be drawn through the section to follow in order to highlight that 
di storted commun i cat ion is" ali ve and well" withi n medi ci ne and its 
many areas of ethical concern. 
5.9 ETHICAL DEBATES RELATED TO THE HUMANIST TRADITION 
The advancement of medicine along technological l i nes, whilst it can 
be argued to have improved many areas of human health, can also be 
seen to have achieved this improvement at the expense of human 
meaningful intersubjective living . Medical autonomy can often be 
seen in terms of a "closed" authority (backed by scientific 
irrefutability) which operates through an adherence to the training 
of medical personnel to deal with illness in purely scientific 
terms. This means that human disease is addressed in terms of 
objective criteria which takes precedence over a humanistic concern 
for people, their well-being and their ability to make sense of the 
worl d. 
Medical students are thereby encouraged to take a detached view of 
patients and their illnesses, to concentrate upon physical/ 
pathological conditions, and to endeavour to remain apart from 
emotional involvement . According to the medical model, this type of 
treatment affords the patient the most objective/scientific 
handling, and thereby what the medical profession consider to be the 
most effective addressal of the problem at hand . In this respect 
Robert Coombs and Pauline Powers (in Cockerham 1989:8) note that 
" ... physicians would intellectually dissect their patient into 
physical parts ... known as the fragmentalisation method . .. [which 
allowesl the doctor to deal only with the parts and not with the 
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whole". Training in this way places medical education into what 
William Cockerham calls "trade schools", forcing doctors to be 
little more than "technicians" who work on the body, and causing 
what J . McKinlay amusingly calls, " ... thought processes [which 
suffer] from excessive hardening of the categories". 
According to Mark Chesler and Oscar Barbarin (1984) this type of 
relationship between patients and medical staff, in calling for 
unemotional scientific involvement which "trades" in passive 
physical parts, can lead to dissatisfaction on the part of patients. 
They note that: 
Professionals [who] expect passive acquiescence rather than 
active participation from powerless clients . .. correlated 
significantly with patients ratings of communication with their 
physicians and with their doctor's interpersonal style 
(1984:49-51). 
It was indicated earlier in this study (Chapter 3 section 3.2.3) 
that dissatisfaction on the part of patients can arise when they are 
not invited into a two-way interactional undertaking which takes 
account of the intersubjective elements of human living, and 
therefore the creativity involved in true choicemaking. This calls 
for a process of participation between doctor and patient in 
arriving at an "account" of illness and furthermore, for making 
decisions on how to explain and deal with particular situations . 
The way in which this "arrival" is achieved in the terms of this 
thesis is at the very root of the ethical debate addressed in this 
chapter. Therefore by looking at particular ethical concerns 
within medicine, it should be possible to highlight the humanist 
argument . 
5.9.1 Genetic engineering 
In the field of genetic engineering medicine has made great strides. 
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Related to childbirth, the "good" news in this field of medicine has 
brought much joy to childless couples by offering them the chance to 
become parents through technological intervention. But controversy 
does exist in this area because questions and choices exist, which 
by their very nature involve not only the parents to be and the 
doctor involved, but the general public at large. Kevin O'Rourke and 
Dennis Brodeur (1987) note in this respect that medical technology 
has moved from being able to repair the human body to an area of 
actually being able to make human bodies. Thi s they indicate 
prompts the situation where people must face the question: "Is it 
right for us to become our own creators"? It is to this area of 
genetic engineering that this discussion now turns. 
5.9.2 The test-tube baby debate 
Genetic engineering has made it possible to artificially "mate" 
multiple egg and sperm in a culture medium outside of the mother's 
body under controlled laboratory conditions. Thereafter choice is 
in volved in deciding which, and how many, of the mated embryo should 
be imp lanted into the mother to run to full term conception. The 
medical model assumes that it has the right answer to this choice 
and it uses its scientific code of ethics to decide which embryo 
should live and which should die. In terms of the humanist argument 
this would not be problematic once certain ways of making such 
decisions are made available. In this respect humanism cal ls for 
decisions of this nature to involve not only scientific choice, but 
also the meaning structures of the parents to be and the concerns of 
the wider society. This denotes an intersubjective forum of ideas. 
However, this is not to presume that the parents were not involved 
in making the decisions. They must have been involved to have 
supplied the egg and sperm necessary to begin the process. But were 
all the options discussed fully with the paronts or were only so 
called "surface" choices involved? For example if the doctor merely 
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discusses the fors and againsts involved with "test-tube" birth from 
a basis of personal belief in scientific proveability , this is not 
real choice, but "surface" choice. This approach invariably 
advocates the benefits of scient ific irrefutability ("good" news ). 
and although it will be successful in putting the parent's minds at 
rest, it in no way involves an intersubjective forum which will 
promote the negotiation of both the "good" and "bad" news of the 
situation . 
Because of the way in which the parents to be frame their questions 
(from a base of little knowledge), and the way in which these 
questions are answered (from a belief in science). the couple f ee l 
secure in the knowledge that sc ientific medicine can address and 
quel l their worries. The doctor feels happy that he/she has managed 
to set the couple's mind at rest. In humanist terms what has been 
achieved here amounts to a meaningless jumble of rigidified/reified 
"regime" jargon, whereby medical science has offered only the "good" 
news: the childless couple can become parents. But dangers do exist 
in thi s proc8d ll r e be~ause it in volves the necessity to implant ~orc 
than one embryo into the recipient womb to ensure success. 
The reality when multiple fetuses are conceived often l eads to the 
birth of underweight babies who experience respiratory problems and 
die soon after birth (baby Brandon who died at birth here in South 
Africa in 1990 is a case in point). Brandon was the smallest of 
five babies, three of whom suffered respiratory problems - two 
survived, but the third . Brandon. died. All four surviving babies 
have impaired vision and face years of. "hopefully", corrective 
interven tion by medical science. 
5.9.3 The humanist way of choice 
Following on from the examples discussed above it can be argued that 
the med ical profession has utilised its professional confidentiality 
to bring on ly "good" news of its scientific achievement into the 
communication arena . And by functioning in these terms only, 
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it can be suggested that medicine operates through a form of 
distorted communication because the "bad" news (or the real choices) 
are omitted. To the scientific medical model the answer to such 
a dilemma is simple: the answer lies in scientific advancement . To 
the humanist this answer is not so clear -cut because it involves 
options and alternatives which need ongoing debate in order to 
define what answers mean . All such debate has to come from a truely 
"open" forum which includes all alternatives and all options, not 
merely routinised or reified options and alternatives. Human 
involvement requires that people intersubjectively participate with 
medical science in defining what choices exist, and this implies a 
right to become involved in deciding on medical and ethical issues . 
If this does not take place, then medical technological advance can 
be seen in conflictual terms because it promotes science at the 
expense of a humane meaningful existence - thereby devaluing human 
existence whilst seeking to improve it. This is not only disastrous 
for the very people the medical model purports to serve, but to its 
own Oath of allegiance which calls for medical personnel to do all 
in their power to address human well -being. 
Even seen in this light it is still more than likely that 
prospective parents of a test-tube child (i .e. armed with the "bad" 
news and the real choices involved), will decide that their need for 
children is of uppermost importance (the actual decision in terms of 
this thesis is academic - see introduction to this chapter) and 
therefore wi 11 percei ve even the di scard i ng of "surplus" embryo as a 
small problem relative to their need . Alternatively, they may 
decide that they cannot continue with the process. Whatever 
decision is made, when humanistic values are involved the decisions 
taken will have evolved from a truly humane platform which takes 
into account both the "good" and "bad" news of the situation. If 
this type of interaction does not take place then the medical model 
can be seen to have functioned in terms of what Jan K. Coetzee 
(1989b) refers to as a "monopoly of knowledge" which robs people of 
their personal dignity because it does not allow for cognitive 
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participation. This utilises the principle which informs humanism's 
call for the preserving of people's rights to participate in 
defining and constructing a world of meaning . And this, Coetzee 
notes, means : 
To live in a world containing meaning [which] does not imply a 
static conception of social reality; [because] it presupposes 
an active dialogue between people and their overall reality 
(1989a : 6) . 
5.9.4 The distortion of the lifeworld through "colonisation" 
In Chapter 2 section 2.5.3, it was noted that Habermas's argument 
for communicative action involves knowledge as guided by particular 
interest or purpose. It was indicated that particular interests or 
purposes can, through a process of distorted communication, 
effectively hide the possibil ity for alternative ways of "seeing". 
With reference to the ethical considerations discussed above, this 
can be argued to mean that the scientific dominance of the medical 
model is capable of distorting communication to hide the "bad" news 
of its scientific regimes. Norma Romm (1991:134) argues that unless 
people " ... account for the interests underlying the logic of ... 
scientific analyses ... it wi l l operate behind our backs and control 
us". 
In this way it can be suggested that the medical profession in 
offering scientific "answers", may be seen to place people at its 
mercy by impressing its scientific ideology upon them. This causes 
a distortion of intersubjective living through what can be termed 
the medical models ability to make the interaction which occurs 
within the symbolic space appear rigid and unquestionable, and the 
meanings therein non-revisable . If people ' s consciousness is 
stifled in this way then they are effectively unable to think in any 
other categories. 
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This amounts to a colonisation of the lifeworld by the medical 
model. Ethical decision rests not up on the potentialities possessed 
by human beings themse lves to achieve shared understanding, but upon 
the scientific ideology of achieving a resu lt. Habermas argues that 
it is the function of critical theory to expose this hidden exercise 
of domination. Such an exposure can effectively provide for other 
ways of "seeing", by highlighting the "interests" underlying 
scientific logic and providing entry to a more meaningful 
construction of soc ial reality within the concerns of medicine. Romm 
(1991:146) argues in this respect that humanism calls for a widening 
of the scope of humans to make choices by affording them a knowledge 
of the viable options. In this way the humanist argument alludes to 
an enriching and equalising of the conditions of human existence. 
5. 10 MEDICI NE AND HUMANIST IDEALS IN ETHICS 
What the humanist argument, and the argument presented in this 
chapter calls for, is quite clear. All concepts wi thin the field of 
medical ethics namely, confidentiality, accountabi lity, sha red 
responsibility, ethics itself and the defining of illness, diagnosi s 
and treatment regimes, etc., are open to continuous ongoing 
re-definition. In the medical communicative arena, definition and 
decisionmaking should be shared between all parties concerned in the 
interaction, and seen in a light of dual accountability which 
adheres to a co-responsibility for decisions taken. 
Responsibility in these terms does not imply that the doctor makes a 
decision for a patient and then takes responsibility for that 
decision. Rather it implies that the responsibility for making 
decisions, or taking account of various options, or applying 
confidentiality, is debatable, questionable, re-definable, between 
all partie s involved in specific contexts. This involves what 
Coelzee (1986:8) indicates i s an esteem which goes hand in nand with 
freedom in the humanist tradition. In thi s sense humanism implies 
the opportunity to realise one's human potential. 
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Or as otherwise stated, leads to what Veronica McKay (1990) calls a 
status shift through the delineation of all knowledge pertaining to 
the situation. Therefore doctor-patient interaction should not take 
place from a platform of pre -defined policy, but from an 
understanding of the need for participation on the part of all 
people if freedom and meaningfu l ness is to be obtained through the 
realisation of human potential. 
5.11 BERGERIAN ETHICS APPLIED TO THE MEDICAL MODEL 
Earlier in section 5.9.2 the idea of choice undertaken in terms of a 
set agenda or policy was discussed. This form of choicemaking was 
noted not to be real choi ce in humanist terms, but choice made from 
a predefined reified set of meaning patterns. In this respect Peter 
Berger indicates that any pol icy (pol itical or medical) invariably 
implies problems of values. He argues that if human beings have the 
right to live in a meaningful world, then respect for this basic 
human right should provide what he calls the moral imperative for 
Dolicy decisions. In this respect he notAs that: "Sonner or later . 
avowedly or covertly, all pol icy considerations involve choices 
between values, and all policy decisions are value-charged" 
(in Berger, P.L. & Luckmann T., 1976:64). He notes that policy 
decisions involve either " ... the active inflictual or the passive 
acceptance" on the part of people and that this should require " ... a 
justification in terms of moral rather than technical necessity" 
(in Berger, P. L. & Luckmann 1., 1976: 165). 
In the case of medicine it was noted that the "policy" inherent 
within the medical framework is one of what can in humanist terms 
almost be called "non-involvement". In order to uphold the 
scient i fic regime and its professionalisation, medical science 
offers what it sees as the best treatment for patients. When 
involvement does take place - doctors and patlents meet, discuss the 
patients' problems, make decisions upon diagnosis and treatment, 
etc. Berger agrees, but indicates that both engagement and 
detachment 
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within any setting carried to excess can be dehumanising. He notes: 
"The ... fanatic is no less a repul sive figure than the theoretician 
to whom human anguish is nothing but an occasion for intellectual 
exercises" (in Berger, P.L. & Luckmann 1.,1976:245). Arguing that 
it is impossible for humans to maintain a disengagement, he 
indicates that " ... engagement is always in terms of and out of ... a 
specific location ... and therefore must imply a sensitivity ... " 
(in Berger, P.L. & Luckmann T., 1976:247). 
Applied to the ethics of medicine and the doctor-patient 
inte raction, it can be argued that the doctor tries to detach from 
the consultation far enough to maintain a professional scientific 
relationship. But, according to Berger, in the very act of 
engagement there arises an intersubjective arena which can only be 
in the form of a sensitivity one to the other. 
The aim therefore, should be to engender a "consciousness raising" 
pl atform wherein the knowledge of both parties has equal weight 
within the interart.ion. Th e doctor's im~lJt is from a scientific 
standpoint and the patient's imput is from his/her understanding of 
the condition in question. Such interaction should be seen, in 
principle, as an interaction between equals. When seen in this 
light there is always the possibility that intersubjective 
communication will take place (that medical science will not 
organise on behalf of people), and therefore, that real choice in 
humanist terms is potentially possible. But what happens in cases 
where people cannot enter into communication concerning choice 
between alternative options? How would the ethical dilemma of say 
an unconscious road accident victim fare when faced with humanism's 
argument for involving people in deciding? How would the argument 
evolve concerning a baby born with severe spina bifida, or even the 
case of a new heart for old? The following section considers a 
number 0f ~edi~dl conditions as seen from a humanist perspective. 
5.12 ETHICAL CASE STUDIES AND THE HUMANIST TRADITION 
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5.12.1 Case 1: the road accident victim 
In this first situation, and for the purposes of the argument at 
hand, it is necessary to consider the accident victim to be badly 
injured and unconscious before medical intervention . The patient 
cannot be asked because he/she cannot communicate, family have not 
yet been informed so they cannot help decide. It is up to the 
medical personnel to employ scientific medicine to "save" th i s 
particular individual. In line with their medical Oath - to do all 
they can to preserve life - and in line with their belief in science 
as having the right answers, the medical personnel employ all the 
scientific technology they can muster, and either save or lose the 
patient. 
The outcome of whether this particular person lives or dies is 
academic, and so it may seem is the humanist argument to present 
choices, "good" and "bad" news, etc., from which to make decisions, 
because the patient and his/her family were not able to make these 
choices. But this is not the case. The hospital personnel will 
have debated with the "good" and "bad" news of the situation before 
the decision to use scientific know-how was invoked. Questions 
like, how badly are the kidneys injured, i.e . is there enough 
function left to allow a continuance of life should the patient 
recover, etc., will have been considered . Specialists, 
radiologists, nurses, other doctors, all will have made an input 
into the decisions made concerning this accident victim . 
In one respect the choices offered and made will have been fairer in 
that the people making the choice, were all equipped to recognise 
the "bad" news involved from a position of being medically trained. 
On the other hand this does mean that this medical training, if the 
argument advanced elsewhere in this thesis is accepted, does 
predispose such people towards scientific regimes. But at least 
operating here is the aspect of Sartrian co-responsibility which 
does mean that the people making choices will have done so in terms 
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of a humility and care for their fellow human being. For the 
purposes of the argument at hand, what seemed to be a no choice 
situation is actually not correct . Science is called upon at times 
to take over the choicemaking process, but medical personnel are 
human also and therefore real choices can still made. 
5.12.2 Case 2: The spina bifida baby 
In this case a child is born into the world with severe spina 
bifida. Without going too deeply into what this sad condition 
involves (the back of the child is open, exposing the spinal cord 
and the nerves - repair always leaves the child impaired in some 
way: either spastic or paraplegic with the only unknown being, how 
badly), a decision has to be made quickly about what to do. If an 
operation is not performed to close the back the child will very 
soon die . If an operation is performed the child is faced with a 
life of restricted ability and life span. Samuel Gorovitz (1983) 
notes just exactly what this means: 
As a consequence of the spinal cord deformity, the child is 
paralyzed below the level of the lesion. This always involves 
loss of bladder and bowel control ... the kidneys may also be 
dysfunctional ... impairment of circulation of cerebrospinal 
fluid [causing] an accumulation of excess fluid in the brain 
which can result in mental retardation . Treatment ... involves 
immediate closure of the defect to prevent infection ... . Even 
with vigorous therapy, the results are seldom very good ... most 
live pitiful lives. (1983:402,3). 
Again, it is not for this thesis to consider the right (see endnote 
3) or wrong of decisions of this type, but to consider the way in 
which the choices involved are put to the people around the child -
those who have the unenviable task of deciding the fate of another 
human being. In this situation the medical personnel will probably 
want to use their life saving techniques to save the child. They 
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will rely upon the irrefutability of scientific technology and their 
personal belief in its techniques, to persuade the parents to sign 
for the operation. 
will probably offer 
better in this area 
improving, etc. 
In answer to the parents's questions science 
technological answers - like, thing s are getting 
all the time, life for these children is 
But in humanist terms this is merely offering the "good" news of th e 
situation and as such offers no real choice. From what the parents 
are told, only ill-feeling people would decide not to sign the 
consent form for the operation (endnote 2 concerning s igned consent 
refers). On the other hand if the parents are told both the "good" 
and "bad" news of the situation, their decision may be different. 
This is what Habermas means when he refers to knowledge which is 
guided by particular interests (in thi s case scientific medicine). 
And this is what he means by di storted communication leading to 
distorted intersubjectivity. The parents are almost coerced into 
accepting treatment for their child through the distorted 
communication which offers only "good" news. Only "qood" news, 
equals distorted intersubjective living , because people have been 
required to choose an option from a set of reified meanings. 
Richard McCormick (in Gorovitz 1983) suggests that there are 
"either-or " extremes at work in this ethical area, linked to the 
criteria of "meaningful life" . The concept of "meaningful life" is 
used to measure what doctor and parent consider to be a child 's 
chance to live a reasonably useful and happly life. Where the 
consideration is that "meaningful life" is extremely poor or 
hopeless, this yardstick is used to decide for or against further 
treatment. McCormick notes that: 
The awesome finality of these decisions, combined with a 
~vL~IlLia; for "",'ur in rrognosis, made the choice agGnizing for 
families and health professionals. Nevertheless, the issue has 
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to be faced, for not to decide is an arbitrary and potentially 
devastating decision of default (1983:396). 
Here we note the Sartreian notion of co-responsibility which 
eminates from a responsibility to act. Sartre maintains that there 
is no reality except in action, and furthermore that people accept 
not only the responsibility of such action in the knowledge that the 
weight of their choices is hard to bear because it often brings 
anxiety. But also, that only by acting in the world can people 
obtain any self-respect at all. They must take up the potential for 
decisionmaking however devastating this may be because human dignity 
is very much intertwined with people as interacting subjects. (See 
Chapter 2, sections 2.1 and 2.2). 
But this study argues that there is a middle course between 
"either-or" . According to McCormick such a middle course runs 
within the development of "substantive standards to inform parents 
and physicians" (1983:397). This indeed may be one way to offer 
guidelines for acting, but these guidelines rely on medical 
expertise. There are other criteria to be taken into account and J. 
M. Gustafson (in Gorovitz, 1983:398) notes what these might be . He 
begins: "Why would I draw the line on a different side .. . than the 
physician .. . "? (This the writer interprets as on a different side 
to that of scientific knowledge). And in answer to this question 
states: 
While reasons can be given, one must recognise that there are 
intuitive elements, grounded in beliefs and profound feelings, 
that enter into particular judgements ... 
In the case of spina bifida these areas can only be taken into the 
negotiational arena when and if all concerned in decisionmaking are 
invited to share the "good" and "bad" news of the situation. Only 
then can "meaningful life" get anywhere near to being meaningful in 
humanist terms. Because as McCormick (in Gorovitz, 1983) notes : 
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The trouble with slogans is that they do not aid .. . they 
co-opt ... , often only thinly disguising a good 
questionable value judgements in the process. 
tools for analysis and enlightenment; they are 
ideological battle (1983:397). 
5.12.3 Case 3: the new heart for old 
number of 
Slogans are not 
weapons for 
In case three the patient ha s a condition which, if allowed to run 
its own course, will culminate in an early death because the heart 
is unable to continue, due to disease. The patient is fully aware 
of his/her condition and seems to be in a situation where litt le 
choice is available if they are not prepared/ready to die. But the 
scientific medical model is able to offer this patient a choice: 
the removal of the old heart and its replacement with a new. Both 
"good" and "bad" news is discussed with the patient, all options and 
alternatives are thoroughly searched. The patient is told that the 
new heart may work or it may fa il. He/she is told he/she may die on 
the oper"ti~s tobl~ because of the seriousness of such an operation 
He/she is to ld he/she should expect to feel very ill during the 
recovery period, etc. All of these areas are discussed i n an open 
forum which includes the meaning structures of all parties involved 
in the interactional arena: the patient, the doctor, wives, 
husbands , children etc., and a decision is made which can be 
conceived of in what might be called truly humanist terms. 
E. Friedman (1986) notes that even under these circumstances there 
are still very many problems which impinge upon ethical areas of a 
different nature. For instance, the questions which are asked of 
the recipient automatically seem to assume that the quality of life 
will be better after a heart transplant. Friedman notes that this 
is not always the case because quality of life is not easily 
measured due to its subjective parameters. She notes in this vein 
that many heart transplant rec ipients " ... are disabled primarily 
from the side effects of immuno-suppressant drugs, the most common 
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of which are decalcification of bones and secondary i nfection" 
(1986:116). 
Another major problem noted by Friedman is recipient selection and 
she asks who should make the deci s ions in this regard and with what 
criteria? Friedman argues that decisions in the area of transplant 
recipient selection - as experimentation moves into the realms of 
clinical practice - wi l l have to be "standardised" if they are to 
succeed in terms of choosing the best patient in relation to a 
successful recovery. In terms of the humanist perspective, to 
standardise is, however, not to set in terms of finality (as 
Friedman appears to advocate) because what "success" is and who the 
"best" patient is is not so clear-cut. As noted earlier in section 
5.6 above, patients do not always re act in the way in which the 
medical profession expect, or indeed, they themselves expect to 
react. Therefore, seen in terms of symbolic mediation the criteria 
for a standardisation of recipient selection does not make sense 
because it is open to negotiation in terms of the "good" and "bad" 
news of various options concerning recipient suitability. 
Humanistically taken decisions are made on the basis of a choice 
between options at a certain moment in time. Humanism makes note 
that choice, as a hypothesis or tentative agreement, denotes the 
precarious nature of symbolic reality. Human decisions are thereby 
precariously tinged with a non-finality which calls for continuous 
ongoing debate and reconsideration. In this regard it may be that 
the patient whom the doctor thought could handle such a serious 
operation may not handle it well after all. The family who appeared 
confident may crumble under the strain and trauma of seeing a loved 
one in such distress. The scientific regime may fail the patient, 
i.e a heart may not become available in time and the patient dies 
anyway. Whatever the outcome, the strength of the humanist 
perspective lies in the fact that decisionmaking is a shared 
experience which, in relying upon the intersubjective participatory 
aspects of negotiational communication, engenders the possibility 
for all to take part in real choicemaking. 
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This is what Berger means when he speaks of the basic human right . 
which should provide moral imperatives for policy decisions, or 
otherwise stated, a justification in terms of moral rather than 
technical necessity. In case 3 there was definitely a technical 
necessity involved - the patient would die if the new heart was not 
implanted. But the justification for placing on the agenda all 
"good" and "bad" news relative to the situation (even in this case 
where the patient seems to have little choice, except to choose to 
die) is according to humanism, that to be morally correct the 
patient should be meaningfully involved and not scientifically 
"pressed" . 
Otherwise what happens is that the technical approach, as an 
ideological approach, rules the day, and further more as Romm noted 
in section 5.9.4 of this chapter "operates behind our backs". 
People are no longer in control of people's interests - the ideology 
or the technology is . This can be argued to mean that people are no 
longer in charge of their own welfare, the technological medical 
model is. Cornie Alant has something to say about this area of 
medical ethics and it is to his work that this chapter finally 
turns. 
5.13 CORNIE ALANT'S THEORY IN RELATION TO MEDICAL ETHICS 
Cornie Alant maintains that people can only realise their true self, 
" . .. insofar as [they] have a choice, or ... insofar as [they] actively 
participate in contributing to [their] own welfare" (1990 :132). In 
terms of the argument put forward here, this means that people 
should be offered the choice of alternatives rather than being 
presented with only the "good" news of science which appears 
unquestionable. According to Alant this type of "good" news relates 
not to active contribution on the part of peop~e but upon their 
passive acceptance of given scientific truth. In this respect he 
argues that we have all become slaves of the technological society 
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which "produces" us. Concerning medicine he suggests that this is a 
myth of professionalism because it: 
... predefines the attitudes and conduct of pat ients, [in that] 
they swallow pills unconditionally, or let themse l ves be cut up 
without questioning the decision of the surgeon, because 
health ... has become a technological matter - for experts only. 
This kind of elitism denotes health care to a mechanism of 
alienation whereby society loses its creative imput (1990:132). 
In arguing for a medical profession which stresses the level of 
consciousness, Alant calls for people to act with an awareness of 
the physical and clinical effects of treatment, as well as being 
aware of the influence which the so called treatment can have upon 
the total self-conception and construction of reality of patients. 
He argues that if this does not happen, then medicine may become an 
indicator of dehumanisation because it just may lose sight of its 
hermeneutic existence. Alant draws upon Alvin Goul~ner's definition 
of hermeneutic existence as the idea that every interpretation is 
mediated by consciousness, in other words through people's 
interpretative faculties. Therefore, anything less, would in terms 
of humanism denote an alienated existence . 
5.14 A HUMANIST ROUND-UP 
For the argument which has been put forward here, to lose sight of 
our hermeneutic existence relates to medical science as having the 
only right answers to human illness. But as noted in section 5.13 
of this chapter, if this happens then technology controls people, 
rather than the other way around. In this respect Alant suggests 
that concerning the medical institution and its application of an 
ethical code, this idea of interpretating in "right" terms can be 
argued to uphold not only the institution's belief that it has the 
only right answers to health and illness, but that these right 
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answers should be accepted as irrefutable because they are backed by 
scientific provability. 
Furthermore, it is noted by A. Buchanan (1985) that ethics in these 
terms i s untenable if it fails to reflect critically upon the 
presuppositions which underlie its approach. He notes : "The 
adoption of ... purely technical notions of efficiency that 
prevail .. . rest upon controversial [in humanist terms] moral 
assumptions" (1985:2). For the humanist, this controversy can only 
be answered when people are involved in its initial defining . 
This thesis, in arguing that there can be no right answers to 
illness in humanist terms, points to the problem inherent in 
believing that "right" can be rendered without presuppostion. 
Science presupposes its irrefutability and this means that the human 
element of choice is not made available because the "good" news of 
its right answers do not offer alternative options . 
But humanism argues that this is not the case. Medicine, like al l 
the other institutions in society, functions through what can be 
called a co-authorship involving a co-responsibil i ty towards others 
who co-inhabit the world . Social reality in terms of a meaningful 
human reality, has to be seen as revisable and therefore to 
recognise discourse as an integral part of living . Idealised 
"dogma" has a closing off effect which is dehuman i sing; whilst 
symbolic negotiational participation contains an invitat i on of 
openness and an inherent potential to be more . 
Therefore contemporary medicine has to involve the true meaning 
structures of the people it is there to serve, and this means not 
just providing patient answers from a set agenda (or policy) of 
predefined, reified meanings, but by offering real choices between 
the alternatives of "good" and "bad" options. True choice involves 
All meanings, All options and All alternatives, even if they do not 
-174-
seem so attractive, because it is only in this way that medicine can 
hope to reinstate and retain the humane element within its 
framework. 
5.15 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to use the concept of 
medical ethics, to highlight the complex interplay between people 
and the institution of medicine. The historical concerns of medical 
ethics were shown to have changed from a concept which was subsumed 
under theology and supernatural power, to a contemporary concept 
which in itself seems to provide the answers to human life and death 
situations. 
The theory of Jurgen Habermas was utilised to highlight the humanist 
argument in terms of distorted communication leading to distorted 
intersubjectivity. It was shown in this respect that medical 
personnel sometimes invoke their superior elitist position to 
provide only the "good" news of various situations which in turn, 
leads to a suppression of voices and a blocking of discourse. This 
argument was then linked to various ethical debates within society 
and an attempt was made to show where and how the humanist tradition 
might provide a more humane way of "seeing" medical ethics in human 
terms. 
Finally Alant was read to indicate that this more humane way of 
"seeing" actually provides for the well-being and welfare of people 
because only through involvement, in making choices in the light of 
various alternatives, can people realise their true self - a self 
which is always in the process of becoming. 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: Synopsis and recommendation 
In this thesis entitled, Illness as intersubjectivity: a 
sociological perspective, the hypothesis that the scientific 
mechanistic medical model - by adhering to reductionist technology -
is unable to facilitate the personal ongoing meaningmaking necessary 
for intersubjective living, was searched. The ideal of continuous 
intersubjective interaction was shown to form the bedrock of the 
humanist tradition and to be derived from the belief that human 
life, to be meaningful, can only become understandable in terms of 
an experiential nature. 
The term "intersubjective living" was indicated to mean that the 
lifeworld of people is a shared reality which promotes a style of 
living which is not private, but is ongoingly "fashioned" by people 
through the experiential creative process of interaction. This was 
shown to mean that people take cognisance of their own position 
within reality and at the same time acknowledge that other's do the 
same. In taking as its starting point the idea that people 
construct a social reality which is meaningful to them, 
intersubjective living was indicated to suggest that all 
understanding of meaning is inherently linked to choice making, and 
to the taking account of alternatives and options which present in 
interaction. It was argued that for anything to be "known" by 
people, understanding has to involve the human consciousness through 
an experiential taking part therein. Therefore, in humanist terms, 
meanings within the human lifeworld are not "given", they 
experientially evolve through a process of participation. 
In chapter 1, a narrative account of intersubjectivity was built-up 
using three sociological perspectives. The perspectives utilised 
were: systems perspective, conflict perspective and humanism. Three 
author's defined as systems theorists were read: Emile Durkheim, 
Talcott Parsons and Jeffrey Alexander. 
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These three author's theories were shown to indicate that 
intersubjectivity in humanist terms is not apparent within the 
systems perspective, and that the only indication of interaction in 
terms of a 'shared" intersubjective reality is through what the 
thesis defines as 'consensual overl ap·. Within the confl ict 
perspective, the work of Karl Marx, Ralf Dahrendorf and Jurgen 
Habermas was read. Here, in the case of Marx and Dahrendorf, it was 
noted that the conflictual nature of social reality is related to 
class differentation and role authority. It was argued that where 
interaction takes place within the conflict perspective, it does so 
within the confines of either class or role prescription rather than 
an ongoing dialogical process of interpretation and negotiation. 
This was shown to mean that alternative viewpoints are not 
recognised as expressions of meaning which lead to a meaningful 
social reality in humanist terms, but rather, the expression of 
roles. Therefore humanist intersubjectivity does not present 
because choice is mediated by class and role interests. 
Conversely Habermas's critical Marxist stance was indicated to 
incorporate the phenomological bent for meaningmaking by showing 
that communicative action is able to take account of varying 
viewpoints in the world. Habermas was noted to indicate that when 
these varying viewpoints are stifled by the power mediums operating 
in society (as with the oppression of Marxist class differentials 
and Dahrendorf's dominantion/subjection within roles), then a form 
of distorted communication is operating which leads to a distortion 
of intersubjectivity. Habermas's theory, therefore, forms the 
springboard for the thesis' entry into humanism. 
Finally the theories of two humanistically defined authors were read 
in order to lay the foundations for chapter 2 which considers the 
work of contemporary humanist theorists within the humanist 
t·,·ddiLion. I" i;i,i$ respect the Symbolic Interactionist theory of 
George Herbert Mead was utilised to define humanist social reality 
as symbolic, and the theory of Alfred Schutz took up the idea that 
social reality in humanist terms, is a reality of interpretation. 
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There followed a comprehensive exposition of humanist theory in 
Chapter 2. The chapter began with a resume of the humanist 
tradition, building what can be termed a "flavour" of the ideals of 
humanism: that society is meaningful, that social reality relies 
upon human participation and that human life functions dialogically. 
The theories of variously defined humanist authors were thereafter 
utilised to highlight how these concepts fit into the conceptual 
framework of the humanist perspective. The work of inter alia, 
Peter Berger, Richard Brown, Jean-Paul Sartre, Cornie Alant and 
Norma Romm were interlinked with the theories of George Herbert Mead 
and Alfred Schutz (from chapter I), to form a narrative account of 
intersubjective living as defined by humanist thinkers . 
In chapter 3 the argument for the medical model seen in terms of a 
scientific reductionist regime was laid down. The roots of this 
mechanistic medical model were historically located and then brought 
up to date to highlight the "form" of contemporary medicine in terms 
of the thesis definition . To augment this debate, various authors 
from the theory chapter (chapter 2) were re-read to indicate that 
scientific contemporary medicine is mechanistic rather than humane, 
and through its el itist professional knowledge, has successfully 
colonised people's meaning structures through an infiltration of 
human consciousness. This was shown to mean that medicine operates 
in conflictual terms: both as an institution of care and control. 
In chapter 4, the juxtaposed positions of the scientific medical 
model and the humanist tradition were brought face-to-face. In this 
way the areas of conflictual "belief" structures were shown to be at 
variance with humanism's ideal of meaningful worldconstruction. The 
theorists previously identified within the humanist sociological 
literature were utilised to highlight the colonisation of people's 
meaning structures, and to show that: a) the medical models 
infiltration into human consciousness does flot provide for 
intersubjective living and b) that it achieves its autonomy - its 
scientific irrefutability - at the expense of human participation. 
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In chapter 5 the concept of medical ethics was discussed in terms of 
variously defined areas within the field of medicine. The concepts 
of confidentiality, accountability, shared knowledge and 
participation were related to various topical ethical debates within 
contemporary medicine. The work of earlier defined humanist authors 
was drawn through the ethical considerations taken up, and an 
indication was made at various points to highlight how the medical 
model might successfully reinstate the humanist ideals of choice, 
dialogue, creativity and construction of a meaningful life world 
into its scientific framework. If this has been achieved, the study 
will have successfully introduced "real" choice into medicine by 
providing for health, illness, and treatment to be seen in 
intersubjective terms: not in terms of "given", unquestionable 
facts, but rather in terms of a "healthy" (humanist) 
reconsideration. 
Recommendation 
In this thesis the humanist tradition, and in particular the concept 
of intersubjectivity therein, was theoretically applied to· the so 
called scientific medical model. This study was undertaken in order 
to test the hypothesis: 
That the scientific mechanistic medical model (with its 
adherence to reductionist technology), is unable to facilitate 
the personal ongoing meaningmaking and worldconstruction 
necessary for intersubjective living and healing. 
The concept of intersubjectivity was systematically applied to 
various areas within medicine and suggestions were proffered as to 
how the medical framework might become more humane if scientific 
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medicine were to incorporate the human potention for experiential 
participation in the defining of heal th, illness and treatment 
regimes. 
It seems natural, having laid the foundations for human i st 
methodology and research in this work, to proceed to "test" the 
methodological relevance and accountability of humanism "in the 
field". With this in mind it may prove pertinent to embark upon a 
practical comprehensive study/search for intersubjectivity in 
medical practice . Such an empirical study would be based on the 
critical reflexive epistemological tradition and brought to fruition 
through the methodological conception of intervention research. In 
this way it should prove possible to draw some kind of parallel 
between theoretical positions concerning scientific medicine, and 
the position of humanist theory seen as a radical alternative . 
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 5 
1. The decision of whether to sustain life on a life support 
machine, or to continue life through the use of this aparatus, has 
been removed from the personal decisionmaking arena of medical 
staff. In other words there now exists a procedure which involves 
various medical personnel. No longer is to sustain or continue life 
support linked to the beating of a heart, but to the procedural 
process of "brain death". Various tests are carried out at set 
intervals, over the course of 24 hours, to determine how much brain 
and muscle function remains within the body. Below a certain 
reading, even when the heart continues to beat, a person is 
considered to have died and life support is either denied or 
withdrawn. 
2. Decisiontaking can be handed over from patient to doctor by the 
signing of what is known as a "form of consent". The patients who 
sign such a form relinquishes their own autonomy over their health 
and treatment and in so doing empower a doctor to make whatever 
decisions may be deemed necessary for the good of their (the 
patient's health). This "contract" is entered into by both parties 
under terms of fidelity and faithfulness. This means that both 
parties are bound a) for the good of the patient and his/her health, 
and b) for the doctor and his/her profession. There is little doubt 
that this is the case. No physician would abuse such a contract. 
Even in humanist terms, as long as all options and alternatives were 
made quite clear to the patient and the patient made the choice to 
sign a "form of consent" from a platform of full knowledge of what 
this means, then this type of decision is and must be considered 
meaningful in human terms. 
3. From a humanist point of view, any decision made in a 
nonparticipatory way is "wrong". 
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